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Editorial

When we first thought of doing this special issue on *Globalisation*, we thought it would be a topic on which everyone would have something to say. After all, is Globalisation not the form in which capital is supposed to be the most pervasive in its influence, with claims to subsume everything, even its discontents? Is it not when it is supposed to have penetrated the farthest reaches so long inaccessible to it? And, we were right, at least in the response we got. We have never had quite such a flood of contributions. And this has enabled us to represent diverse areas of the South much better than ever before in this e-magazine. The editorial team of *Global South* wishes to thank all the contributors for their overwhelming response. But, the very same flood also calls for an apology, as many articles and other contributions could not be accommodated in this issue. We promise that we will publish some of the material in the next issue. And this is not just because of the number of pieces (and their quality) that we have. This is also to do justice to the theme of Globalisation.

This issue will try, as the reader will see, to present varying perspectives on Globalisation, both in terms of geographic and other positions. And perhaps that is the only way that we can try to unravel the story of globalisation a little bit further, by localising it: Trying to look at all possible angles. This look at globalisation from various perspective positions is indeed very important. For, globalisation's efficacy resides not only in its spread but also in the very localised nature of its variegated influence. And this, in turn, creates new forms of its operation— new structures which are oppressive and constitutive of who we are, in the South. It could, for instance, allow an interesting reading of David Harvey's arguments about uneven development, or of how capital transfers its (constitutive) anxiety of the finitude of space by finding newer spaces (the colonies earlier, the South now), in time (in backward/primitive climes) or in the infinitude of cyberspace, where also parts of the South are often the major locus. It might even help us better ask the question, if not answer it, the one Michael Harvey and Antonio Negri asked with such eloquence— why does the triumphant march of capital make the 'Nation' an increasingly valid code, even of resistance?

Much work remains to be done on all these fronts. This is just our little (first) effort in this direction.

Prasenjit Maiti, in the first article of this issue, deals with globalisation at its own declared level— the global, and traces its growth and development in the context of both the global and the historical. It also seeks to understand the variegated impact globalisation has had and the various ways people have tried to negotiate with it. Kingsley Awang Ollong takes up the case of Africa and the impact of trade and Foreign Direct Investments in the Continent. In doing so, he maps how this part of the South keeps falling behind further and further out of the purported benefits of globalisation and also prescribes ways in which the continent can also become beneficiaries of the process. Ingrid Suarez has a tantalising story to tell. She takes on the oft-repeated and never questioned notions of households headed by females to be invariably poorer and punctures this simplistic understanding in this case study in Southern Mexico.

Anna Christie K. Villarba-Torres deals with the complex issues involved in the representation of the Igorot in contemporary Philippines. She shows, through the complex interaction of media, tourism and politics how new modes and techniques of representation have opened up the plays of power, authority and representation that were hidden from site by dominant discursive and representation practices. In an exploration of an area rarely, if ever, thought about, Saumitra Basu and Prabir Kr. Das deal with the fate of the elderly in India after Globalisation. And in doing so, they expose the falsehood of the 'human face' of globalisation by showing what the globalisation regime does to the most marginalised and 'helpless'.

In the *Across the South* section, the first presentation is a conference report by Shruti Tambe. Here, she deals with a conference on another group of the most marginalised: The 'De-Notified Tribes' of India, and shows how the successive (state, market etc.) systems have done practically nothing to ameliorate their condition. Yu Hou demonstrates the double dangers involved, of environmental hazards and social conflicts, in the unbridled growth of industries in rural areas of China without proper environmental precautions. In another report, G. Palanithurai and R. Ramesh write about a conference on the debilitating, and indeed disastrous, consequences of Globalisation on the rural poor, who are doubly disenfranchised by being both poor and rural.

In the *Book Reviews* section, Jacklyn Cock reviews a book by Edward Webster, Rob Lambert and Andries Bezuidenhout, in which they seek to ground globalisation by removing it from the realm of abstract 'high' theory and placing it in the realm of lived experiences, particularly of an increasingly insecure labour force. Mahmudul Sumon, reviews a book edited by Jonathon Xavier Inda on how our modern subjectivities, even, or perhaps particularly, in the age of globalisation, are constructed by notions and practices of governmentality. From the review it is clear that the book is one of the most important interventions in the application of Foucault's notions to the South. Sati U. Fawtshak reviews Paul Collier's work on how the poorest keep getting poorer under the aegis of globalisation, thus again exposing the falsehood of the promise of global development that globalisation holds out, as so many of the authors of this issue demonstrate.

We hope this issue will provoke a lot of thought, if not debates, as many of the pieces do not merely describe and/analyse the situation(s), but also talk about ways to deal with them.

Articles

Negotiating Globalisation¹

Prasenjit Maiti

Prasenjit Maiti presently teaches at the Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Business Management (Public Systems Management and Human Resource Management Departments). He was recently a Guest Professor at the University of Southern Denmark. Dr. Maiti has written three books till date on the problems of governance, development and ethics. He has also edited Volumes on Social Capital, Rural / Urban Development and Environment. His latest Edited Volume was on the Puzzles of Development.

Abstract

This article seeks to explore issues thrown up by Globalisation- its problems and opportunities, freedoms and requirements. It is both a descriptive and a prescriptive exercise.

Introduction: The Problem

The idea of human freedom is essentially rooted in the concept of human development, according to Amartya Sen's *Development as Freedom* thesis (that outlines an entitlement to capacity-building process). And the idea of human progress is a construct that is designed around the axis of freedom. What is freedom? Is it only lack of societal constraint, withdrawal of discipline and punishment, willing suspension of the panoptic Super Ego that they address as the "mainstream"? Or is freedom a concept much more fundamental, to be read into the texts of Rabindranath Tagore, Roman Rolland or even Thoreau?

Sociologists claim that civilisation is what we are and culture is merely an arrangement of artifacts that we happen to use during the course of our politics in everyday life. But then, civilisation is also a system of values that is handed down over generations as a movement of socialisation that laymen identify as "progress".

Negotiating Globalisation

Contemporary state systems guided by the dynamics of globalisation are like so many Januses- the phenomenon assumes a most robust character in the developed North but an almost impotent identity in the developing or still underdeveloped South. So globalisation necessitates a dialogue between the rich and the poor outside its essentialist assumptions of an uneven power discourse as conditions of Good Governance and Structural Adjustment Programs become essential markers of most Third World postcolonial democracies today.

While there are contentions that aggressive market forces make it difficult for welfarist governments to protect their citizens from transnational actors that are as elusive as their hot money, there are also counter-arguments that institutions like the International Monetary Fund or the World Trade Organization actually safeguard citizens from the administrative limitations of their respective national governments. There appears to be a consensus, however, that powerful markets tend to undermine political elites at home.

¹ An earlier version of this article was published on www.boloji.com. It is republished here with the kind permission of the editor, Rajender Krishan.

Global Village

John Echeverri-Gent has pointed out that if globalisation, on the one hand, facilitates decentralisation then, on the other, it also helps develop pockets of dynamic Free Trade Areas in large developing countries like China and India by reorganising their economic geography, Foreign Direct Investment and global commodity chains. This process, however, creates large hinterlands of economic backwardness and entrenches economic inequality within the developing South. Globalisation, therefore, intensifies regional disparities in the Third World. John Rapley has found that Structural Adjustment Programs have varied widely in the results that they have yielded. While Latin America has partially benefited from structural adjustment, Africa has not. Rapley has also argued that Rolling Back the State- that is less government as an imperative of contemporary globalisation- does not always lead to enhanced economic growth.

Globalisation, therefore, would appear to be an open-ended journey towards a globalised world order whose weightless economy may be described as one that defies both national and international borders so far as economic transactions are concerned. This is a situation where freight charges are nil and trade/tariff barriers would disappear. Such a pilgrim's progress, however, is nothing new. Technological innovations during the past five centuries have steadily helped integrate the global community into an emergent global civil society. Transatlantic communications have developed from sailing boats to steamships, to the telegraph, the telephone, the commercial aircraft and now the Internet where even nationalism as a conventional political ideology has been reduced to "banal nationalism".

State and Civil Society

Liberal democratic régimes like India or even the U.S. can only be politically successful, deliver the common good and thereby continue in power in a more stable (read pro-people) manner if they are able to correctly read the obtainable ground realities and problems thereof. These problems are more or less popular in nature, and have a

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propensity to develop into discontent of the ruled actors against their ruling institutions. So the actors in power have to continuously shuffle and delicately balance priorities of human development, well-being and accessible freedoms like the ever-important agenda of human rights and civil liberties, a responsive and responsible administrative machinery, transparency at all levels of public expenditures and domestic and international peacekeeping projects rather than playing mutually harmful "spy versus spy" games.

Subrata K. Mitra, a political scientist by profession, has quite rightly cautioned that, "If the wielders of power concede the point to those who challenge established values and norms, they risk losing their legitimacy. On the other hand, the failure to give satisfaction to the discontented might deepen their sense of outrage and alienation which can further reduce their legitimacy."

Powers-that-be ("Cabinets or Foreign Offices") will do well to continually redress grievances of political actors at the grassroots in a political manner by establishing and ably handling pro-people institutions. Only then organic identification would bind actors with institutions – only then the incipient involvement noticed at the level of "actors and institutions" would, arguably enough, transcend itself to the level of "actors in institutions", consolidating both the level and the quality of progress of freedom in the process.

Progress and Development: The Eternal Duo

But how can progress be distinguished from "development", if at all? A most prominent item on today's humanitarian global agenda, apart from mantras like good governance, social capital, neo-liberal communitarianism, grassroots empowerment, civil societal capacity-building and gender sensitisation, is certainly the notion of sustainable development. This has become almost a catchword of sorts in the Third World, decolonised nation-states that are more or less grappling to muster a political system around pluralistic identities of nationhood enmeshed in ethnicity, language, religion, region and mutual distrust. It is almost as if "softy states" are hanging loose and can only be brought back on to the fast track of development by way of external intervention and advocacy on the part of the Eurocentric West.

Development, it may be appreciated at this point, is not anything extrinsic like politics imposed from the above without any regard whatsoever to the end-users of limited political resources. Actors who are supposed to interface with their very own institutions are nearly always more comfortable if left alone with the material conditions of daily life that breed organic ethos of community existence. This is where the colonial masters went wrong in Asia, Africa and South America when they bled the

colonies white and left behind a legacy of comprador bourgeois and crony capitalism that, in turn, fostered a repressive state apparatus and a perverted anti-people bureaucratic managerial state system that was not only anti-people but was also occasionally anti-progress.

What Richard Cobden implies by "*Cabinets or Foreign Offices*" is actually this mechanistic attitude of the political elite (in capitalist systems) and party leadership (in socialist societies) that are smug in the cocoon of their mistaken convictions that people at the top echelons of power, authority and influence have necessarily a working knowledge of "the greatest good for the greatest number". This is not a utilitarian or even a welfarist state approach – it is actually self-defeating as amply evidenced in the erstwhile U.S.S.R. where an insane arms and space race with the United States (incidentally the only country in the entire world to have actually materially gained from the First and Second World Wars with minimum military casualties) led the once powerful communist country to a more or less incredible situation of mind-boggling bankruptcy.

Military hardware and nuclear weapons were being manufactured at the cost of basic consumer requirements like bread, potatoes and vodka, following Stalin's rhetoric of an entire generation making sacrifices (read being purged if found to be politically incorrect) for the cause of a better Russia of the future. Moscow's huge and sprawling department store G.U.M. was always nearly empty while the party's top brass were running around in their imported limousines, shopping in dollar shops selling Swiss chocolates and watches, Scotch whisky, French champagne and perfumes. Add rampant corruption and repression to accept a second-hand political ideology not originating from ground realities of the people and you have ideal recipes for killing fields like the infamous Prague Spring.

Back to Basics: Public Action Enterprises

We are reminded of Mohammad Yunus of Bangladesh in this respect – the 'magician' of the *Grameen Bank* ("rural bank") microcredit revolution who even hugely impressed Hilary Rodham Clinton. What Professor Yunus still does is amazingly simple – he organises self-help groups in the manner of cooperatives and tries to make them economically self-reliant in areas as humble as poultry, weaving, dairy and even small-scale production. But when such cottage industries are linked ("forward and backward integration") in the larger context of market forces they become formidable in their control of the overall agrarian and even the urban economy. Peasant women in Bangladesh carry mobile telephones to communicate with distant markets, distributors and dealers! This may sound incredible but it is true nevertheless,

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proving the validity of Cobden's observation.

Operation Flood in Anand (Gujarat, India) and the Lijjat and Kissan enterprises are other such brilliant instances of people working toward their common good (based on innovative techniques like outsourcing of manpower and material resources, subcontracting or leasing of plant and machinery, breaking down the production process to delimit financial risk liability ventures somewhat akin to Adam Smith's exposition of the division of labour dynamics) without any outside intervention whatsoever. One must remember that neither India nor Bangladesh tends to practice authoritarian régime maintenance. What was possible once in Beijing's Tiananmen Square when the People's Liberation Army crushed pro-reform students under tanks and armored carriers is unimaginable in either India or Bangladesh (that secured its liberation in 1971 by way of Indian military cooperation). So democracy is an essential requirement if "the progress of freedom" is to continue unabated.

Voice of the People: Evolution of Democratic Policy Prescriptions

By democracy we ordinarily mean popular authority or rule. As made popular by Jean Jacques Rousseau, one of the ideologues of the French Enlightenment (that effectively altered the course of European history by beginning the disintegration process of the medieval and feudalistic Age of Empires), the voice of God is heard in the voice of the People. This was a far cry from the autocratic self-styled pronouncement of French king Louis XIV— "I am the State". It was no wonder that his grandson Louis XVI's wife Marie Antoinette (later sentenced to die to rather unceremoniously at the guillotine) had once expressed her wonder in such a naive fashion on hearing about the simmering discontent among the Parisian mob standing in endless queues or bread lines and more often than not starting violent riots among themselves— "If they cannot eat bread why don't they eat cake!"

This vulgar ignorance of the ruled on the part of their rulers is rather inimical to democracy. But we must remember that democracy as dynamic capacity-building agency in the post 9/11 world has all of a sudden underscored its long-ignored extrinsic quality. Democracy is not really insular, stretching from the East Coast to the West Coast of the U.S. If the notion of external sovereignty has suffered quite extensively since the height of the Cold War when the world was almost vertically divided into the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries (save the NAM states led by Nehru, Nasser and Tito), the idea of external democracy has gained much popular and diplomatic acceptance.

Simply put, powerful nations can no longer ignore internal human rights or civil rights agendas vis-à-vis world public opinion. But this is what the U.S. is consistently trying to follow as

its most shortsighted foreign policy since the Malta Summit Conference when President George Bush Senior and CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev officially declared the end of the Cold War, a historic event that even prompted Francis Fukuyama to write a banal work on the end of history and the last man.

Since the days of its Nineteenth Century isolationist Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. has put up apparently impregnable walls around itself that could not be dismantled even during the Marshall Plan for the Reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War or establishment of first the League of Nations (as an initiative of President Woodrow Wilson's historic Atlantic Charter) and then the U.N.O., the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and now the omnipotent World Trade Organization that apparently dictates the movements of a new spectre of the new millennium, namely Globalisation.

The U.S. foreign policy has always been designed on lines of "muddle and meddle"— Vietnam, Korea, Bay of Pigs, Iran Contra scandal, Afghanistan and now Iraq. The country boasts of democracy and swears by it, boiling with righteous motivation to export Yankee democracy around the underdeveloped world, but has, however, classified the JFK assassination archives for no apparent reason whatsoever. Clandestine covert operations, the strategic defense initiative (Star Wars), research in biological and chemical weapons— you name it and you would find the dirty trick invariably up America's (read the CIA and FBI's) sleeves. In fact, it is the only nation to date that has used atomic weapons during a war, destroying Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the process to avenge the Pearl Harbour attack and crippling generations of Japanese children long after the holocaust as a result of toxic radioactive radiation carried forward genetically by succeeding generations.

Since the Gulf War fought by Senior Bush as the much-hyped Operation Desert Storm so graphically shown on CNN across millions of idiot boxes around the world, nobody knows exactly how many innocent Iraqi children have died from malnutrition, disease and hunger due to the U.S.-imposed and U.N.O.-condoned sanctions against Iraq. The U.S. condemns Osama bin Laden but should actively engage in soul-searching regarding its own virulent international terrorist status in our contemporary unipolar world where might is right in a Hobbesian state of affairs where human life, property and security are all indeed "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, short". The U.S., in brief, should radically reorient its foreign policy to address the dignity of human life and internal sovereignty of nation states around the world.

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Africa in the Global Economy



Kingsly Awang Ollong

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He aims to specialise in Business History after his Ph.D. programme.

Abstract

This paper examines the changing economic environment under globalisation and reviews issues pertaining to international trade and capital flows. It places emphasis on the trends, issues, and arguments about regional trade arrangements and foreign direct investment (FDI) on the ground that these would be the key for Africa in its strategy to link itself to the global economy. The paper discusses the marginalisation of Africa in the rapidly integrating global economy and its possible explanations. It is shown that industrial countries have been wide open to Africa's exports relative to those from other regions, and that the problem lies on the part of Africa in its restrictive domestic as well as import (openness) and export policies. The paper considers strategies for linking Africa to a changing world moving into the twenty first century. Necessary reforms on the part of the African economies and initiatives that industrialised countries and multilateral institutions such as the WTO and the World Bank can take are enumerated.

Introduction

During the last decade of the twentieth century, 'Globalisation' has been the name of the game throughout the world economy. Globalisation, defined as the integration of production, distribution, and use of goods and services among the economies of the world, has been manifested at a factor level in the increasing flows of capital and labour, and at the product level in resounding growth in world trade above and beyond the growth of world output. In the last decade, international trade in goods and services has grown twice as fast as global output. In the same period, developing countries as a whole have increasingly assumed a larger role in world trade with their share climbing from twenty three to almost thirty percent. Developing regions claimed thirty percent of global FDI stock in 1997.

The relocation and integration of production processes across national borders has been reinforced by increasing flows of private capital, especially in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI), which is often associated with global production strategies of multinational enterprises (MNEs). Technological progress that reduces the cost of transportation, communications, and financial transactions, coupled with declining trade barriers, has enlarged opportunities for anyone searching for less costly production bases for exports and for spot production for local markets.

From the point of view of the recipients, capital inflows enlarge import capacity above and beyond export earnings for a certain period. If inflows are used to increase domestic supply capacity and augment international competitiveness, countries are rewarded with higher productivity growth and export earnings, which preserves their import capacity in the longer run, thus creating a virtuous cycle of high growth and trade integration.

One of the main features of the recent wave of globalisation is a visible involvement of MNEs in both trade and financial transactions. According to U.N. statistics, total sales of MNEs' overseas subsidiaries surpassed the value of world trade in goods and non-factor services by over twenty five percent in 1993¹, and currently, more than two-thirds of world trade is carried out between MNEs and their overseas subsidiaries. About half of these trade transactions are intra-firm in nature.

Another key feature of the current globalisation is a rapid expansion in service trade. Due to the revolution in information technology (IT) and declining transportation costs, service-supplying enterprises and service-demanding consumers engage more and more in cross-border transactions. The successful completion of the GATT Uruguay Round underpins the heightened prospects for further integration by improving market access and securing a conducive environment. As a World

1 United Nations, *World Investment Report: Overview*, United Nations, Geneva, 1996.

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Bank report summarises, the Uruguay Round achievements are: Greater than one-third average reduction of tariffs on manufactures; major scaling back of non-tariff barriers with the abolition of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement and voluntary export restraints; extension of multi-lateral discipline to trade in agriculture and services; stronger and clearer rules, standards, and dispute settlement procedures; and strengthening of the trading system through the creation of the World Trade Organization.² The WTO Millennium Round will cover trade in agricultural products and services among other things. These are the areas that could bring real opportunities to developing countries, including those in Africa.

A visible resurgence in regional integration agreements in the 1990s should be carefully analysed given the failures of similar past initiatives. The WTO should also redefine its attitude and possibly make new rules with respect to regional trading arrangements such as the free trade area that GATT Article XXIV originally governed. For the countries in the South, it remains an open-ended question whether the new regionalism, particularly the South-South arrangements widely seen in the African and Latin American continents in the 1990s, can serve as an entry point towards global integration.

As the crises of the 1990s such as the Mexican Peso crisis and the Asian financial crisis demonstrated, 'Globalisation' brings, alongside new opportunities for increased trade and external finances, new challenges of economic management in the face of discerning international investors.

Not only trade and financial regimes but also market institutions and political frameworks are often questioned. When moving toward globalisation, an abolition of market distortions, particularly bias against exports, is the imperative item on the government's to-do list for integration. Increasingly, mobile investment capital and the extension of global production networks at the hands of MNEs have accentuated the economic effects of agglomeration. Given an establishment of economies of scale in a certain industry in a certain country, latecomers to the game are placed at great disadvantage. Status quo means a gradual loss of ground in the world economy under globalisation. In this context, the failure in African economies to create an environment conducive to the private sector in general, and to the export sector and FDI capital in particular, throughout the 1980s, when other regions of the developing world were working to establish a virtuous cycle of integration and growth, explains Africa's current state of marginalisation in the global

economy.

This paper first reviews in section one, the changing economic environment under globalisation. Trends and issues in international trade and capital flows are reviewed. Particular attention is paid to the trends, issues, and arguments about regional trade arrangements and foreign direct investment (FDI) as these would be the key for Africa in its strategy to link itself to the global economy. In section two, the paper introduces and analyses the marginalisation of Africa in the rapidly integrating global economy. Possible explanations for this marginalisation are introduced.

It is shown that industrial countries have been wide open to Africa's exports relative to those from other regions, and that the problem lies on the part of Africa in its restrictive domestic as well as import (openness) and export policies.

Changing Economic Environment under Globalisation

Historical Background of Globalisation

Looking back from the turn of the century, one can say that there was a marked acceleration in world integration through trade in the mid-1980s, as is highly visible in Figure 1. As noted earlier, international trade in goods and services has grown more than twice as fast as global output on average since the mid-1980s. Similarly, we have observed a huge upsurge in cross-border capital flows from the developed to the developing countries since around 1990 (Figure 2). By relieving import capacity constraint on the part of the developing economies, these resource flows brought about an increased presence of the recipient economies, largely East Asian and Latin American countries, in world trade.

History has observed multiple surges in the process of globalisation through trade and financial services. For instance, the Mediterranean trade propelled by Phoenician merchants during the period of the sixteenth to the thirteenth centuries B.C., the East-West trade through the Silk Route developed during the eleventh century A.D., and the Age of Geographical Discovery during the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries propelled first by the desire of the western European economies to open the commerce of the Levant in order to circumvent the dominance of merchants from Venezia and Genova in the Mediterranean Sea, and then by the rise in Mercantilism that became prevalent toward the end of the sixteenth century and remained a dominant doctrine until the eighteenth century. In more recent history, one can recall the process of global integration from the late nineteenth century up through World War I,

² World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries 1996*, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1996.

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
often associated with the second upsurge of colonialism in modern European history, characterised by the colonisation of Africa, Asia and the Pacific by the Great Powers.

Two World Bank reports summarise the developments during this period and compare those with the recent wave of globalisation.³ Export volumes rose by 4.3 per cent per year in real terms during 1900-13 for thirty-two countries representing some four-fifths of world output, population and exports.⁴ Tariff levels were low, with many countries engaging in virtually free trade. The stock of foreign capital invested in developing countries (mostly in the form of FDI and public sector bonds) is estimated to have risen by 3.7 per cent per year in real terms. Further, international migration was scarcely restricted and migration flows were substantial. However, unlike the present, most investment was concentrated on infrastructure projects such as railroads and on the primary sector, not manufacturing. In present-day trade integration, the shares of manufactures, intra-industry trade, and service trade are higher. Also in contrast with the earlier situation, today capital flows, specifically FDIs, are channeled through MNEs. In addition, cross-border migration is much more restricted now.

Trends in International Trade Integration


A ratio of trade (exports plus imports of goods and services) to output (GDP) is one overall ex-post facto measure of trade integration. Speed of integration, defined as the difference between the growth rates of trade and of GDP, is the first order approximation of the rate of change in the trade/output ratio, and is commonly used to measure the pace of trade integration. World aggregate trade/output ratio more than doubled in the past thirty five years, from twenty per cent in 1960 to forty five per cent in 1996. During the same period, the ratio for developing countries increased from thirty one per cent in 1960 to fifty one per cent in 1996. The world speed of integration has not been constant during these years; there have been periods of rapid integration and stagnation (see Figure 3). Yet overall, except for periods of macro instability, the world has kept a positive pace of integration since 1950; that is, international trade has grown faster than output. In this context, the recent wave of globalisation may be seen as a mere evolution in the process of economic integration. Actually, for OECD economies, this recent upsurge in the speed of integration meant a revival in the trend of trade integration, which had been slowed by the macroeconomic instabilities and heightened non-tariff barriers in the nineteen seventies and early

nineteen eighties. Figure 3 reveals that for developing countries, however, the rising trend in trade integration that started in the mid nineteen eighties was a rather new phenomenon. In fact, more than three-quarters of the twenty per cent rise in developing countries' trade integration ratio (trade/GDP) since 1960 was observed only after the mid nineteen eighties. A series of reform and liberalisation efforts undertaken by developing countries in the past decade and a half represents an effective shift in development strategy from an inward-oriented import-substituting framework designed strategically to reduce dependence on the outer world, to an outward-oriented export-promoting framework designed to create a virtuous cycle of higher integration and faster growth with expanded opportunities. As far as developing countries are concerned, therefore, this upward link in the integration trend is a revolution that signifies a shift in development strategy.



Source: World Bank, *World Development Indicators*, World Bank, Washington D.C., 1999.

Figure 2: Net Resource Flows to Developing Countries, 1970-1998



Source: World Bank, *Global Development Finance*, World Bank, Washington D.C., 1999.

Together with the rapid spread of international production networks established via FDIs from MNEs (to be discussed in Section 2.3 and Section 2.5), a main feature of present-day trade integration is a rapid expansion in service trade. Thanks to the innovation in information technology (IT) and declining transportation costs, many professional services that were traditionally considered non-tradables have become tradable and are actively traded both through traditional international markets and

3 World Bank, *World Development Report, 1999/2000*, Oxford University Press for the World Bank, Oxford and the World Trade Organization, *Annual Report*, various issues, Geneva, 1999, p. 69.

4 A. Maddison, "The World Economy in the 20th Century", *OECD Development Center Studies*, OECD, Paris, 1989.

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through markets in cyberspace. Figure 4 illustrates the increasing shares of factor and non-factor services in the global transactions of goods and services. The majority of factor receipts are the returns on investment other than FDI (i.e. such as portfolio investment).


The Marginalisation of Africa

Trend—Marginalised and Delinked

Africa has been gradually but steadily marginalised in the rapidly globalising world economy ever since the last half of the twentieth century. The marginalisation of Africa is visible in its shares of exports and output in the world and in the developing community as shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4, respectively. Africa's share in global exports fell from 4.5 per cent in 1977 to two per cent in 1997 (in current dollar terms), in contrast with the fact that developing countries as a whole increased their presence in world trade. Figure 4 illustrates Africa's similarly sinking trade share in developing regions, from 15.5 per cent in 1981 to 9.2 per cent in 1997. Africa's trade share rapidly declined after the start of the current wave of globalisation when other regions of the world adopted integrative strategies while Africa continued to stay inward-looking. During the twenty year period up to the mid nineteen nineties, the growth rate of per capita income for the top one-third export performers among developing countries (average 10.2 per cent real rate of export growth) was positive 1.9 per cent. The growth rates for the middle one-third (3.5 per cent export growth) and the bottom one-third (-3.2 per cent) are negative 0.6 and negative 2.5 per cent respectively. On an average, exports worked as the engine for growth. Reflecting the marginalisation in world trade, Africa's output share in the world economy declined visibly from 3.1 per cent in 1980 to 1.5 per cent in 1996.⁵


Africa's share in global private capital flows also declined gradually up to the latter half of the nineteen eighties, from which time the speed of marginalisation in world investment accelerated visibly (Figure 3). With the collapse in oil prices in the first half of the nineteen eighties, FDI flows to Africa halted almost at once. Its share in the total FDI flows to developing countries in 1997 was 4.7 per cent as opposed to twenty three per cent in 1970. The only international economic dimension in which Africa has become non-marginal is aid.⁶ Africa now receives about forty per cent of total official net resource flows to the developing regions (Figure 5). The importance of aid flows is also visible in Figure 6, if the composition of resource inflows is considered in comparison with that for the entire developing community (Figure 2).

Figure 3: Africa's Declining Share of Exports and GDP in the World




Source: World Bank, *World Development Indicators*.

Figure 4: Africa's Declining Share of Exports and GDP in the Developing Countries




Source: Ibid.

Figure 5: Africa's Changing Shares in Resource Flows to the Developing Countries



Source: World Bank, *Global Development Finance*, World Bank, Washington D.C., 1999.

Figure 6: Net Resource Flows to Africa, 1970-1998



Source: World Bank, *Global Development Finance*.

Africa's trend of marginalisation in the global economy represents a process of delinking from the world economy. Figure 7 shows the annual average rate of changes in trade/GDP ratio for the regions of the world economy for the periods of 1975-84 and 1985-94. With the revolutionary shift in development strategy on the part of


5 Various World Investment reports. See www.unctad.org.

6 P. Collier, "The Marginalization of Africa", *International Labor Organization Review*, 134, 4-5, 1995.

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many developing countries noted earlier, the process of trade integration has accelerated since the mid nineteen eighties. In the second time period, East Asia accelerated its already high pace of integration, and Latin America, having overcome the debt crisis of the nineteen eighties, reversed the process of disintegration into that of integration. Although its pace of disintegration from the global economy has slowed, Sub-Saharan Africa has become the only developing region still in the process of delinkage. Collier⁷ also notes that since 1970, Sub-Saharan African GDP has risen more rapidly than its trade, while in contrast, trade has risen much more rapidly than GDP in Asia and Latin America over the same period. In addition, Coe and Hoffmaister⁸ confirm that African policy makers have generally been more skeptical about the value of opening up their economies, and the trade liberalisation that has taken place in Africa generally pales beside the sweeping trade reforms adopted during the past decade or so in many Latin American countries as well as in most of the former centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Figure 7: Changes in Trade/GDP Ratio (annual average rate)



Source: World Bank, *Database for Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries*, World Bank, Washington D.C., 1996.


In terms of the FDI/GDP ratio, the collapse of oil prices in the nineteen eighties contributed to the decline of FDI into oil-producing economies of the Middle East and Africa, as noted earlier. Furthermore, the ratio also declined for Sub-Saharan Africa if the comparison is made between 1981-83 and 1991-93. However, gradually turning this trend are recent FDI inflows to the following four countries: Tunisia; Morocco; and South Africa, thanks to the 'Association Agreements' with the EU (due to a heightened expectation for future exports to the Common Market); and Mauritius, thanks to phenomenal growth of its export processing zones (EPZs) (Figure 8). Nonetheless, as noted above, considered size-wise (\$ 7.6 billion net inflow in 1997), Africa's intake of global FDI has been marginalised.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 541- 557.

⁸ D. Coe and A. Hoffmaister, "North-South Trade: Is Africa Unusual?", *Journal of African Economies*, 8, 2, 1999, pp. 228-256.

⁹ The 4th ACP-EU Convention of Lome signed in Mauritius on 4 November 1995.

Figure 8: Gross FDI/GDP Ratio (period averages)



Source: World Bank, *Global Development Finance*.

Why is Africa Marginalised?

Many critics often cite a hostile global economic environment as a major factor in Africa's marginalisation in world trade. It is true that Africa, like many other primary commodity exporters, suffered from deterioration in terms of trade through the most part of the 1980s and 1990s.

However, it is also true that many former commodity-dependent exporters have grown out of that monoculture through rigorous investment in the agricultural sector that secured productivity growth and supported industrialisation and diversification of the trade structure. A more relevant question is: Has Africa been systematically forced to operate under a restrictive trade environment?

Preferences are given to most developing countries by most developed economies under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Furthermore, many GSP schemes offered even lower preferential tariffs to those designated as least developed countries (LDC) by the United Nations classification of developing communities. Of fifty three African countries, thirty two qualified for this treatment. They are Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia.

On top of the GSP, the EU offers more preferential access to sixty-eight African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) developing countries, which includes all Sub-Saharan countries under the Lomé Convention (Lomé 4).⁹ Under the trade provisions in the Convention, the majority of ACP exports are granted unrestricted access to the Common Market. (The current Convention is scheduled for renewal in the year 2000.)

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Ng and Yeats¹⁰ calculate the average margins that these tariff preferences provide Sub-Saharan Africa in the EU, United States, and Japan. With three OECD markets combined, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa enjoy preferential tariff margins of about one to 4.5 per cent relative to pre-Uruguay Round MFN tariffs. Looking at the three OECD regions separately, preference margins are highest in the EU market given trade provisions of the Lomé Convention, ranging from two to four percentage points (with an exception of Swaziland's 4.9 per cent). The preference margins in the U.S. and Japanese markets range from 0 to three per cent. With these computed figures, Ng and Yeats¹¹ conclude that there is no evidence that OECD tariffs caused the general loss of competitive position reflected in Africa's declining market shares. The evidence suggests that the tariff treatment provided for Africa rather enhanced its competitive position vis-à-vis other exporters.

By examining coverage ratios of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) using the World Bank-UNCTAD SMART database, the same authors find that only 10.8 per cent of Sub-Saharan African non-fuel exports face NTBs as opposed to the 16.6 per cent average for all developing countries. The lower NTB coverage ratio is largely accounted for by the fact that most African countries' textile and clothing products are not affected by Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) restrictions. Only nineteen per cent of African textile exports face NTBs, as opposed to fifty three per cent for such exports from all developing countries combined, and an even larger discrepancy, the African coverage ratio for clothing is about eighteen points below the sixty three per cent developing country average. The authors then examine Africa's own trade barriers and find that Sub-Saharan Africa's average tariff rate of 26.8 per cent and NTB coverage ratio of 34.1 per cent are considerably higher than those numbers for a set of fast-growing exporters more than three times higher in average tariff, nine times higher in NTB coverage. The authors conclude that Sub-Saharan Africa's own high import barriers, particularly to imports of key inputs for exports, are the main causes of Africa's marginalisation in world trade.

Similar findings are made by Sachs and Warner.¹² Using an econometric analysis of cross-country growth data, per capita growth is related to: 1) The initial income level of the country, determining whether there are potential catch-up benefits; 2) The extent of overall market orientation, including openness to trade; 3) The national saving rate; and 4) The geographic and resource structure of the economy, with landlocked and resource-abundant economies tending to lag behind coastal and resource-scarce ones. The study finds an overall shortfall of 4.5 percentage points in Africa's growth performance in 1970-89. Of this, the study attributes 1.8 points to lack of trade openness, 1.9 points to low savings rates, and 0.9 points to highly distorted domestic markets. Drawing on an earlier paper that shows income convergence only among open economies,¹³ Sachs and Warner conclude that successful growth will depend first and foremost on economic integration with the rest of the world. Africa's largely self-imposed exile from world markets can end quickly by cutting import tariffs and ending export taxes on agricultural exports.

Dollar,¹⁴ after examining evidence from ninety five developing countries for the period 1976-1985, also concludes that outward-oriented developing economies really do grow more rapidly. Thus, this study also attributes Africa's slow growth to its inward-orientation. The author states that in Africa inward orientation results from exchange rates that are overvalued as a result of protection.¹⁵ According to his estimates, the adoption of Asian-type outward-oriented strategies, coupled with a stable real exchange rate, could have added 2.1 percentage points to annual African growth over this period. Harrison,¹⁶ after evaluating a correlation between economic growth and various measures of openness, also finds that growth is generally positively associated with openness. Nash and Thomas¹⁷ show with empirical evidence that trade policy reforms in developing countries can make an important contribution to industrialisation and growth. Using empirical results suggesting that Africa's participation in international trade is 'normal' given its level of income, country size and geography, Rodrick¹⁸ argues that the marginalisation of Africa in world

10 F. Ng, and A. Yeats, *Open Economies Work Better! Did Africa's Protectionist Policies Cause Its Marginalization in World Trade?*, Policy Research Working Paper 1636, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1996.

11 Ibid.

12 J. Sachs and A. Warner, *Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration*, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1995.

13 Ibid.

14 D. Dollar, "Outward-oriented Developing Economies Really Do Grow More Rapidly: Evidence from 95 LDCs, 1976-85", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 40, 3, 1992, pp. 523-544.

15 Ibid., p. 532.

16 A. Harrison, *Openness and Growth*, Policy Research Working Paper 809, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1991.

17 John Nash, and V. Thomas, *Best Practices in Trade Policy Reform*, Oxford University Press for the World Bank, Oxford, 1991.

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trade is entirely due to the slow growth of African economies. Using a gravity model analysis of bilateral trade between Africa and industrialised countries, Coe and Hoffmaister¹⁹ state that after controlling for the various determinants of bilateral trade— economic size, distance, population, access to the sea, export composition, linguistic ties and the degree of openness— Africa's trade is not at all unusual. What is unusual is that Africa actually over-traded with the North relative to other developing countries in the early nineteen seventies, but the degree of overtrading has steadily declined over the past twenty five years. The authors state that this is one aspect of Africa's marginalisation in international trade. Given that trade integration and economic growth are simultaneous achievements in many successful integrators of Asia, and that industrial countries have been wide open to Africa's exports relative to those from other regions, the results of these studies, too, indicate that the problem lies on the part of Africa in its restrictive import (openness) and export policies.

Otsubo²⁰ describes episodes of Sub-Saharan African (and other regions') trade and foreign exchange reforms and resultant changes in speed of integration or disintegration. The trade regimes of both African Financial Community (CFA) members and non-CFA members of Sub-Saharan Africa before 1985 were characterised by the severity of quantitative restrictions covering virtually all categories, and by high tariff rates that were probably largely redundant due to high non-tariff barriers. Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Ghana, Nigeria, and Tanzania (all non-CFA members), and particularly the latter three initiated changes by attempting to reform the foreign exchange markets to correct highly overvalued currencies, as manifested in high black market premiums. These countries all succeeded in reducing black market premiums and all except Malawi accomplished sustained real devaluation of their currencies. Except for Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), they all substantially reduced or eliminated quantitative restrictions on imports. Tariff rates, however, were not touched. Although reversals of reform have been frequent, Ghana, Madagascar, and Nigeria succeeded in attaining a positive rate of trade integration after the reform, while Tanzania and the DRC at least slowed the pace of separation from the world market. Kenya and

Malawi, on the other hand, either started to separate or increased the pace of separation from the world market. In the process, Malawi experienced real appreciation while Kenya managed to produce only a negligible amount of devaluation. In these economies, the rate of improvement in price distortions was much smaller than in the other reforming countries. Overall, non-CFA sub-Saharan Africa was barely able even to slow the process of isolation from the world market after the mid nineteen eighties. Turning to the other countries, the CFA failed to devalue their currencies during the nineteen eighties or to carry out other trade reforms, only to realise the need for substantial devaluation in 1994. A moderate trend increase in the trade integration ratio is now expected for this group of CFA members due to the positive effects from the 1994 initiatives.

As most MNEs engage in international trade both in inputs and outputs, any restrictions on the cross-border flows of goods and services will discourage inward FDI. Also, as payments on cross-border trade and returns on investment, including profit repatriation for FDIs, have to be paid in hard currency, any restrictions on foreign exchange transactions will be equally detrimental to international capital flows. The 1996 issue of the World Bank's Global Economic Prospects, featuring disparities in global integration, used country credit ratings by institutional investors as one of the indicators for the degree of integration. Risk perceptions of international investors are important determinants of capital inflows and outflows, as investors have become more and more discerning as noted earlier. Investors are looking not only at macroeconomic fundamentals such as fiscal and balance of payments imbalances and monetary instability, but also at institutional fundamentals such as government and judicial systems, and systems of economic and monetary regulations and monitoring.

Collier²¹ enlists four explanations for Africa's marginalisation in trade and investment: Insufficient reform; insufficient scale; high risk; and weak restraints. Africa has simply not adopted sufficient economic reform according to the assertions made in Collier's piece, as well as many other writings, including those in Adjustment in Africa.²² Collier²³ states that until the late nineteen eighties it was straightforward to explain Africa's marginalisation in terms of domestic policies which were hostile both to the

18 D. Rodrik, *Trade Policy and Economic Performance in Sub-Saharan Africa*, NBER Working Paper Series 6562, NBER, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1998.

19 Coe and Hoffmaister, "North-South Trade".

20 S. Otsubo, *Globalization: Accelerated Integration through World Trade— A New Role for Developing Countries in an Integrating World*, Policy Research Working Paper 1628, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1996.

21 P. Collier, "Globalization: Implications for Africa", Paper presented to the IMF-African Economic Research Consortium Seminar on Trade Reforms and Regional Integration in Africa, Washington D.C., 1997.

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private sector in general and to the export sector and foreign capital in particular. While the reform efforts since the nineteen eighties somewhat reduced the gap (in treatment of private and foreign investors and manufacturers) between Africa and the rest of the world, the gap persists and it continues to haunt Africa in its quest for integration.

Borrowing ideas from Krugman's notion of low-level equilibrium traps in endogenous growth models,²⁴ Collier²⁵ presents insufficient scale and low-level traps as the second reason for Africa's marginalisation. Regarding economies of scale, there are two types: Those external to the individual firm, and those internalised within the firm in the production and supply of inputs as agglomeration proceeds. However, due to Africa being in a low-level trap with little manufacturing located in the continent, firms there cannot reap the positive effects of agglomeration. Transport costs influence the location decisions of firms, and the detrimental effects of high transport costs in Africa are cited by many studies including *Global Economic Prospects 1996*²⁶ and Sachs.²⁷ The *Global Economic Prospects, 1996*, shows that in the fiscal year of 1991, sub-Saharan Africa's net freight and insurance payments were \$ 3.9 billion, or fifteen per cent of total exports, compared with 5.8 per cent for all developing countries. The report attributes these high transportation costs to anticompetitive cargo reservation policies that many African countries adopted in the past, attempting to develop national fleets.

As the third of the four reasons of marginalisation, Collier²⁸ points out a high-risk business environment in most parts of Africa. The majority of African countries are subject to two types of high risks: Policy changes and shocks. Many African governments often change not only economic policies but also policy rules themselves, making investment decisions difficult. Africa has often been subject to terms-of-trade shocks, anomalous weather conditions, and incidents in neighbouring economies that abruptly change the structure of relative prices, again making investment plans riskier if not impossible.

Collier²⁹ cites a lack of 'agencies of restraint' as his last, but not the least, important factor in the marginalisation of Africa. North³⁰ shows that, historically, development has required a reduction in transaction costs and that this reduction is in turn dependent upon institutional innovations such as a reliable legal system. Collier³¹ states that in Africa both the civil and legal systems and the audit system have deteriorated (since independence) and that this deterioration of the judicial and accountancy professions in Africa weakens or removes the key agencies of restraint which private agents use for asset transactions.

In summary, the process of Africa's marginalisation in the global economy can only be stopped and reversed if Africa works on a reform agenda, particularly liberalisation of trade and creation of an investment-friendly institutional environment, in order to stop the process of disintegration and start linking with rapidly globalising world markets.

Conclusion

This paper is written in order to make policy suggestions for Africa's re-engagement in the global markets moving toward the twenty first century. Strategies of integration are to be considered both at national borders and within domestic economies. In linking African economies to a rapidly globalising and sometimes volatile world economy, the possible role of regional integration schemes, and strategies to draw foreign direct investments (FDIs) were presented and evaluated with forward-looking policy suggestions.

Africa has been gradually but steadily marginalised in the rapidly globalising world economy in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The marginalisation of Africa is visible in its shares of exports, output, and private capital inflows in the world and in the developing community. The only international economic dimension in which Africa has not become marginal is aid. Africa's trend of marginalisation in the global economy represents a process of delinking from the world economy.

Given that trade integration and economic

22 World Bank, *Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results, and the Road Ahead*, Oxford University Press for the World Bank, Oxford, 1994.

23 Collier, "Globalization: Implications for Africa."

24 P. Sachs, *Geography and Trade*, Leuven University Press, Leuven and MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1991.

25 Collier, "Globalization: Implications for Africa."

26 World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects*.

27 J. Sachs, "Growth in Africa: It can be done", *The Economist*, 29 June 1996, pp. 21-23.

28 Collier, "Globalization: Implications for Africa."

29 Ibid.

30 D. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.

31 Collier, "Globalization: Implications for Africa."

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growth are simultaneous achievements in many successful integrators of Asia, and that industrial countries have been wide open to Africa's exports relative to those from other regions, it can safely be said that Africa's largely self-imposed exile from world markets can and should end by liberalising trade. In order to stop and reverse the process of Africa's marginalisation in the global economy, Africa should also work on a wider range of reform agenda on top of trade liberalisation, such as creation of an investment-friendly institutional environment.

How can and should Africa utilise regional integration schemes in linking itself to global markets? In answering this question of crucial concern to Africa, this paper enumerated conditions for Africa to successfully utilise regional integration initiatives for the said purpose. Ten suggestions made in this context are as follows:

1. Africa should aim at North-South integration with a more open trade framework.
2. Use regional integration/cooperation schemes for the African continent in order to benefit more from the Association Agreements with the EU.
3. Past integration schemes built on inward-looking ISI strategies should be replaced by export-promoting outward-oriented open regional schemes.
4. Use regional integration schemes in order to capitalise on the new motives and lock-in reform agenda.

5. Use regional schemes, including monetary unions and cross-border initiatives (CBIs), as agencies of restraint.
6. Shift in strategy from grand market-integration schemes to more regional/sectoral cooperation and to CBIs for now, as a step toward more formal market integration in the long run.
7. Emphasise regional/sectoral cooperation and CBIs to reduce transport costs for exporters.
8. Sort out overlapping regional integration schemes and discontinue multiple memberships in integration arrangements.
9. Use regional schemes as a forum for knowledge management and dissemination.
10. Utilise regional integration/cooperation schemes in order for African countries to participate more actively in global multilateral negotiations such as the WTO process.

Most importantly, whether it be domestic/border reform or regional integration initiatives, as they work on strategies in order to reverse the course from de-linking and marginalisation into linking and re-engagement, and to form a virtuous cycle of integration and growth, African leaders should always bear in mind that it is Africa's course of action that determines future relations between African economies and the global markets.



<http://sweetresolution.files.wordpress.com/2006/10/africacoke.jpg>

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"Who puts the bread on the table?" : Female-Headed Households, Poverty and Strategies of Survival in Southern Mexico



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Abstract

The thesis of the high incidence of poverty among female-headed households (FHHDS) in developing countries has been supported uncritically by development agencies despite growing evidence that shows the opposite.¹ Evidence grounded in quantitative data and conventional measures such as per capita income, consumption and expenditure are constantly used to legitimise the disadvantage of women. However, some researchers argue against the social construction of FHHDS as economically marginalised. Contrary to common assumptions, I question in this paper the straightforward relationship between female headship and poverty drawing on examples from Southern Mexico.

Introduction

Some studies, especially those produced by the World Bank, have concluded that female-headed households are concentrated among the poorest of the poor. Other researchers claim that although female-headed households face a high risk of poverty, they are not necessarily worse-off than male-headed households. The present article indicates that before asserting the poverty of FHHDS, it is crucial to make distinctions between the types of households headed by women because an analysis of their differences indicates that not all female-headed households are poor.

Evidence supporting the economic disadvantage of female-headed households seems to be grounded mainly in empirical studies based on quantitative data.² Based on macro economic quantitative analysis, Buvinic and Gupta concluded that more than fifty per cent of the data (thirty eight countries) indicates a high incidence of poverty among female-headed households and only a minority (eight countries) shows the opposite. They suggest that three sets of factors determine the poverty of FHHDS: The higher dependency burden of the households; the lower assets and earnings of women

in the female household; and a combination of both factors. For example, they suggest that "in Brazil, female-headed households have a 30% to 50% greater chance of being in poverty that do male-headed ones, not because they have more children or fewer adults but because the female head earns less."³

Unlike the above findings, some researchers⁴ suggest that there is weak evidence that demonstrate that female-household headship is directly related to poverty. Neither international development agencies such as the Economic Commission for Latin America and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) can consistently prove the relationship between poverty and female-headship. The IFAD, for example, asserts that in many developing countries, "...in spite of the constraints women face, poverty is only slightly higher among female than male-headed households"⁵. Quisumbing also points out that "...while female-headed households are worse off in terms of a number of poverty measures, these differences are statistically significant in one-fifth to one-half of the datasets, depending on the poverty measures used".⁶ The poverty of female-headed households is then a generalisation that may have

1 Kavita Datta and Cathy Mc Ilwaine, "Empowered Leaders'? Perspectives on Women Heading Households in Latin America and Southern Africa", *Gender and Development*, 8, 3, 2000, pp. 40-49.

2 Mayra Buvinic and Geeta Rao Gupta, "Female-headed Households and Female-maintained Families: Are they worth targeting to reduce poverty in Developing Countries?", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 45, 2, 1997, pp. 259-280.

3 Ibid.

4 See, for instance, Sylvia Chant, "Family Formation and Female Roles in Queretaro, Mexico", *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 4, 1, 1985, pp. 17-32; N. Fuwa, "The Poverty and Heterogeneity Among Female Headed Households Revisited: The Case of Panama", *World Development*, 28, 8, 2000, pp. 1515-1542;

5 International Fund for Agricultural Development, *Grenada Rural Enterprises Project: Formulation Mission Report, Working Paper I, Socio-economic and Gender Equity Aspects of the Target Group*, Rome, 2000.

6 Quisumbing et al, *Gender and Poverty: New Evidence from 10 Developing Countries*, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington D. C., 1995, p. 2.

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dangerous outcomes for policy making and implementation.

Although it is impossible to deny that many factors put female-headed households at an above-average risk of facing poverty, it cannot be concluded automatically that FHHDS are poorer than male-headed households. As Chant suggests, matching female-headship and poverty is dangerous because it is an easy assertion that does not allow for an examination of the real causes and nature of poverty.⁷ Furthermore, as Jackson points out, "the poverty of... women-headed households has been obscured by the inclination... to 'talk up' the numbers of women-headed households, and their poverty, to justify GAD [Gender and Development] in numerical terms".⁸ Examining poverty implies looking at the different ways in which poverty is engendered; such strategy requires looking at households as sites where intra household allocation is the result of differences in power positions. Using this framework, it will not be implied that FHHDS are a priori poorer than male-headed households.

This paper has three main objectives. The first is to argue that female-headed households are not concentrated among the poorest of the poor. Multiple perceptions of poverty indicate that female-headed households do not consider themselves poorer than male-headed households. Variables such as agency, power, authority and self-esteem are regarded to be as important as income. The second aim is to demonstrate that female-headed households make use of diverse strategies which help them to overcome economic hardship and male control. FHHDS' strategies challenge the belief that their income is lower than that of male-headed households; the multiple mechanisms used by different household members try to increment their sources of income. By acting within 'patriarchal bargains', the strategies that women use are full of struggles in order to adapt to situations of socio-economic hardship. A third and final objective in this paper is to argue that women in female-headed households assert authority and autonomy that women in male-headed households do not usually have.

In addition, I intend to illustrate the varied relations that exist between female headship and poverty by focusing on female-headed households in two villages in Southern Mexico

called Botes and Alvaro Obregon. I argue, based on data taken from fieldwork interviews, that most female-headed households do not perceive themselves as poorer than other types of households. I show that differences in *de facto* and *de jure* composition, stage in the life cycle, education, ethnicity and race, are important factors that determine the greater access to resources that some households have over others.

With this paper, I do not attempt to generalise about the situation of all female-headed households in Mexico, because differences in regions mark variations in levels of poverty and household headship. My primordial aim is to give voice to women's own perception of poverty in the area of the research.



Is there a straightforward relationship between female-headed households and poverty?

This study defines the household as a spatial unit characterised by shared residence and daily reproduction, where economic co-operation, reproductive activities and socialisation of children take place.⁹ Household headship is conceptualised as the person who retains more authority and power within the household. The present paper adopts the definition of the National Mexican Census (2000) that identifies as head of the household, the person recognised as such by other household members.¹⁰ However, it is also argued here that such a definition is problematic because cultural practices may hide the identity of the real household head.

In what follows, I will contest the principal reasons for believing in the poverty of female-headed households. I will make use of the data obtained in the literature and the interviews I conducted during fieldwork in Southern Mexico.

7 Sylvia Chant, "Women-headed Households: Global Orthodoxies and Grassroots Realities", in Haleh Afshar and Stephanie Barrientos (eds.), *Women, Globalisation and Fragmentation in the Developing World*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1999, pp. 91-130.

8 C. Jackson, "Rescuing Gender from the Poverty Trap", *World Development*, 24, 3, 1996, pp. 489-504.

9 Although households and families have been used as synonyms in this paper, both are conceptualised as different entities despite the fact that they would usually overlap. Families are defined as moral and ideological units that are present in particular social orders as a set of normative relationships.

10 The concept of household headship has also been debated because most countries use different indicators to measure household headship, which leads to confusing statistical results.

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The first reason in the understanding of the poverty of FHHDS rests on taking as universal the idea that women in FHHDS have lower earnings. This is echoed by Mannan, who observed in Bangladesh that the status of women "...is reflected in their almost non-existent role in the formal economy, low literacy, poor nutritional status and high rates of morbidity, mortality and fertility. Rural Bangladeshi women are regarded as poorest of the poor because they are economically poor, socially prejudiced by customs and beliefs and traditionally secluded by purdah due to patriarchal dominance of the society. The situation becomes even worse for households headed by women".¹¹ Probably that may be the situation of FHHDS in Bangladesh, but it cannot be taken as universal for all FHHDS in the world. There is strong evidence from Mexico that income in male-headed households is only slightly higher than in FHHDS. For example, Chant suggests that in terms of per capita income, male-headed households are only marginally better-off than FHHDS. Furthermore, in a study conducted in Mexico by Miraftab, it is concluded that the total income of FHHDS is only 3.9 per cent lower than that of male-headed households (\$3.60 vs. \$3.74 total household income per week).¹² In Botes, one of the villages where the fieldwork was conducted, although one of the women interviewed did not have a formal job or salary, her way to face economic hardship was through the selling of snacks to children. She also prepared tortillas for other families, washed and ironed clothes. By making use of her own labour force, she brought income to her household. She also told me that her neighbour (who lives in a male-headed household) is as poor as her

and sometimes his family barely eats two meals per day.

A second argument lies in the belief that FHHDS have heavier work burdens and limited support from external parties. There are two problems with these assertions: First, it denies that female-headed households usually have fewer dependents to maintain than male-headed households and also that female heads are helped by other household members on domestic chores. During the fieldwork, I was able to observe that many women in FHHDS received help mainly from the oldest daughter who was responsible for youngest siblings and household arrangements. Secondly, female-headed households receive the remittances of migrant members. Many *de facto* and some *de jure* FHHDS obtain money from migrant husbands, daughters and sons.¹³ To be a *de facto* or a *de jure* female-headed household entails differences in economic terms. The first type denotes households where partners are absent "...due to labour migration, but who have ongoing contact, normally accompanied by the sending home of remittances. Women in this situation are thus heads of household on a temporary basis".¹⁴ The second type of household, *de jure*, is characterised by the absence of a male partner "on a more or less permanent basis and receive no economic support.... This category would include single mothers, divorced and separated mothers and widows".¹⁵ It has been argued that some *de facto* FHHDS may be in a better economic situation than *de jure* FHHDS, especially those *de facto* households where men have well-paid jobs. In the towns researched, for example, *de facto* female-headed families had better houses than those of the *de jure* families, i.e. they had floors, windows, electricity, safe water etc. Most houses were built with the remittances that male partners sent from the United States. In conclusion, in order to dismantle the argument of the poverty of female-headed households I consider that it is necessary to make distinctions between types of households according to factors such as life stage, status of headship, composition and perceptions of poverty. *De jure* FHHDS deal with more economic disadvantages than the *de facto* ones.

Finally, I would like to comment that my own research has reached different conclusions than

11 M. Mannan, *Female-headed households in rural Bangladesh: strategies for Well-being and survival*, UNFPA Paper 10, 1999, p. 1.

12 F. Miraftab, *Revisiting Informal-Sector Home Ownership: The Relevance of Household Composition for Housing Options of the Poor*, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1997, p. 311.

13 Migration in Mexico is a common survival strategy for peasant households. Migration to the USA, main destination for migrants, has increased during the economic crisis of the last two decades.

14 Sylvia Chant, *Women-headed Households: Diversity and Dynamics in the Developing World*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1997, p. 15.

15 Ibid.

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those that assert the poverty of FHHDS. While I do not attempt to undermine the male headship neither to assert that female headship is not burdened by poverty, I attempt to suggest that the construction of female-headed households as disadvantaged may be a western construction¹⁶ used by development organisations with the purpose of undermining the legitimacy of female-headed households in the developing world. Such construction overlooks women's own perceptions of poverty and hides the poverty of women and children within households that do not fall below the poverty line.



The Mexican data

In Mexico, the majority of households are still headed by men and only one-fifth are female-headed. However, despite the growing number of female heads that participate in the economy, government discourses reaffirm their 'poverty'. By contrast, this article highlights the limitations of seeing poverty only through the lens of material assets. I argue that the use of traditional income/consumption measures cause increases in the incidence of poverty among female-headed households. Instead, I propose that a human poverty approach would be more useful in assessing the multidimensional aspects of deprivation that women face in their daily lives.

According to the latest population census of 2005, Mexico is a country with 103,263,388 people¹⁷ with an average income per capita of US \$ 9,716.¹⁸ Recent data from the Ministry of Economics suggest that poverty is increasing, which inevitably leads to deterioration in quality of life, deficient nutrition and diminishing health

and educational standards. In the last decades, the percentage of households living below the poverty line increased from 39 percent in 1989 to 43 per cent in 1996. Data from the Secretary of Social Development imply that 53 million people live in extreme conditions of marginality, rising unemployment, deterioration of wages, constant devaluation of the peso, inflation, social insecurity, lack of adequate sanitation, deficient health and educational systems, sub-contracting, foreign capital dominance and economic instability.¹⁹

During the last two or three decades Mexican inhabitants have been experiencing deterioration in the standards of living for the people in general, not only for female-headed households. As Bouillon et al points out, between 1984 and 1994 the country experienced a sharp increase in household income inequality while at the same time, "... the relative situation of rural areas and of the southern region of the country deteriorated between 1984 and 1994. The ratio of rural to urban income fell from 0.57 to 0.41 and ... income in southern rural areas fell 14 per cent in real terms, while rural income in the country fell only half per cent."²⁰

In the two villages researched, the deterioration of the agriculture and the lack of capitalist investment, have made this region one of the poorest of the country and a source of migrant labour to other states and to the USA. The lack of national or international markets to sell agricultural products has made most peasants, especially in Botes which is mainly an agricultural village, opt for migrating to tourist spots. In the case of Alvaro Obregon, which heavily depends on the sugar industry, the production of sugar has constantly employed migrant and local workers, but restrictions placed by international treaties and the government on the industry, make the situation more difficult every year.

Regarding gender disparity, Mexico does not seem to be very different from other Latin American countries. Women, who account for 52 per cent of the population, had in 1997 a participation in the country's economy of 35.3 per cent,²¹ they have 2.3 children in average²² and in terms of basic education, the percentage of educated women has improved to 86.7 per

16 Chandra Mohanty, "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses", in Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres (eds.), *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism*, Indiana University Press, Indianapolis, 1991, pp. 51-80.

17 National Institute of Geography and Informatics, *II Population and Household Count 2005*, National Institute of Geography and Informatics, Mexico City, 2005.

18 See the Wikipedia entry: <http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C3%A9xico>.

19 Lourdes Benería, "Structural Adjustment, the Labour Market and the Household: The Case of Mexico" in Guy Standing and Victor Tokman (eds.), *Towards Social Adjustment*, ILO, Geneva, 1991, pp. 161-83.

20 Bouillon et al, "Rising Inequality in Mexico: Household Characteristics and Regional Effects", *The Journal of Development Studies*, 39, 4, 2003, p. 133.

21 National Population Council, <http://www.conapo.gob.mx/prensa/2004/13boletin2004.htm>.

22 National Institute of Geography and Informatics, <http://www.mortalidadmatrna.com.mx/docs/madresINEGI2004.pdf>.

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cent.²³ However, geographical as well as ethnic discrimination remains present. For example, indigenous women suffer more than other women in the country in terms of access to services, and also incidences of poverty in the south of the country are higher than in the north.²⁴

In respect to household headship, there seems to be an increase in the number of female-headed households, with levels varying between and within regions. Statistics from Mexico indicate that in 2000, there were 4.6 million of households headed by women, that is, one-fifth of all households in Mexico were female-headed, more commonly among older age groups. However, that was not the case of the women I interviewed who were in an early or middle stage of their life cycle, whose ages varied from twenty years to forty years.

Furthermore, in cases of economic crisis, female-headed households re-organise and use all the labour available in order to cushion themselves against economic poverty. The use of 'household strategies of survival' (although the term has been highly contested it is still a useful theoretical concept that can explain how households organise in order to cope with economic hardship).²⁵

The three most common survival strategies that I encountered in the households interviewed were: Paid employment, reliance on children's labour and migration. In the first case, it has been documented that the rise in the number of women in the workforce has been linked to the increase in the female household headship of young women, especially in urban areas. In the second case, I can point out that a common belief, closely related to the poverty of FHHDS, is the inter-generational transmission of poverty. It has been affirmed that female-headed households transmit poverty to their children and these children in this type of household are more prone to suffer from poverty because they engage at an early age in economic activities.²⁶ Yet, as Chant has pointed out, "...there is little evidence to suggest in the study cities in Mexico that children of working mothers suffer from social afflictions to any

greater degree than children of women who stay at home".²⁷ Therefore, it cannot be said that in the case of Mexico children from FHHDS work more than children from male-headed households. Economic impoverishment has forced both types of households to send more labour to the market. Finally, I can say that although there are many causes that have led to a rise in the number of FHHDS in Mexico, such as economic poverty, teenage pregnancy, male infidelity, alcohol abuse and intra-family violence, in the towns researched, the main reason for the formation of FHHDS has been the process of national and international migration to urban centres of the country and to USA.

Although I could mention more than one reason that causes the formation of FHHDS, due to the restraints of time and space in this paper I will focus only on migration.

National and international migration is one of the principal causes that has driven the formation of *de facto* female-headed households in Mexico. For more than fifty per cent of the rural poor, migration to the USA and urban areas of the country constitutes a strategy of survival. Female migration is a relevant phenomenon by itself and Mexico is considered among one of the countries in Latin America with the highest number of female migratory networks. In 1997, the ratio of male to female migrants was of 77.8 per cent showing that women migrants in Mexico outnumber men.²⁸

Migration is an inevitable component of development in which communities have to transform their economic, cultural and familiar composition due to the temporal or permanent movement of people. In Quintana Roo, the state where I undertook fieldwork, migratory flows usually head to Cancun, a city that draws a large number of tourists. It is located in the north and has seen a nearly ten fold increase in its population, going from 115,000 inhabitants in 1980 to more than one million inhabitants in 2005.²⁹ In Botes, for example, members of domestic groups have migrated to either Cancun or the USA in order to enable the reproduction of the household.

23 INEGI- Inmujeres, *Women and Men from Mexico*, Mexico, 2003, p. 3.

24 Bouillon et al, "Rising Inequality", pp. 112-133.

25 Diane Wolf, "Daughters, Decisions and Domination: An Empirical and Conceptual Critique of Household Strategies", *Development and Change*, 21, 1990, pp. 43-74.

26 Mayra Buvinic and Geeta Rao Gupta, "Female-headed Households and Female-maintained Families", p. 268.

27 Sylvia Chant, *Women and Survival in Mexican Cities*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1991, p. 210.

28 V. Lawson, "Hierarchical households and gendered migration in Latin America: feminist extensions to migration research in progress", *Human Geography*, 22, 1, 1998, pp. 39-53.

29 National Institute of Geography and Informatics, *II Population and Household Count*, 2005.

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Positive consequences of male migration in *de facto* female-headed households are the temporary increase in women's decision-making, power and authority within the household. Negative outcomes are the splitting apart of entire households that do not have exploitative gender relations but that need to migrate in order to survive. However, there are other causes for migration. One of them is the migration of women who try to escape violent marriages and abusive relationships.

Finally, in Quintana Roo, female-headship is one of the lowest in the entire country (17.3 per cent). Yet the rapid urbanisation of the northern area due to the development of the tourism industry has been pooling female-headed households from other parts of Mexico. In the villages where I conducted the research, female-headed households are still a minority, which makes them thought to be 'deviant'. However, I believe the findings of the present research highlight that this type of household is becoming more common in the developing world.

Case study: Quintana Roo a peripheral province located in Southern Mexico

In what follows I am going to describe the research arena in order to give a brief social and economic panorama where the female-headed households I interviewed are located. It is going to be useful in order to see the scope of choices women have for their strategies of survival.

Quintana Roo is the easternmost state at the tip of the Yucatán Peninsula. It borders the Mexican states of Yucatán to the northwest, Campeche to the west, the Central American countries of Belize and Guatemala to the south, and the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea to the east and north. The most recent census estimates that it is the most important province of the country with immense demographic growth due to the development of the tourist industry as I mentioned before.

The region is predominantly dependant on the tourist industry, yet the economy has been affected by the gradual deterioration of the rural economy and therefore people are always on the search for new alternatives to ensure economic survival. As a direct consequence of the development of the tertiary sector, demographic changes have resulted in what is known cur-

rently as the 'feminisation of rural communities', due to massive immigration to the United States and to some Mexican cities located along the coast.

For this study two locations were selected: Alvaro Obregon and Botes. The first one is the larger two. According to the 2000 census, approximately 2,921 people live there. The main economic activity is the production of sugar for commercial purposes and sixty per cent of the economically active population, most of them men, is employed in the sugar industry. The village is the most important commercial area in the region and a place that attracts women heads of households because of the bigger advantages in finding jobs. The second village is Botes, a rural-based town with less than six hundred inhabitants. People there practice subsistence agriculture: Grow maize, beans and squash for eating. In this community it was more difficult to find female headed households because most of the women tend to migrate to Alvaro Obregon for employment, a process that Bradshaw defines as the importation of female-headed households. Furthermore, some other FHHDS tend to be invisible because they are subsumed inside larger and extended households.

Having explained this, I will provide the reader with a general view of two life stories that demonstrate that female-headed households are not necessary poor, taking into account women's own perceptions of poverty.

Martina's migration

Martina is an indigenous woman who ran away from an abusive relationship few years ago because her husband used to beat her and her children when he was drunk. She traveled to many cities and finally she decided to settle down in Alvaro Obregon where she started to work as a domestic worker in a middle-class house. She took her three children with her. Although she described her economic situation as poor, she preferred to migrate to Alvaro Obregon in order to be far from her husband and avoid conflicts. Despite the fact that she feels isolated sometimes because she does not have an extended social network as all her relatives remain back home, she feels much better without her husband's violence. This story highlights that domestic violence is a "push factor" as relevant as income needs. Furthermore, the abuse to which she was subjected undermined her self-esteem and agency and constituted a violation to her human rights. According to her, the most pressing deprivations were her lack of personal security and her feeling of powerlessness. I would like to emphasise from this life story that several women heads of households give many times more priority to agency and self-esteem than to income.

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Carmela's strategies of survival

Carmela, a thirty eight years old woman, divorced and mother of seven children in Botes told me that she had to go to live in her parents' home because people in the village where gossiping about her. She said that men were constantly harassing her for sex while at the same time they were forbidding their wives to talk to her, mainly because she was considered a *mujer facil* (easy woman). When she was living with her parents, most of the gossiping stopped.

Social ostracism and harassment are common experiences that female-headed households encounter through their life time. In addition, negative attitudes portray the females who head them as incompetent and unable to lead their households. Some other consequences of drawing direct links between female-headship and poverty are the denial of agency to the efforts made by women in their struggle against poverty and the idea that they intergenerationally transmit poverty to their children. By the same token, to believe that they are 'deviant' or 'incomplete' families is a negative stereotype.

Conclusion

The clear and straightforward relationship between women and poverty is commonly associated with the increase in the number of female-headed households. Quantitative research seems to be the best source to derive data for female-household poverty. Evidence showing the disadvantage of female-headed households seems to be confined to few studies in developing countries, yet recent studies worldwide demonstrates the complex interaction of factors that determine poverty. Conventional quantitative measures have paved the way for assessing the deprivations of female-headed households. However, they are inaccurate indicators because, as Kabeer has pointed out, the traditional income/consumption measure is 'male-centred'.³⁰ Such measures tell little about the gender dimensions of poverty and ignore qualitative indicators like health, nutrition, literacy, empowerment, agency and autonomy. From a gender perspective, definitions of poverty that go beyond income/consumption levels are more useful because they allow for better understandings of the different ways in which men and women face poverty. Vulnerability, well-being, power, and self-esteem are some dimensions that can be encompassed in a holistic approach. A Human Poverty model is then used in order to give voice to the diverse experi-

ences, needs and priorities of the women interviewed.

Underpinned by feminist models of the household that combine Sen's human poverty approach and Kandyoti's patriarchal bargain, this paper has tried to open up the 'black box' and look to the strategies employed by the household in times of economic hardship, particularly migration. According to feminist responses to gender-blind theories, "...household strategies necessarily embody relationships of power, domination and subordination..."³¹

FHHDS employ diverse mechanisms that challenge the concrete sets of constraints that contain the patriarchal bargain. Women heads of households struggle not only against economic but also gender rules. Leaving an abusive relationship and forming a female-headed household is, for example, a common strategy used by some women in Mexico.

Evidence presented here suggests that although there are socioeconomic factors that place women under severe economic constraints, not all FHHDS are poorer than male-headed households. *De facto* FHHDS may have more sources of income than *de jure* FHHDS, therefore showing important economic differences within FHHDS. The use of various strategies diversify women's incomes and challenge the myth that all female-headed households are the poorest of the poor. Furthermore, women's priority to non-material aspects of poverty should be taken into account as well as the fact that the overwhelming presence of poverty in the region proves that poverty is not an issue of headship, but a national problem affecting all types of households.

In addition, I hope that this article shows that FHHDS are just another form of social organisation that is not necessarily among the poorest of the poor. The different ways women defined poverty are legitimate and should be taken into account if a complete view of the picture of the world is to be created.

As a final comment, this study would be incomplete without highlighting some ways to eradicate female poverty. Bearing in mind the dangers of focusing only on female-headed households i.e. the leakage to non-poor households, the overlooking of 'secondary poverty' or the poverty women bear in male-headed household, development policies need to analyse those gender relations that maintain women's subordination and design strategic solutions that do not encompass instrumentalist objectives.

30 N. Kabeer, 'Agency, Well-being and Inequality: Reflections on the Gender Dimensions of Poverty', *IDS Bulletin*, 27, 1996, p. 1.

31 Wolf, "Daughters, Decisions and Domination", p. 60.

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The enhancement of women's capabilities, the enlargement of women's choices and the removal of cultural constraints are all necessary

for engendering human development for women in both female and male-headed households.



<http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/haiti/gfx/titlephoto2.jpg>

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Globalising Ethnicity: Tourism, Media and the Politics of Igorot Representation



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Abstract

Anthony Giddens defines globalisation as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice-versa”.¹ Social relations are best exemplified by communications characterised by a ubiquity of networks that straddle the globe, resulting in what Frank Webster calls “globalization of communications”.²

Giddens asserts that modernity has given rise to two things: 1) heightened surveillance and 2) violence.³ The former has to do with a more aggressive information gathering and the latter with what started as an industrial warfare transforming itself into a conflict shaped by information. Modern societies have now become “information societies” with the capitalist mandate that runs thus: “(W)e must know about people if we are to arrange their social life”.⁴ But knowing is one thing; imparting is another. In the business of tourism, for example, the tourist no longer allows the landscape to remain as it is, but the simple act of taking a photo of it, is able to “graphically transform space [and native inhabitant] into its own material image,” resulting in a “universal commodification of [our familiar] object world”.⁵

Information about tourism therefore play a more integral role in the maintenance and adaptability of capitalist interests and activities. Thus, they have become crucial to the emerging phenomenon of global localism, whereby international and local issues and interests are connected and managed.⁶

This paper focuses on information and tourism’s engagement in a dialectical process that is capitalist in form and function. The end result is the persistence of the politics of representation involving indigenous people like the Igorot of the Cordillera, north Luzon, Philippines (Figure 1 Map of Cordillera).



Figure 1: Map of Cordillera

The postcard and the iconography of Igorotness

Tourism remains the biggest industry in the world and ecotourism is the fastest growing section in the international tourism market. The Cordillera is home to the world renowned and UNESCO-accredited traditional rice terraces and diverse cultures of its indigenous people. The Cordillera is an “ideal tourist site,” meaning it “generates income through ecotourism while promoting environmental awareness and preservation of cultural diversity at the same time”.⁷

Yet ecotourism is a highly controversial term since it often fails to address issues of commercialisation and erosion of cultures, environmental destruction, biopiracy among others. In fact, an internationally recognised definition, which would clarify what criteria are

- 1 Anthony Giddens, “From the Consequences of Modernity”, in Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (eds.), *Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory: A Reader*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1994, p. 181.
- 2 Frank Webster, *Theories of the Information Society*, MPG Books Ltd., Bodmin, Great Britain, Second Edition, 2002, p. 72.
- 3 Giddens, “From the Consequences of Modernity”, p. 203.
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 Frederic Jameson, “Reification and Utopian Mass Culture”, in Raiford Guins and Omayra Zanagoza Cruz (eds.), *Popular Culture: A Reader*, Sage Publications Ltd., London, 2005, p. 117.
- 6 Webster, *Theories of the Information Society*, p. 9.
- 7 Marianne Frei, <http://www.twinside.or.sg/title/eco.13.htm>, p. 2.

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to be used to measure the implementation of ecotourism is yet to be formulated.⁸



Figure 2: Contemporary Postcard

So as the debate rages on, media representations of IPs, like the postcard, continue to proliferate. The popularity of the postcard lies in its being a cheap souvenir/memento. More importantly, by virtue of its establishment as an ethnological artifact, the postcard was imbued with a "totemic significance" and historically, supplemented "a national identity in the United States that was suddenly expensive..." and provided "visual referents" to such expansion by way of signaling a frontier to be crossed and conquered and posing a limit to what could be assimilated into the nation.⁹ The mass production of these types of postcards helped concretise and speed up the grand colonial design of conquest.



Figure 3: Colonial Postcard

Figure 2, for instance, is a contemporary watercolour and pencil illustration by Bernadette C. Solina titled "Two Kankana-ey Girls." It may be juxtaposed with a colonial postcard in figure 3.¹⁰ The girls in both postcards are clad in traditional Benguet attire, from the *paynet* (turban) to the blouse and long skirt. More

importantly, all four girls wear doll-like smiles. Cultural studies critic, Rolando Tolentino, provides an interesting detail about this demeanor. He posits that it is part of the tourism discourse of national repackaging. One smiles to attract more tourists and to hide the outside perception of a national crisis.¹¹




Figure 4: PLDT Advert

It is significant to note that figure 3 is a "real photo" postcard, an early trend in the industry. This became popular in the late 1890s when Kodak sold a photo backing paper significantly for making snapshots taken with their new USD 2.00 camera. The postcards were actual black and white photos, usually in sepia tone, with painted postcard backs, in contrast to the regular commercial types painted from plates from a master photograph or drawing. Later, this type was hand-painted. Figure 3, for example, is painted and the colours of the attire are usually approximated. However it is an erroneous approximation. The photo uses green, blue, brown and maroon to paint the traditional clothes. But the traditional Benguet Kankana-ey dress uses only black, white and red. Interestingly, figure 2 utilises the same colors for an equally misinformed rendering. In this light, the approximated hues, which helped perpetuate an imagined cultural identity of the Kankana-ey has not yet been transcended. Moreover, following semiological thought, the myth of the female native as natural, uncomplicated, innocent, carefree, easy to please and thus subservient is foregrounded. This misrepresentation not only projects an iconographic "idealized expression"¹² of the female Kankana-ey. It likewise proves that iconography is ideological because it reproduces a dominant set of beliefs and attitudes which have imposed themselves¹³ on the Igorot as a whole and the

⁸ Ibid., p. 3.

⁹ Vicente Rafael, *White Love and Other Events in Filipino History*, Ateneo de Manila University Press, Quezon City, 2000, p. 81.

¹⁰ Jonathan Best, *Philippine Picture Postcards. 1890-1920*, Bookmark Inc., Manila, 1994, p. 3.

¹¹ Rolando B. Tolentino, *National/Transnational Subject Formations and Media in and on the Philippines*, Ateneo de Manila University Press, Quezon City, 2001, p. 128.

¹² Andrew Tolson, *Text and Discourse in Media Studies*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996, p. 66.

¹³ Ibid., p. 167.

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Kankana-ey in particular.

So how does the native take all these? With ambivalence. It may be flattering in that they see something special out of the ordinary act of smiling, but “unsettling to see one’s own place through alien eyes”.¹⁴ It is disturbing that she has to remain just as she is, costume, demeanor, tradition and all just so tourists will continue to buy postcards and come in droves.



Figure 5: GLOBE TELECOM Advert

Print adverts and the global studio

Stuart Hall asserts that cultural identities undergo constant transformation so that “becoming” is as central as “being”.¹⁵ In the context of the global and local nexus, technology, figures prominently in the native’s “becoming.” In adverts related to information technology for instance, the native is currently being (re-) constituted to underscore the shrinking distances in and around the global village. Figure 4, a Philippine Long Distance Telecommunications (PLDT) advert utilises the power of pun to illustrate this concept. The photo is a medium shot of three *lallakay* or male Ifugao Igorot elders in the context of everyday life or “customary routine”.¹⁶ The specific highland setting, complete with open fire, a jar of *tapey* or rice wine and a pot of brewed mountain coffee command attention since the subjects are authoritative figures of *dap-ay*, a traditional political institution where laws are formulated, punishments meted and men gather for socialisation.

The subject of the Globe Telecom advert (Figure 5) is a *baket* or female Igorot elder situated within the specific parameters of Baguio City. The advert presents a strong emotional appeal. The *baket*’s wrinkled brow and cultural heritage blend well with the company’s intent of helping her and her people “preserve [their] humanity and their culture.” But she is not

representative of Baguio City in the same way that Baguio City is not representative of the entire Cordillera region. Despite the attempt at incorporating her and her language through the caption “*Agsao ka*” or “speak,” she is neither one with her sisters in the hinterlands nor with the other inhabitants of urbanised indigenous communities. She reinforces the lowlander’s stereotype of Baguio and the Cordillera as home to the minority Igorot. In the end, she is merely an effective marketing strategy.

Figure 6 is an almost-life size poster of a male Igorot in full store-bought ethnic regalia. Again, as if to say, welcome to Baguio, home to the primitive minority. The poster is an advert of a leading business company’s waybill service that is yet another indicator of reduced distances within the global sphere, thus the catchphrase “door to door delivery.”

These print adverts emphasise the persistence of the trope of primitivised categories in contemporary times. Given the opportunities for the Igorot to enter the public space, what squeezes through is made “typical of the Igorot as a whole.” The Igorot is made to appear as a viable market in tourism and the information technology industry boasting some amount of economic values, but in reality, the Igorot remains a symbolic, visual signifier.

Hence, postcards and print adverts may be considered alternative visual routes to marginalised people’s histories and cultures, effectively laying bare questions on power, authority and representation that have been closed long enough in many a dominant discursive practice.



Figure 6: VICTORY LINER Waybill Advert

14 Ibid., p. 170.

15 Stuart Hall, (ed.) *Representation: Cultural Representing and Signifying Practices*, Sage Publications Ltd., London, 2002, p. 112.

16 Tolson, *Text and Discourse in Media Studies*, p. 201.

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Globalisation and Its Effect on Population Ageing: The Indian Scenario



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Abstract

Globalisation claims to have a human face. To that extent was adopted the poverty reduction strategy papers and the so called 'Washington Consensus'. These were presumably adopted to meet the inadequacies of the structural adjustment programmes. However, the developing countries like India did not achieve the desired results because of implementation failure and the lack of participation. Due to population ageing, the effect in general is disastrous for the elderly in this country.

Within a short compass we shall highlight such effects in this paper as have been seen in the health sector, the economic sphere and other services generally deemed to be essential for the elderly.

Introduction

When Joseph Stiglitz proposed a new paradigm for development in 1998 the general thought was that it would lead to a reevaluation of globalisation particularly for the developing countries. His main thrust was participation and ownership, a radical change in outlook and the facilitation of consensus building within the framework of state policies.¹ The poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) was a new initiative towards that end and was introduced in 1999 by both International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The salient points were as follows.

- It is a country led strategy process and should be a government document
- There must be a time bound programme for all sections of society
- It needs to be result-oriented with a special focus on policy impact on the poorest

- It must be a nation wide participatory process involving government and also the civil society and the public
- The poverty reduction strategy must be based on a medium to long term approach with sequential performance criteria and monitoring arrangements.² The objective of PRSPs is growth and an updated version of the good old 'trickle down hypothesis'.³ In this regard it has been proposed that structural reform should have a new human face, i.e. employment oriented strategy for development should be based on the following five principles:
 - i) increasing income and productivity in the small farm sector;
 - ii) stimulating the micro enterprise sector;
 - iii) expanding labour intensive export;
 - iv) special employment creation schemes through public infrastructure programmes; and

1 Fredric Lapeyre, *World commission on the social dimension of globalization*, Working paper 31, ILO, Geneva, 2004.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.; World Bank, *Attacking Poverty*, World Bank, Washington D. C., 2000, pp. 7-8.

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v) expanding social services to the majority of the population.

The above sums up the new supposed human face of globalisation. For our purpose we may look at the impact of these on population ageing.

But before we do that we need to explain the meaning of population ageing in the Indian context.

In India, since 1961 a sharp decline in the overall death rate and also in mortality levels in the older age groups initiated a process of ageing. This has accelerated after 1971 when the fertility level also started declining. Between 1951 and 1971 the number of sixty-plus population increased by about 67 per cent, reaching 32.7 million by 1971. During 1971-81, the increase in the aged population was about 32 per cent as against the increase of 24.7 per cent recorded for the total population during this period. During the decade 1981-91 the old age population increased by 13.5 million with a decadal growth rate of 31 per cent. According to estimates made by the Technical Group on Population Projections, the likely number of the elderly by the year 2016 will be around 113 millions.⁴ The data clearly reveal that the absolute number of elderly population (sixty years and above) is increasing rapidly, and the population is beginning to age.

Table 1: Increasing Trend in the Proportion of Aged (Sixty Years and Above) in India, 1961-2021

State / Union Territory	Year						
	1961	1971	1981	1991	2001	2011	2021
India	5.63	5.97	6.28	6.58	7.08	8.18	9.87

Source : *Census of India* , 2001

This consequence is also reflected in the age structure of aged population, which suggests an increasing trend in the proportion of old. The growth of old-old (seventy-eighty years) and very-old (eighty plus) more or less remains the same over time. But other age groups between

sixty to seventy years shows an increasing trend over the decades.

Table 2: Growth of Older Population in India, 1961-2001

Age Group	Year				
	1961	1971	1981	1991	2001
60 - 69	65.12	65.37	64.13	62.82	63.58
70 - 79	24.83	24.85	26.31	25.93	26.31
80 - 89	07.92	07.68	07.86	09.06	09.15
90 - 99	01.74	01.71	01.39	01.92	01.97
100+	00.40	00.40	00.31	00.27	00.29

Source : *Census of India* , 2001

In the Indian context, men outnumber women. This phenomenon is also true in the young-old (sixty-seventy years) age group. But as age increases, the sex ratio is in favour of women in the old-old and very-old age groups (sex ratio is defined as the number of females per 1000 males).

Table 3: Sex Ratio for the Elderly in India, 1961-2001

State / Union Territory	Age Group	1961	1971	1981	1991	2001
India	60 - 64	77	92	94	94	91
	65 - 69	96	92	96	94	97
	70+	106	97	98	93	102

Source : *Census of India* , 2001

Practically all sections of the world have experienced continuous improvements in life expectancy and India is not an exception to this phenomenon. Another important feature that can be mentioned here is the men's life expect-

⁴ Population Tables in Government of India, *Census of India*, Government of India, New Delhi, 2001.

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ancy, which is uniformly lower than women's.

Table 4: Life Expectancy at 60+: India

Period	60 years		65 years		70 years	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
1901 -11	9.0	9.3	7.3	7.6	5.8	6.0
1911 -21	9.0	9.5	7.3	7.7	5.8	6.2
1921 -31	9.3	9.9	7.5	8.0	6.0	6.4
1931 -41	10.0	10.6	8.0	8.6	6.3	6.8
1941 -51	10.9	11.4	8.8	9.2	6.8	7.3
1951 -61	12.3	12.8	9.8	10.3	7.6	8.0
1961 -71	14.3	14.3	11.1	11.5	8.6	8.9
1971 -81	16.1	16.1	12.8	13.0	9.7	9.9
1981 -91	17.3	18.0	13.7	14.5	10.4	11.0
1991 -2001	18.1	20.0	14.6	15.9	11.0	12.1

Source : *Census of India, 2001*

The other consequence of such phenomenon is reflected in rural-urban living. India being an agrarian country, more than three fourth of aged persons are residents of rural areas. As a consequence of this the effect of population ageing is more severe in the countryside than it is in the urban area.

Table. 5: Trends in the Proportion of Aged in Urban and Rural Areas, India

State / Union Territory	Year				
	1961	1971	1981	1991	2001
India					
Rural	5.83	6.21	7.21	7.15	7.10
Urban	4.74	4.98	5.37	5.79	5.95

Source : *Census of India, 2001*

This being so, the entire purport of globalisation shall be effective more aggressively on the aged population of the Indian subcontinent. These

effects can be traced in three arenas in economic, health and social-cultural spheres.

Economic Aspect

In both poverty reduction strategy papers and structural reforms programme an emphasis has been laid on participatory process increasing income and productivity, special employment creation and expanding social services. This inter alia means that the gerons both in urban and rural area deserve to be treated as a homogenous group that should not fall into the quagmire of poverty and dependency. An economic analysis shows that the percentage of urban poverty of the aged are 64 per cent male and 46 per cent female respectively, whereas in the rural areas, 58 per cent of women and 45 per cent of men are entirely economically dependent.⁵ The dependency ratio in this context is also very noteworthy. Over the decades, old age dependency is gradually increasing and the fall out is seen more in females. According to 2001 Census of India, such dependency in the overall context of aged population stands at 11.72 per cent males and 12.05 per cent females. This clearly shows that the participatory process of employment and income generation do not have any bearing on the Indian sixty plus population both in urban and rural sector. In effect, in the globalisation parlance the elderlies have no place whatsoever with regard to re-employment, higher income generation and social participation in the economic field. Thus the core structural reforms do not have any implicit concern for the small farm sectors in the rural areas neither do they have any responsibility towards stimulating the micro enterprise sector.

In view of participation and change, globalisation in India has a wider ramification for the aged in both the organised and the unorganised sector of the labour force. Due to the policy of liberalisation and global flow of capital, the concepts of 'voluntary retirement schemes', downgrading of banking interest rates and withdrawal of subsidies in the service sectors have made the senior citizens of the country more vulnerable after they retire from the organised sector. A crucial opinion in this regard is noteworthy.

"the relationship between ageing and employment is usually not considered together. There is, however, a close nexus between them may be seen in terms of: (i) marginalization of the elderly worker with upward increase in age; (ii) the demotion in status and rewards which comes in the later years of a worker's career and (iii)

5 S. Irudaya Rajan, *Chronic Poverty among Indian Elderly*, Working Paper 17, Chronic Poverty Research Centre and Indian Institute of Public Administration (IIPA), New Delhi, 2004.

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possibility of a worker having to face casualization..."⁶

According to 1991 Census there are seven million aged people in the organised sector while 53 million are in now unorganised sector.⁷ But in another ten years this figures will have jumped to eight million and 72 million respectively. However the organised sectors do have some retirement benefits in the form of pension, provident fund etc. There is a new controversy over investing the provident fund amount in the volatile share market. Judging by the current tendency of the Indian central government such a move in the future cannot be ruled out. This is in fact an offshoot of globalisation where liquidity of capital is essential for the global business. In contrast to this the unorganised sectors have very little social security. They neither have pension nor gratuity nor provident fund. But having some access to land and land related property, the rural old to that extent can cope with low income, and manages to feed from hand to mouth.⁸ What is more alarming in this context is the emergence of three hundred million people who are on the verge of entering into old age and they all belong to the unorganised sector.⁹ Thus the quality of life and the human face of globalisation do not concur at all. Rather the process of liberalisation and capital requirements do not look beyond their nose i.e. profit, more profit and more global business irrespective of the economic status of the country concerned.

Health Aspect

Experts believe that the main problem of the older adults in India is poverty. There is a tendency both in developing and developed countries to equate old age and poverty as a concomitant phenomenon. In other words it means that the old have difficulties in meeting their basic needs such as food, clothing, shelter, health and transportation.¹⁰ Of these, health is a prime area where the effects of globalisation are felt by the aged. Both primary health care and institutional care before the advent of globalisation were domains regulated by the Indian government. There was very little private capital intrusion in these two fields though the services rendered could not be said to be ideal. Both in urban and rural areas such ser-

vices were extended without looking for profit nor were they guided by market economy. The entire scenario in this regard changed with the advent of global capital. For the first time in the history of the country, private capital was allowed into the medical services and the plethora of high cost package treatments introduced. Thus the medical services now have become a commodity in the competitive market where the affluent middle class and elite are able to buy the services without considering the cost. This in other way is an intrusion of global capital establishing medical industrial complexes (MIC) even in an underdeveloped country like India. Thus the biomedicalisation of ageing¹¹ has become a reality even in the Indian context.

We may now look more incisively at some of the macro level factors related to health of the aged in India. The experts generally concur that the causes of death of the aged in the Indian subcontinent are circulatory problems, gastro-intestinal disorders, genitor-urinary and under-nutrition. Added to these are the chronic diseases such as cough and cold, locomotor problems, problems related to vision and hearing and lastly loss of memory. This is true both for urban and the rural seniors. In fact, the notion of morbidity and the treatment are generally issues that engulf the entire health profile of the elderly population. This has a direct relationship with the socio-economic status of the elderly in India.¹² Globalisation, in this sense, could have done yeomen services without sticking to the principles of market economy. Both biomedicalisation and medical industrial complex (MIC) did not operate as they should have, covering the entire population including the old. Neither have they fulfilled the declaration of 'Doha Conference' of 2001 where 'Medicine for All' was the proposed major goal. In other words, globalisation has directly jeopardised the social fabric in so far as the medical services are concerned. The promises of socio-economic service in this sense do not reflect the so-called humanistic face that has been proposed in the PRSPs and remains ever elusive for the parental generation of India.

Social Aspect

Just like medical services, globalisation has created many difficulties in the social arena.

6 P. Arun Bali, *Care of the elderly in India- Changing configurations*, Indian Institute of Advance Studies, Shimla, 2001, p. 192.

7 Ibid.

8 K. Markides and C. H. Mindel, *Aging and ethnicity*, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, 1989.

9 Ramgopal Agarwala, *Pension System in India: Turning a Crisis into an Opportunity*, International Development Policy Institute, New Delhi, 2000.

10 Bali, *Care of the elderly in India*.

11 Carol Estes and E. A. Binney, "The biomedicalization of aging: Dangers and dilemmas", *Gerontologist*, 29, 5, 1989. pp. 587-596.

12 P. Arun Bali, "Invoking local initiatives in health care education of the elderly in rural areas", *Research & Development Journal*, 3, 3, June, 1997, pp. 28-40.

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Family, shelter, food, clothing and attires, transportation etc. all are affected by the advent of globalisation all over the world. In the Indian context, families were arguably extended ones. It was equally visible in the rural and urban sectors even in the early 1980s. But, with the policies of liberalisation adopted by the government, the pattern began to change from early 1990s and the families have now become more and more nuclear. In all the metropolitan cities of India, the younger generation due to career progression and time-space compression became more individualistic and the elderlies were marginalised and forced to live outside such nuclear families.¹³ In fact, at present for such career building, the rural youths leave behind their older parents and grand parents in the hinterland of the country and these people are now living in uncertainty, sometimes even forsaken by their offspring. Informal family care that these were used to have become a thing of the past. The seniors are unable to cope with the distance and fast moving technical innovations which are the products of globalisation. Thus is born a consumer society of self interest completely ignoring the traditional past of the country.

Such changes are also found in the residence pattern of the senior citizens in the metropolis. The plethora of high rise buildings consisting of apartment blocks has now become the order of the day. Gone are the days of one or two storied buildings where the sixty plus generation took pleasure in meeting their neighbours and kin as and when they pleased to do so, or go out just for the sake of an outing. The relationship with the younger generation, particularly the grandchildren do not seem to be a pleasure now and depression, isolation and loneliness are found in a large number of old. The situation is marginally better in rural areas where large scale migration on the part of the younger generation is not so rampant. But in states like Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu in the south, Maharashtra and Gujarat in the west, Haryana, Punjab and Himachal Pradesh in the north and West Bengal in the east do have out migration from the rural areas to the cities. Aged people in all the states are suffering from the same

syndrome of depression, isolation and loneliness. We believe that this is a tertiary effect of globalisation, ushering in social changes that are not always conducive for a 'Society of All Ages'.¹⁴ Food, clothing and attires are two significant areas where the effect of globalisation can now be seen perceptibly. Food chains, departmental stores, brand name attires and shoes are part of the culture known as 'Mcdonaldization' bred through globalisation.¹⁵ A notable critic in this regard observed:

"The mcdonaldized world was one in which the straitjacket of the formalised rules, regulations and the governance of the impersonal and technocratic organization, was finally coming to dominate the everyday world of human interaction."¹⁶

The so-called 'Mall Culture' and the shopping spree have given rise to a generation who do not consider their glorious tradition to be a thing to remember. The elderly both in urban and rural areas are now caught in a dilemma of adjustment that is not always comfortable for them.

In this age of IT revolution, speed has become a key word of action. Since time is consuming space, capital, goods, people, idea and images are moving from one part of the globe to the other at an incredible speed.¹⁷ Transportation thereby has become a declared goal of globalisation policies. But in a vast country like India, interconnectivity in that sense is yet to be achieved. It is more so in the rural areas, hill tracks and arid zones that do not come into consideration because of their lower commercial viability for the global multinational business interests. Thus the aged population in this part of the country will never get the privilege of speed and comfort. The easy accessible transports that need to be provided by the state to the gerons do not seem to have any effect on the concerned objects. Thus the co-existence of bullock cart, cycle rickshaw, push cart and the fast moving automobiles and avionics are still a reality both in the urban and rural areas of the country. The low foot-board transportation, separate safety crossing zones, wheel chair boarding etc. still remains a futuristic dream even if globalisation assures participation and changes in social services.

13 Sarah Lamb, "Modern families and independent living: Reflections on contemporary aging", in Sanjukta Dasgupta, and Malashri Lal (eds.), *The Indian Family in transition: Reading literary and cultural texts*, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2007, p. 81.

14 *Report of the Second World Assembly on Ageing*, Madrid Political Declaration and International Plan of Action, 2002.

15 George Ritzer, *The Mcdonaldization of society: An investigation into the changing character of contemporary society*, Pine Forge Press, University of Maryland, USA, (Revised edition), 1996.

16 Phillip Hancock, "Review of the book 'The mcdonaldization of society: An investigation into the changing character of contemporary society (Revised edition)'", School of Critical and Cultural Studies, UK, 1996, www.mngt.waikato.ac.nz/ejrot/Vol2_1/hancock.pdf.

17 Jonathan Xavier Inda, and Renato Rosaldo (eds.), *The anthropology of globalization- A reader*, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 2002.

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Discussion and Conclusion

Hitherto we have discussed many facets of globalisation engulfing the Indian gerons. The core issue being the welfare of the elderly, we have tried to show the fallacies of the so-called 'participatory approach' that envisages social change. Globalisation indeed is a global affair and its aim and objective is to establish a social order encompassing the entire global population. But the major problem in establishing such world order is the contradiction between the developed and the developing countries. This is a contradiction that cannot be resolved easily and is just a reflection of certain economic principles outlined by the western power axis controlled by the United States. In many an instance, it has been found that the state policies of the weaker nations are enfeebled further by the vested interest of the powerful multinational companies. This has been also termed as a cultural contradiction between the centre and the periphery where such peripheral cultures are trying to regroup as a counter force on the centre.¹⁸

This brings us to the Indian context where liberalisation and deregulation policies in the nineties have opened the country to the multinational dictums and the interest of the population, particularly the marginalised, disabled, the poor and the aged are compromised. The Indian state policies towards the seniors thus follow a path of amelioration instead of giving the people financial and social security and freedom to build their own life in accordance to their own custom and tradition. A case in example is the National Policy on Older Persons (NPOP) which is full of lofty ideals and platitudes without taking into account the actual ground realities. For the sixty years and above population of about eight crores (7.9 per cent of the total population), the so-called benefits of globalisation may have touched a very insignificant middle class affluent elderly and the elites. A vast number of rural old and a large section of some such slum dwellers and the most vulnerable section of the population i.e. the elderly widows have not gained any substantial benefit from the process of globalisation. In fact, globalisation treats the old people in a linear and stigmatised fashion all over the world. The envisaged policies do not consider the diversity of culture and the heterogeneity of the life course of human beings scattered through out the world. In fact globalisation should have taken this fact and chalked out a programme for non-linear diversity observed in the developing countries.

However, whatever criticism is thrown at the

process of globalisation in this twenty first century, such historical process has become a certainty that cannot be reversed overnight. We have noted the declared goals of the later phase of globalisation in the form of Washington Consensus and PRSPs that the promised reduction of poverty and social participation for all. However, the zeal that has been shown in the implementation of TRIMs, TRIPs and SAP do not seem to be equal while implementing the policies of social participation and change. The Indian state has opted for the policies of liberalisation, privatisation and deregularisation in the economic sector without introducing such liberal changes in the social, cultural and political sphere.

Another important aspect is the fundamental challenge as has been thrown by globalisation at the so-called theories of gerontology hitherto practiced by the western world. In fact in treating the elderly of the country, the Indian government is following the same old models of amelioration and dole without evaluating the impact of globalisation on the senior citizens. This fallacy in the macro level has been aptly described as under:

"The central paradox of globalization, the displacement of a crucial range of economic, social and political activities from the national arena to a cross-cutting global / transnational / domestic structured field of action is that rather than creating one economy or one polity, it also divides, fragments and polarizes. Convergence and divergence are two sides of the same process. Globalization remains a discourse of contestation that reflects national and regional antagonism and struggles."¹⁹

This is emphatically true for the Indian parental populations who are cross-cultural by nature within a country and the influx of consumer culture has yet to uproot this heterogeneity transforming into the unilinear culture as practised in the west.

We know now globalisation is irreversible but as has been suggested above, the state may take note of the cultural diversity of the country and chalk out policies without disturbing the fabric of our rich tradition. To the policy-makers and global capital, India is a ripe market for large scale commodification. But it does not give them the right to derail the cultural ethos, nor does it make any sense to marginalise their elderly, depriving them of the right to live in peace and grace however modest that might have been.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ P. G. Cerny and N. Evans, "Globalization and public policy under new labour", *Policy studies*, 25, 1, 2004. pp. 51-64.

'Assimilation to Cultural Identity': Struggles of the De-notified and Nomadic Tribes



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Every week Pardhis are tortured in various corners of Maharashtra. Members of Ex-criminal, de-notified and nomadic tribes across India face the same plight. Many instances of the nomadic, pastoral and de-notified tribes suffering deprivation, exclusion and planned evacuations throughout India do not even get reported in the mainstream media busy portraying the 'top 100 billionaires',ensex boom and electoral swings. By now it is a well-documented fact that the developmental model and its implementation mechanisms in the post-independence period were not only based on notions of inequality; but these often produced new hierarchies. Continuation of the hierarchical colonial judicial system, bureaucracy and education system reinforced and deepened the stratified and hierarchical social structure. All this led to multiple deprivations and multiple exclusions. On the one hand, the communities outside the margins of the village- tribal, nomad and communities labeled as 'criminal'– were perennially deprived of principles of equality and justice; on the other hand their 'traditional identity and culture' was threatened in the wake of 'modernisation'. These deprived and marginalised groups face two types of challenges today: First of all fighting for survival in the context of globalisation and secondly, relocating and re-constructing community identity and accordingly negotiating their relationship with wider society.

This is not an easy task by any means. Each of these challenges is defined by multilayered realities and contestations of various kinds. In the context of the Nehruvian model of planning with a mixed economy framework, the issue of survival was fraught with problems related to access to sources of livelihoods. However, the economic structure is changing so fast and so completely in the contemporary context of globalisation that skills required in the market have changed. At the same time, the state is no longer a 'welfare' one, with fewer resources for educational and vocational grants and subsidies aimed at welfare schemes and programmes. The very act of survival has become a battle in itself for the marginalised in this new context.

Breaking free from the given stamp of collective cultural identity, based on a

hierarchised conception of social structure constructed by colonial ideology, is another crucial challenge. As various communities go through the process of identity reformulation, a range of expressions of identity politics are coming to the fore. This is the time for making difficult choices. The communities concerned need to seriously discuss and debate various dimensions of survival and identity questions and decide the future course of action. A national seminar organised by the Department of Sociology, University of Pune, on 'De-notified and Nomadic Tribes: Issues and Perspectives' attempted the same by bringing together academicians, activists, community members and leaders and policy makers. In the two day long deliberations, there were multiple voices putting across a variety of perspectives and paradigms.

Many oppressed and neglected groups are voicing their newly articulated political consciousness and aspirations in the contemporary stage of democratisation of Indian society. The pastoral, nomadic and de-notified tribes are like 'dalits among the dalits' due to their multiple deprivations and social, political, economic and judicial exclusion. The stamp of criminality pushed the 'de-notified' or 'ex-criminals' outside the physical and social boundaries of the social organisation and made them eternal suspects. Their hyphenated existence today has continued to create suspicion and repression by the state and continues to reproduce educational, economic and political discrimination. In this sense they carry the 'double burden of Dalit-ness'. In Maharashtra, the genre of Dalit poetry and autobiographies brought the agonising conditions of dalits to the fore and underlined the systemic oppression and exploitation that they have had to face for centuries. This has galvanised many social movements and academic research projects, which have contributed new insights and given a new sharpness to scholarship in the field. In the decade of the 1980s the issues of nomadic communities received attention due to '*Upara*'(the outsider), an autobiography by Laxman Mane. At the national level, in recent times, whatever little has been written on these tribes has been due to the influence of the writings and actual mobilisational works by

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Mahashweta Devi.

In the years following Mahasweta Devi's intervention, Balkrishna Renke (who worked as the Chairperson of the Commission on the issues of De-notified and Nomadic tribes appointed by the Government of India and has recently submitted the report), Laxman Gaikwad (author of the autobiography— *Uchalya*— the pilferer) and many others committed themselves to activities ranging from conscientisation, mobilisation, design and implementation of welfare schemes (however meagre they are) and political consciousness and representation. All this culminated in the creation of a seminal document like *Vimuktayan* in Marathi. The public intellectual discourse in Maharashtra was certainly shaped and influenced by these and other related developments.

The workshop echoed some of these discourses, sensibilities and also articulated new voices. One thing was clear: 'Freedom' from the "British Raj" could not secure citizenship in the true sense for these communities; hence after experiencing sixty years of 'Swaraj' (independence) they have to rethink the issues of survival and sovereignty. The ontological principles framing the colonial anthropological discourses resulted in a specific perception of crimes and criminality. As a result, a separate category called 'criminal tribes' was created. In fact what is urgently required is deconstruction of the process of labelling these communities from various perspectives. This will explicate the dynamics of colonial policy— the specific stage of colonialism in which labelling was attempted, the specific objectives of such policy, its political, economic and socio-cultural ramifications and so on. In one sense, creating the binary notions of 'citizen' and 'criminal' was an important part of the process of colonial expansion. The labelling of communities was thus a part of a strategy to wipe out all possible and potential forms of protests, rebellion and resistance to the colonial rule. Communities with strong local traditions of knowledge making, mobility, and productivity had only two choices: To be a part of the colonial or ruling ideology, based on the claim to be a part of the normative mainstream of 'Indian society' (as understood by the British) or to invite the wrath of the colonial powers. The Nomadic were physically mobile, they possessed trading and commercial skills, and many of them were artisans and were considered by the so called mainstream to be 'outsiders'. Perhaps this very marginality made labelling and outcasting of some communities possible. Extensive research on these issues would clarify a great deal more of this process. Continuous physical movement characteristic of these communities implied loss of identity as citizens and hence the relationship between holding property and holding power in a village setting needs to be explored.

Another significant issue is the nature of the relationship with mainstream society. Assimilation was prescribed as the best possible strategy by colonial anthropologists and writings from structural-functional perspective influenced by it. This discourse portrayed all 'tribal communities' as the frozen historical forms of 'primitive' societies. Through the study of these tribes with their 'primitive' way of life, Western scholars aimed at analysing the legacy of humankind. The terms 'primitive communities', 'pre-modern', 'backward', 'uncivilised' supposedly leading a 'static life' suggested that these communities were passive, frozen, the 'exotic historical other' of the 'western present'. This facilitated the use of indological approach to study these communities.

The civilisational perspective highlighted the cultural and normative commonalities between tribal communities and the Great Indian civilisation and hence refused to acknowledge their cultural specificities or distinct collective identities. It treated them as but small pieces of the great collage. During the colonial period, the 'Salvation Army' designed and controlled the 'settlements' for the 'criminal tribes'. In the post-independence period the alternatives offered to the DTNTs were assimilation, adaptation and accommodation. A combination of assimilationist and civilisational perspectives influenced policy making and academic writings. The official policy of 'National Integration' clearly implied this.

The contemporary challenge for academicians and activists is multifold: To go beyond the legal label of DTNTs and bring out the specificity of Garudi, Ramoshi, Takara, Chchara, Chchapparband, Bhamta, and the like by focusing on their respective subjective experiences: On the one hand, bring out the differences among them; and on the other hand, bring them together through a cultural identity for a fight for justice and equality. These contemporary challenges can be met only by strategising in multiple ways: Material and cultural, constructive and confrontational, immediate and long-term.

By focusing on the specificities of various communities— some known as 'nomadic', some as 'pastoral' and yet others as 'De-notified'— many speakers in this conference deconstructed and scrutinised the category called 'DTNT' itself. They brought out the regional, historical specificities, varied local knowledge traditions and skills acquired by various communities to underscore the internal differentiation within this broad administrative category. Midlata Rani focused on the De-notified tribal communities of the Mysore Princely State and argued how the Criminalising Act was in fact irrelevant in that context due to the lack of implementation. Avinash Gaikwad gave the history of the 'Black' Act labelling communities as inherently 'criminal'

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and commented on the Missionary management of Sholapur, Baramati, Mundhawa and Daund Criminal settlements in Maharashtra. Though he acknowledged that these settlements offered formal education and some skill training to the residents; he pointed out that the practices of surveillance and the paradigm of 'punishment', which resulted in deep humiliation, is not even mentioned. He argued that all the communities labelled as DTNTs are not at the same level of socio-economic and educational development. Though Kanjarbhats, Kaikadis, Banjaras, Rajputs, Takari and Vanjara are more advanced than others; he also pointed out certain commonalities between DTNT communities like landlessness, resourcelessness, lack of political representation, subjection to state oppression and continuous suspicion. Malli Gandhi gave a history of the DTNT settlements established by the British in Andhra Pradesh. Inhabitants at some settlement camps like Kalichedu, Sitanagaram and Lingala experienced some improvements in their lives, by virtue of the mobility they attained through educational opportunities in these colonies. However, the very reformist assumptions that ruled these closed settlements, need to be scrutinised and dissected, particularly the ideology of 'disciplining' imposed on them. Gandhi reiterated that poverty is the biggest challenge that the de-notified tribes are facing even today and provision of new assets and livelihood opportunities alone can help to solve this problem.

While portraying the situation of the DTNTs in Ahmednagar District, Arun Jadhav focused more on the women as they are, according to him, 'slaves of the slaves'. The Caste Panchayats based on traditional, community diktats still operate as 'quasi-sovereign' systems, as G. S. Ghurye had called them, and are successful in oppressing and dehumanising members, women in particular, in the name of continuing the 'tradition', he added. These 'traditional judicial systems' still surpass the egalitarian and democratic spirit of the Constitution of India, and the authority of the judiciary.

The issue of 'tradition' is very significant and it has been repeatedly discussed in current social science discourses. Can tradition be defined in singular or in an essentialised, homogenised way? What is termed as 'traditional' may be a contemporary reincarnation of certain values and practices thus put forward for various reasons by certain groups and camps. If this is so, then to simply demand 'preservation of tradition' or its 'revival' as protection of identity can mean obstructing the dynamics of change. Within the cultural, moral and ideational ethos called 'tradition', there are many customs, rituals, rites that can open up emancipatory spaces within the received framework of the community, which could even

counter the hegemonic value systems of the caste system. At the same time there are certain elements that reiterate the established norms of the ruling ideology. What is crucial then is an open discussion within the community about what is 'tradition', what aspects of that received 'tradition' can be accepted and continued as they open up opportunities for transformation for all, and how to 'preserve' tradition.

An entire session was devoted to issues related to pastoral and nomadic communities. This nomadic segment is affected by expansion of farmlands, shrinking pastures and commons, policies related to globalisation and resultant constraints on livelihood opportunities. Anita Sharma presented her observations based on the study of Bakarwala community in Kashmir. While she argued that poverty, exclusion from developmental processes and educational exclusion are the salient features of the nomadic communities today, she also attempted to lay out the complex relations between instability, uncertainty, nomadic life and religious identity. The relationship of the nomadic communities with the State is at least two dimensional. On the one hand, the government tries to 'settle' these communities and freeze their mobility; on the other, it uses these communities for the 'vote bank politics' that all political parties resort to. She illustrated these dynamics through an analysis of the education of Bakarwala children. Though the government has established hostels for Bakarwala children in each district, the children enrolled therein are cut off from the traditional knowledge making systems and occupational skills, for example, knowledge of the geography, biosphere and medicinal herbs, etc. Within the realm of formal education, the not-so-sympathetic approach of the teachers and hostel wardens, limitations of the curricula and the community's negative approach to education together result in drop outs at the middle school level. Girl children cannot even reach that level of education. Her main argument in this context was that the educational system should be designed in such a manner that community skills and wisdom is also put to use so that they will be able to maintain their separate identity and yet combat poverty.

Nitya Ghotage, using the human rights perspective, argued for protection of social, economic and legal rights of the pastoral communities. She analysed the broader context of pastoral mode of production, which has evolved through ecologically suitable methods. For example in low rainfall zones, growth or decline of production and assets depend on local ecological dynamics clubbed with invention of new species, and/or migration. Some members of the pastoral communities migrate seasonally or cultivate land and are semi-nomadic, yet sharing the ethos of pastoralism in general. In

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spite of these differences, she argued in favour of taking a consolidated view of the issues of the pastoral and nomadic communities. As an occupation, animal husbandry depends on access to common grazing lands and pastures, and therefore availability of public land. In the context of globalisation, the growth of cities, private land ownership, expansion of land under cultivation and in general, the dominant developmental model threatens pastoralism as a livelihood system and a way of life. This is aggravating marginalisation of pastoral and nomadic communities. The government's development schemes too threaten the rights of the pastoral communities. For example, classification of land under various categories like forests, grazing land, private land and taxable properties restricts the conventional rights of grazing cattle on the commons.

It is interesting to see how neo-liberalism and conservationism deprive the nomadic and pastoral communities in different ways. For neo-liberals expansion of production or establishment of industry are the primary aim. Expansion of irrigation facilities leading to augmentation of land under cultivation throughout the year creates competitors for resources between farmers and pastorals and the construction of new medium and large dams close the conventional migration routes of the pastoral communities. Establishing SEZs also displaces the entire livelihood system of pastures and those who depend on it. Interestingly, the conservationist discourse also deprives them either through social forestry (wherein varieties of trees useless for cattle and sheep are proliferated) or through ban on grazing in watershed areas.

Vinay Mahajan presented a historical review of pastoral and nomadic communities. After 1950, the government allotted land to some of the communities and thus converted them into settled communities. Eventually expansion of cultivation and Green Revolution resulted in the alienation of these communities from their sources of livelihood. He commented on the survival strategies of these communities including changing migratory routes, modifying the strategies of tending cattle or working as unskilled labour in the unorganised sector for daily wages. His paper highlighted the need to move beyond the binary of peasant cultivators versus the pastorals. This could be the only way to forge a dialogical relationship between farm production and pastoralism. Otherwise watershed development programmes will endanger nomadic and pastoral communities.

Ajay Dandekar and Kanji Patel commented on the troubled relationship between the pastoral communities and the state. Dandekar presented a rapid historical review of the post-independence period, to argue that the developmental model chosen resulted in unequal

social relations, sustained by the government through coercion. He put forth a scathing criticism of the laws passed, policies designed and implemented, and proposed bills in the name of principles in the constitution and argued that discontent among the masses across the sub-continent is produced by the erstwhile developmental model. Nomadic communities have been worst hit by these strategies and policies; and the New Economic Policies are worsening their plight. According to him, the de-notified, nomadic tribes face three major questions today: Citizenship rights, land rights and political rights. Since the state is no longer a 'welfare' state, can the voluntary organisations provide a solution to this problem? Referring to the simmering discontent across the quiet woods and hills in India, he claimed that the issues of these deprived communities need urgent attention.

Kanji Patel referred to the unparalleled contribution of Mahashweta Devi and her colleagues. He proposed a two-pronged strategy to address the issues relating to de-notified tribes: Acknowledgment of legal and political rights, along with conservation of 'traditions' and rejuvenation of cultural legacy. The de-notified tribes maintain that they are deprived of 'desh' and 'jati'— the two organising principles of the Indian society. Some of the communities feel that they can attain justice only by claiming a place in the caste hierarchy, as they expressed in one of the gatherings, he added.

Activists Vandana Gaikwad, Gulab Waghmode, Daxin Bajrange, Anil Pande and Laxman Chavan shared and analysed their varied experiences and observations while working in various villages and small colonies. Together they highlighted the stigma of criminality, which leads to constant humiliation, suspicion by government authorities and others alike, material exclusions and deprivations leading to lack of citizenship rights and dignity coupled with police atrocities, custodial deaths, and challenges in mobilisations. Vandana Gaikwad elaborated on how women are still under the influence of Hindu caste system. She narrated how women who wanted to join the developmental mainstream through 'self help groups' were harassed by the police. Daxin Bajrange brought forth the ghetto-like situation in a Chhara neighbourhood in Ahmedabad. The young generation cannot afford to declare their community status as it would lead to deprivation and stigmatisation. At the same time the issue is not of education and employment; but of honour and dignity, he asserted.

Swayam Panda and V. Lalitha discussed the implications of various government policies. Lalitha discussed the reformist work done under Gandhian influence by Gora, and his son and daughter-in-law Lavanam and Hemalata in

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Stuartpuram settlement colony in Andhra Pradesh. The attitude of the local police could be transformed due to the work of a voluntary organisation called Samskar, she said. Dilip D' Souza, the famous journalist, showed how observations of contemporary life of the ex-criminal and nomadic tribes present a montage of optimistic and pessimistic frames.

Looking back at all the presentations in this seminar it is clear that there are multiple voices among academics and activists regarding the deprivation and humiliation faced by the nomadic and de-notified tribes and the ways to combat it. Strategies and tactics ranging from use of any available means including violence, resistance to government machinery to mobilisation, obtaining rights through revival of cultural legacy, identity politics and reiteration of identity within the caste system were discussed and analysed.

Senior scholars and activists like Ganesh Devi and Balkrishna Renke participated in the workshop. Prof. Devi illustrated how the imaginary category of the 'Thug' was created by British rulers and was inculcated in the minds of those deputed in India to curb resistance. He urged the need to go beyond myths of different kinds and push demands for reservation and political representation. Renke took note of the different voices among the nomadic and de-notified tribes. In his inaugural address he said that these stigmatised communities not only want to shed the stigma, but also claim sunlight today! His appropriate use of the metaphor summed up the range of aspirations of the nomadic and de-notified tribes. Creative use of new strategies would help towards success in the struggle, he asserted.

Rudolf Heredia asserted that the issues of the nomadic and de-notified tribes have to be tackled within the discourse of the nation-state. He discussed the contemporary plight of these

communities within the context of colonial policies, the label of criminality to control their nomadic lifestyle and the history of the Salvation Army and its role in 'reforming through control' within the settlements. According to him, methodologically, poetic ethnography is the only strategy to translate these experiences. He argued that if these communities are studied as minority communities, such a perspective will define their rights only in terms of community cultural rights. It is debatable, as he rightly suggested, whether these communities can be said to have such 'common cultural rights' to address their contemporary issues.

What remains to be seen is whether the political space required for the realisation of the individualistic, modernist aspirations expressed by those hailing from the de-notified tribes can be actually made available at all. Another dilemma is whether their cultural identity can be defined in terms of the cultural legacy within institutions like the 'Caste Panchayat', which blatantly violates women's rights. Are we then talking about cultural legacy in terms of select cultural elements or preservation of institutional features of 'the tradition' reinvented by the leadership as tradition, which is always invented at various points of time? Since cultural identity is created through contestations and confrontations with the wider society at any given point in history, is it possible to preserve distinct cultural traditions in the fast changing world?

In the near future some of the answers will be clearer since the first National Commission on the issues of the nomadic and de-notified tribes has already presented its report and recommendations. Hopefully, some new legal and policy frameworks will evolve. At least a meaningful beginning can be made with these developments.



<http://www.robmillard.com/archives/globalization.png>

Disputes over Environmental Pollution Accidents: Case Study of China¹



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Abstract

Along with its rapid development, China has had to confront more and more environmental problems, one of which is frequent occurrence of environmental disputes. In this study, two typical cases that occurred in China in 2006 are used to discuss the risks of increasing environmental pollution accidents. Increasing pollution accidents not only led to increased health risks, but also a growing number of environmental disputes that affect national safety and social stability. An environmental conflict has often occurred following a pollution accident in urban and rural junctions of China in which a development zone or industrial park is usually located. Few environmental conflicts were resolved successfully through litigation in the past several decades. They were usually solved in an ad hoc manner, not systematic enforcement. Necessary legal mechanism is required urgently in China in order to maintain the people's rights and interests.

Information reports on accidents are difficult to obtain and often there is a time lapse between the event and the report. More work needs to be done in this regard in China.

The majority of firms operate without environmental permission, showing the weaknesses in environmental management. E.I.A (Environmental Impact Assessment) is an important tool in environmental management for deliberating various claims concerning proposed activities. In China, a more strict implementation of the E.I.A. is required.

Introduction

With the growth of environmental awareness, the need for harmony between human beings and the environment as a major goal of human progress is becoming a commonplace.² Rapid economic development can undoubtedly enhance people's quality of life. However, they should be applied with an awareness of the nature of existing environments. Mismatches between development and environments can cause more and more environmental conflicts.

Environmental conflicts are social disputes that sprang up during the 1970s, involving grassroots organisations, the environmental movement, developers, industries, civil service and regulatory agencies, with the government acting as an entrepreneur introducing public improvements. Issues related to environmental policies focus on democratisation, building up participative capacities, empowering community groups, cooperation between the state, market

and society, shared management and partnerships among the many different political players, paving the way for this set of proposals.³

In the developing countries, environmental conflicts flare up sharply over issues linked to social inequalities. In rural areas, these clashes are triggered more by the seizure of natural resources (land, water or forests) or the preservation of indigenous peoples and protection for poverty-stricken families living in these areas. These disputes are called "ecological and distributive" by Guha and Martinez-Alier.⁴ In urban areas, these conflicts are prompted by the takeover of land and the benefits of government investments, or mitigating and offsetting the impacts of development projects.⁵ In this article, environmental conflicts refer specifically to mass protests over environmental pollution.

Several factors have led to a rapid increase of such disputes in China. These include the recent spurt in China's environmental protection

1 The interactions and advice of Dr. Liu Zhi-quan and Zhu Jun of China Environmental Protection Administration are appreciated. Partial support for this research came from the major project of Ministry of Education for Philosophy and Social Sciences in China through grant 06JZD0020.

2 Sachihiko Harashima, "Environmental Dispute Resolution Process and Information Exchange", *Environmental Impact Assessment Review*, 15, 1995, pp. 69-80.

3 Celso Simoes Bredariol and Alessandra Magrini, "Conflicts in developing countries: a case study from Rio de Janeiro", *Environmental Impact Assessment Review*, 23, 2003, pp. 489-513.

4 R. Guha and J. Martinez-Alier, *Varieties of Environmentalism*, Earthscan, London, 1997.

5 Bredariol and Magrini, "Conflicts in developing countries".

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work in various fields, the thorough development of civic environmental awareness, awareness of the law and universal rights, awareness arising from environmental pollution and environmental damage. "Mass protests over environmental pollution have been on the rise in recent years, increasing at a rate of almost 30 per cent a year, and they often occurred in economically developed regions", said the head of the State Environment Protection Administration (SEPA) in a meeting with local environment protection officials nationwide.⁶ This environmental problem has become one of the main factors that affect national safety and social stability.

Through two typical cases that occurred in China in 2006, the paper discusses how the rising demand for a better environment, the increasing environmental pollution accidents have triggered high rates of environmental disputes or mass protests. It is important to study in-depth the reasons and characters of disputes so as to reduce their occurrence and resolve them successfully once they occur.

Cases

Incident 1

On 22 March 2006, an electrochemical company located in Ningbo Daxie Development Zone caused sparking due to electrical short circuit, which led liquid chlorine residue in the pipeline to leak out for about ten minutes. The company did not report to any managerial department nor inform the nearby residents, but dealt with it as a simple production accident and resumed production soon, in fact, on the same day after the accident. The accident caused residues to be left on the windward side of vicinal crop such as broad bean and cole roll causing an environmental hazard. Some nearby villagers reported dizziness, tightness of the chest, irritating cough, itching skin and other symptoms. On 28 March, 678 people reported to the hospital for medical examination, of which 51 were detained for observation, and two people suffered mild chlorine poisoning. Because of a misunderstanding, more than a hundred villagers besieged the factory and damaged its door.

The Environmental Protection Bureau of Ningbo City received reports of the accident on 23 March. The State Environmental Protection Administration got the information from the Office of the State Council of Information on the morning of 28 March. Field surveys and tracking of the whole process of dealing with were done thereafter.

On 26 March, Ningbo Daxie Development Zone ordered the company to stop production. On 28 March morning, the Ningbo City held a special meeting where an inspection group was set up with the deputy mayor in charge of security as its head to cope with the ramifications of the

accident.

According to expert assessments, about 100-120 kilograms of liquid chlorine leaked during the incident. The leaked Chlorine could be found 1.2 km from the site of the accident. A large area of broad bean leaves in the village curled. The chlorine spread over an area about 1,000 meters long and of 500 meters wide. The X-Ray reports of two of the victims showed patches on their lungs.

Incident 2

On 5 April 2006, more than forty villagers blocked a village's main thoroughfares in Zhejiang protesting against a company's sewage pipeline rupture that led to pickling wastewater spills, pollution of surface water and nearby wells. The environmental protection departments confirmed after inspection that the water of a number of wells in the village was contaminated by acid, and there was certain degree of organic pollution. Two suspected companies were notified to stop production. On 6 April, the Government arranged for safe drinking water through tap water pipes, and persuaded villagers to withdraw their agitation.

On 9 April, 29 villagers went to the hospital to ask for medical examination. Nine of them tested positive for occult blood urine. The thoroughfare was blocked again. The next day, some villagers ransacked the factory and assaulted the owner. Till the 15th, a total of 190 villagers participated in medical examinations, which resulted in 59 positive urine occult blood results. On the afternoon of 14 April, more than 60 villagers appealed to related departments and petitioned the government for the closure of enterprises, provision of monitoring data and paying medical expenses for them.

Field surveys by a joint investigation team composed of provincial and municipal public health and environmental protection departments showed: (1) There was no obvious correlation between the results of the urine test and the contaminants. (2) Urine test results of existing population in Nanshan Village were close to conventional and clinical normal distribution. (3) Enterprises adjacent to the Nanshan village do, to a certain extent, pollute the environment.

On 25 April, the local government again began a dialogue with the villagers. Compensation for health damage (but no specific amount of compensation) and announcement for environmental monitoring data were put forward by the villagers. Local government agreed with the villagers' demand of going to the EPA to get environmental monitoring data.

After the incident, the local environmental protection departments carried out continuous monitoring and investigation of hidden dangers. Investigation found that only one among thir-

⁶ http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2006-05/04/content_582631.htm.

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teen enterprises in the affected areas was allowed officially to produce for five years, the remaining twelve enterprises all had produced illegally for two years. These enterprises were all small-scale, equipped simply and without approval of environmental protection departments. They produced smaller, simple equipment, multi-workshops for the family mode of production. The wastes generated from production and processing are handled without any treatment.

After the investigation, the State Environmental Protection Administration required: The enterprises which did not implement E.I.A procedures immediately stop production, eliminate continuous production after the notice was issued; continue to strengthen monitoring, timely reporting monitoring data; investigation in other enterprises for hidden environmental dangers, and inconsistencies with the environmental protection procedures. On 27 April, the State Environmental Protection Administration also made specific plans for the complete removal of sources of pollution and dealing with contaminated water and soil.

Findings

There is no doubt that these two events were different in form, yet the reason for the incidents, exposed a lot in common in popular reactions, the information publishing process and the effects of the pollution-creating accident.

The exposed groups in the two incidents described here were similar. Both incidents happened in industrial areas which were in the vicinity of rural areas. The individuals affected in both accidents were villagers.

No information was published about the accidents until conflict occurred between the villagers and the polluting industries. The former occurred on 22 March 2006, but the State Environmental Protection Administration was informed six days after the incident. The latter occurred on 5 April 2006, while the State Environmental Protection Administration received the report from EPA of Zhejiang Province more than half a month later. Undoubtedly, the site survey data was not timely.

In the first incident, exposed individuals reported dizziness, chest tightness, irritating cough, skin itching and other acute symptoms. Only two were suspected to be victims of mild chlorine poisoning according to X-ray chest radiography. In the second incidents, 59 tested positive in urine test, but there was no obvious correlation between the results of the urine test and the contaminants according to the joint investigation by provincial and municipal public health and environmental protection departments.

Due to the damage to crops and fear of the adverse health effects, the two cases aroused disputes between villagers and polluting enterprises. Pollution prevention practices were

implemented by local government to appease angry villagers.

Comments

It is important to consider why there were so many points in common in both incidents. An important question is whether there were similar circumstances associated with each incident to explain the similarity between the two incidents. An in-depth causal analysis of the accidents and disputes is required.

Oversight on environmental management and lack of an emergency system were observed in the process of the firms' establishment and during the period of accident management, which probably led to more unnecessary damage. And the continued presence of a majority of firms without environmental permission shows the weaknesses in environmental regulation and corporate social responsibility.

As shown above, there is no legislation instructing related units to give any information in time about incidents to authorities. So, information on accidents depends on reports that have to be coaxed, and that too, after a considerable lapse of time after the events. Even then, many essential details of information go unreported. Accordingly, significant communication problems occurred in dealing with serious conflicts. More firms being honest or ethical in the way they behaved would be a good thing.

Due to the damage to crops and health, both cases aroused dispute between villagers and the polluting enterprises. According to China's Environmental Protection Law, a citizen has the right to challenge a firm's actions regarding violations of environmental laws and ask for compensation for damage, but few environmental conflicts were resolved in this way in the past several decades, and so was the case with these two incidents. Difficulty of proof, an expensive legal process and difficulty in identifying the causal relations between pollution and damage are the major obstacles.

Fear of the unknown was a significant reason for many disputes. This fear was not limited to short-term tangible environmental impact but included uncertainties as to what long-term impact a pollution accident could have in the future. Debates frequently centre on the type of effects on health experienced, often couched in terms of 'true' effects—objectively measurable—versus 'perceived' effects. The possibility that there might be an effect on health is frequently voiced in the absence of sound epidemiological evidence against which to judge claims.

Local protectionism interferes with environmental monitoring. In China, the law gives the Department of Environmental Protection the right to inspect, fine and propose changes. But at the local level, the right to inspect is often blocked. The orders to stop or limit production are often not being approved and adopted by

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
local governments. Some local governments even openly develop local policies focusing on the protection of enterprises.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Along with its rapid development, China has had to confront more and more environmental problems, one of which is frequent occurrence of polluting accidents and related disputes, but it was not until after the Ninth Five-Year Plan that most Chinese from the top down began to develop the kind of consciousness about environmental issues that has played such a role in domestic politics and economy. With the growth of environmental awareness, disputes caused by environmental accidents have increased rapidly. Through two typical cases that occurred in China in 2006, this paper discussed the increasing environmental accidents that have triggered a growth of environmental disputes which affected national safety and social stability. It is very important to find a way to resolve this kind of dispute in regional development. The major groups involved in these disputes are contractors, local and national governments, and local residents (villagers). The major causes of environmental disputes are health damage and fear of the unknown. As residents of an area are directly affected by the sustainability of their environment, their approval is critical to dispute resolution. Under the current practice, efforts towards the dispute resolution are left to the somewhat arbitrary discretion of regulatory officials or firms in their dealings with the public.

Our study shows the critical need for more structured ways to deliberate issues of collective choice rights in the formal regulatory process.

Finally, we would like to emphasise that the continued presence of a large number of firms without environmental permission shows the weaknesses in environmental management in China. As we all know, E.I.A. (Environmental Impact Assessment) is an important tool in environmental management for deliberating various claims concerning proposed activities. The E.I.A. requires the preparation of a report to provide advice to decision-makers with respect to the environmental soundness of a project. The E.I.A. has since evolved to become a process by which conditions to mitigate adverse impacts are developed. These assessments are used to help define the types of activities that can or cannot be conducted in certain types of geographic areas, to define the conditions under which permitted activities may take place, or to define acceptable thresholds for certain quantities of activities or release of substances in given environments based upon scientific findings. A stricter E.I.A. is required in China. The administrative and enforcement power of environmental laws and regulations are also needed to be strengthened. At the very minimum, regulatory officials can develop guidelines for firms who see the value and efficacy of addressing issues of both operational and collective choice rights based on the lessons learned thus far.



http://www.geographyalltheway.com/ib_geography/ib_globalization/imagesetc/globalization_image.jpg

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Globalisation: Contemporary Trends and Events Report of a Tri-partite (Local-governments, NGOs, and Academics) Meeting held at Gandhigram, 20-21 October 2008 Rajiv Gandhi Chair for Panchayati Raj Studies, Gandhigram Rural University, Tamil Nadu



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Introduction

Globalisation, as an international system, has now replaced several old systems. It has its own rules, logic and route that today directly or indirectly influence the economies, politics, environment, society, and thus lives of people of virtually every country in the world. Some consider that development brought about by globalisation is environmentally disastrous and unsustainable. Some think globalisation will improve the chances for most people for greater opportunity, democracy, and that the world after globalisation is getting flat with no disparities. Some want to get the economics right. Some want to get the politics right. Some, especially the Civil Society Organisations, want to steer it to be people-centric. One considered view is that globalisation needs to be managed well—through domestic policy interventions and appropriate institutional structures—so as to minimise the abhorrent effects on the poor and on their livelihoods.

This is based on the premise that economic and technological integration of economies, although they may render a few positive results in terms of economic growth and access to technologies, the balance sheet analysis shows that it has created a few assets and a lot of liabilities in India. The government is busy manoeuvring the economic growth rate, and pushing multilateral mega projects through. They have, perhaps, no time to address the equity question; they have no time to analyse if it benefits the rural poor. Eventually, the understanding is that economic integration benefits some, and hurts many. Especially, it has very little or almost nothing to offer to the poor in the

villages. But, the plans rolled out one after another reveal sufficiently clearly that it grabs several things of the poor such as land, water, and other livelihood resources posing 'the economic efficiency of resource use' as the alleged reason.

The Extremities

Decentralisation or devolution of powers is found to be a good strategy for social development, whereas centralisation, that is global integration, is advocated for business development. Tenet-wise these two concepts—globalisation and decentralisation—are at two extremities. The coincidence is that in India, these two concepts started taking shape exactly at the same period of time. Interestingly, both the ideas were introduced by the Central government of India—one for devolution of powers and the other for integration of Indian economy into the global free-market trend. This called for co-existence of both the concepts. But the fundamental clash in the basic tenets, often, makes the interactions inevitably incompatible or discordant. Decentralisation believes in people's power and democracy. Globalisation believes in population and market mechanisms. Decentralisation asserts the rights of the locale in determining sustainable use of resources for livelihood needs, whereas globalisation makes an 'economic efficiency calculation' in resource use. Decentralisation revolves around democratic principles, and globalisation revolves around the market principles.

The Workshop

A tripartite-meeting held with leaders of local self-governments, NGOs and academics from

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seven districts of Tamil Nadu identified that there are several things that the Village Panchayats have to take up, to be able to manage the onslaught of globalisation. The programme was organised on 20-21 October 2008 by the Rajiv Gandhi Chair for Panchayati Raj Studies of the Department of Political Science and Development Administration, Gandhigram Rural University, Madurai. This two-day meeting had a series of sessions discussing various topics including a SWOT analysis to understand the contemporary trends and events that affect rural lives, livelihoods, and grassroots level democracy.

Objectives

The theme of the discussion revolved around identifying trends and events along with ways and means to manage globalisation at the grassroots level so as to find ways to safeguard natural resources and rural livelihoods.

Notable Remarks

The workshop remarked that first of all, from the point of view of resource-use and the natural recouping ability of environment globalisation is unsustainable. Secondly, the processes tend to take democratic institutions at the grassroots easy. Thirdly, countries world over prove that while competition to put in the best of everyone's effort and sharing of technologies is good, unfettered free-market capitalism and reckless adoption of globalisation policies result in economic volatility so that even the best of minds are unable to predict the tentacles and the fallout. When the speed, especially at the macro level, is reckless and overwhelmingly complex, the ability to visualise the likely repercussions become extremely difficult. This curtails our ability to pin down exactly the loose ends to prescribe solutions, before landing in quicksand. Being a connected-economy limits the possibility for insulating. One solace is that the issues at the grassroots are considerably clear. That is, the micro-level issues that affect ordinary citizens and rural livelihoods are sufficiently clear. The issues have been dealt with in detail in the earlier works of Rajiv Gandhi Chair for Panchayati Raj Studies.¹

Another notable comment is that India has been cautiously slow or rather the government is not freely allowed by the leftist movements, local bodies and other civil society organisations to take the reform process too fast. Perhaps, this is one of the reasons how the country has been saved from the economic turmoil the world is facing today. Moreover, this turmoil does not bother the poor or the NGOs or the civil society that works for ordinary citizens, because a downturn in stock market bothers only big inves-

tors and not the downtrodden people, unless it reflects in the prices of essential commodities. But, [Marxist and Gandhian] ideologues, who, since the beginning of the introduction of the unfettered free-market capitalism, have been raising their voice against it have a strong reason to increase the pitch of their scream. It looks, for trying out globalisation policies, a coalition government at the Centre is good, so that the strings of control are multiple and the steering cannot be reckless.

The state and Central governments of India cannot afford to ignore the rural poor, because they are the majority that determine who would hold positions of power in the subsequent elections. Therefore, while the government wants to accelerate the pace of introduction of globalisation and privatisation processes, there are also social safety nets introduced for the poor and those in agriculture. But, the general comment about such schemes is: Applying 'expired balm' to a hammering headache.

The general tendency observed about globalisation during the discussions is that it benefits some who have (or have access to) capital, technology, knowledge and information, and political power centres. The support that globalisation gets from the government is far too high compared to what decentralisation gets. The patronage of political players to the process of privatisation and globalisation is very clear because in many cases they also turn out to be beneficiaries of globalisation. The workshop commented that globalisation benefits some and hurts many. The pity is that the many who are hurt are in the villages dependent on agriculture or traditional arts and crafts. There has also been almost a prophetic belief that globalisation would fall because of its own weight, mainly because its tenets do not take into account nature's recouping ability. Man outrunning nature, rapidly depleting resources is hysterical and unsustainable. The drive towards economic growth rate fails to recognise that nature has only a limited amount of resources, that it cannot sustain uncontrolled production and unrestrained consumerist culture. While making statement that globalisation would fall soon, one concern concurrently expressed is it is very much likely that globalisation would cause damages to the natural environment beyond repair, before it collapses.

The factors of production commonly needed for any entrepreneurial venture (or for production function to take place) are land, labour, capital, knowledge and information assets. The rural poor generally have land and labour. But they usually do not own the other factors like capital,

¹ See G. Palanithurai and R. Ramesh, *Globalisation: Issues at the Grassroots*, Concept Publishing Company, New Delhi, 2008.

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information and knowledge. The Special Economic Zones robbed them of their lands placing capital in their hands. In the SEZ bargain the land-owners have been given a liquid asset (cash) in lieu of a permanent asset (land). Land value keeps appreciating day in and day out, whereas money value keeps depreciating. It is generally considered all over India that the investment one makes in land is the wisest investment one can make. When this is the socio-economic reality, the government acquires land from the land owners in the villages to be given to private moneyed people to set up units in Special Economic Zone. To the private investor, the money invested in the company may fail, but the money he invested in land never fails.

Those who speak highly in favour of globalisation tend to make reference to computers, broad band internet connectivity, the mind-boggling amount of information available on the World Wide Web, the drastic reduction in mobile phone charges, e-ticketing, e-banking, outsourcing that has become a trend all over, and such other activities. Similarly, when they talk about technology they most often refer to high-speed computers, printers, mega capacity servers, and mobile phones. They hardly ever seem to think what percentage of villagers has access to broad band connections, and what percentage of villagers actually have any use to computer or e-ticketing or e-banking services or can afford to access telemedicine facilities.

The condition of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) commenced in many of the villages is, they have either shut down, or are being used for playing computer games by school children for which they should put their signatures in a Users' Register to be shown to the sponsor. The original purpose of reaching the farmers with farm or price related-information did not materialise due to various reasons including non-availability of contents in the local language. Given the rapidity of the dynamics, arriving at ways to manage globalisation from below could only be timid, provisional and exploratory.

SWOT Analysis

The workshop felt that before getting down to identifying strategies to manage globalisation, it would be in order if the participants were put to analyse and discuss the strength, weakness, opportunities, and threats found in globalisation. The popular SWOT Analysis technique was put to use so as to get an overall idea of globalisation. The following is the summary of the SWOT Analysis exercise. The points that emerged during the SWOT Analysis helped identify lead-points to discuss about ways to manage globalisation.

Strength

- India is blessed with a lot of natural resources and favourable climatic condition for production to take place uninhibit-

edly. (However, the legislations and policies to make use of the resources being so weak from the point of view of regulating over exploitation, is a big drawback.)

- India is rich in human resources, and there is also educated and skilled human potential to take on any competition from outside.
- The nuances/niceties associated with traditional crafts and arts are amazing. (But, the weakness is that they are facing the danger of becoming extinct due to insufficient government support.)
- There is constant scheme-based effort made by the state and the central governments to ensure minimum basic necessities to the people, assured rural employment and to provide them with communication, road and other basic infrastructure.
- The government makes 'domestic preparedness' efforts to enable India face globalisation. This includes general infrastructure development such as road expansion, capacity building training programmes, entrepreneurial development programmes, computerisation of banks, railways etc. and new schemes in brining about quality education, quality health care, rural poverty reduction programmes, urban poverty reduction programmes, and agriculture development programmes.

Weakness

- The legislations and policies to make use of the natural resources are very weak from the point of view of regulating over exploitation.
- There is still illiteracy, and plenty of unskilled labourers in rural areas.
- Blanket-type (uniform) schemes introduced especially by the central government all over India often results in locales getting mismatched.
- Despite the existence of constitutionally recognised local self-governance system, the bureaucracy has a tendency to take an upper hand in key decision-making of local area development.
- The land holding pattern is such that many of the agricultural engineering technologies cannot be put to use. Moreover, the farmers are not aware of the technologies relating to agriculture including post-harvesting technologies.
- There are a plenty of small scale and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) including the ones managed by SHGs. They lack orientation on quality, package, branding and competition, which restrains them within a limited circle, and eventually become commercially unviable, or sick.

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- There are certain traditionally respected and ethnic products like *khadi*, natural dyed fabrics, home-made edible oils and hair oil etc. which are struggling to make an existence in the market. This is due to the arrival of branded items in the market, especially the ones imported, or manufactured by foreign companies located in India. The concept of 'Be Indian Buy Indian' has become an old-fashioned statement. The concerns are: (a) These trades and those involved in such trades getting sidelined, and (b) The psychic-attraction towards foreign goods.
- There is great influence of 'cash economy' even among agriculturists. So, there is a general tendency among the farmers to 'sell water' meant for irrigation, and sell even cultivable land for real estates, if it would fetch a good return in terms of cash.
- Despite governmental efforts on providing quality education and quality health care, the recourse people take to government run schools and hospitals is insufficient.

Opportunities

- The use of computers and internet is spreading cutting across disciplines and sectors.
- There is wide-spread introduction of technologies in all fields including agriculture and horticulture. But processes that would enable reach and orient farmers to use them are quite insufficient.
- The amount of information made available is plenty. But, the mechanism to make them available is limited.
- India has abundance of resources including medicinal herbs, indigenous medicines and local medicine manufacturing processes, which could be patented with proper geographical indications.
- The price of mobile phones and telephone charges have come down, creating opportunity from everyone to own a cell-phone. But, economic efficiency of such use (or incurring such expenses) by villagers require to be studied.

Threats

- One of the greatest threats is over-exploitation of natural resources, which free-trade advocates. The common property resources are cashed in on by private profiteering interest with the support of the government, or people with high level political connections.
- The fast reduction in the number of people in agriculture, and the perceptible migration of rural people to urban areas is a threat to urban civic facilities. At the

same time, while the need for food production requires to be increased, there is a considerable chunk retiring from agriculture.

- For Tamil Nadu to remain a food secure state it is necessary to create alternative income opportunities from livestock and small stocks. The reduction of grazing land because of lands being given for SEZ purposes, force rural people sell off their livestock.
- The attraction people get in foreign goods results in indigenous products to remain on the shelf unsold. Those involved in traditional arts and crafts such as carpenters, blacksmiths, goldsmiths, brassware workers, potters, sculptors are finding it difficult to find a market in order to make a living.
- The consumerist culture that is spreading fast even among rural people burns a hole in the pocket of rural people, forcing them to borrow in order to own motor cycles and the women to get beauty conscious and buy unnecessary cosmetic products.
- The consumerist culture has generally made the cost of living much higher even in villages. They have been forced to go in search of 'cash income' in order to maintain the facilities they have learnt to live with.
- Basic services particularly primary and secondary education, drinking water, and health services have become costly in the hands of private players in the market. Availing these services is beyond the reach of common man, when the governmental service is poor.
- The demand for alternative uses of [especially] land and water has brought into question 'the use-right of indigenous community' on these resources. There is constant unrest and struggle taking place to establish their use-right on these livelihood resources.

There is urgent need to reduce the 'weakness' and tide over the 'threats'. The strength and opportunities should be put to proper use in order to manage globalisation. The strength should be efficiently used for seizing the opportunities, and the weakness identified should be gradually surmounted so as not be gulped down by the threats. The points mentioned during the SWOT Analysis exercise greatly benefited while devising ways to manage globalisation at the grassroots level and at the policy level. 'Domestic or local level Preparedness' to take these threats on was felt essential, rather than allowing to be crushed in a stampede.

Certain clarifications could be given as follows for the information of those who intensely op-

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pose globalisation. First, one should take notice that an economy cannot choose to remain a closed economy and stagnate. Several countries all over the world has outsourced jobs to India especially in the IT, automobile, cell phones, and manufacturing sectors. This has generated considerable employment to the educated youth here. India has, perhaps, the largest number of computer literate persons today. This forces one to think that there is need to open up. But, managing at the macro-level is needed to determine which sector to open up, and to what extent to open up. The purpose of opening up should not be content with showing economic growth rate on paper, which makes no sense to the poor in the villages. Specific policy measures and schemes should be introduced to ensure equity in distribution of wealth.

Secondly, prosperity at the cost of depleting natural resources beyond nature's recouping ability cannot be encouraged. Thirdly, there is no country on this earth that has become developed merely through agriculture promotion or production of primary commodities alone. We cannot afford to brush aside things like industrial development, and digital connectivity in the name of *swadeshi*. However, national sovereignty and democratic character of the country or the local bodies cannot be compromised for the sake of economic growth. Similarly, the decisions of the international bodies such as the World Bank, IMF cannot be imposed on India to the extent that it could be addressed as imperialism by any section of the local population.

The workshop found three ways of facing or managing globalisation. The approach we adopt for 'managing globalisation' could depend on the sector in hand and the nature of issues each sector is likely to come out with. The nature of globalisation processes is such that it cannot be let deregularised completely, nor can it be blindly asserted that it should be completely shunned. The cross-cutting nature of some of the issues is one of the reasons for this state of affairs. The right approach of facing globalisation could be adopting a cautiously selective acceptance approach; and showing resistive protection wherever there is a need. The following are the approaches the workshop came up with. But, these approaches should be put to use in combination with others depending upon the changing circumstances or situation in hand.

Managing Globalisation

There are certain strengths and opportunities in the globalised world that even villagers can aim to get benefited from. For instance, this can be of increase in the communication facilities that almost every villager gets access to. However, even the mobile phone facility cannot be mentioned as benefiting the rural community if it was argued on economic efficiency or cost-benefit calculations. The drastic reduction in the tele-

phone charges, knowledge enhancement with regard to sanitary practices and orientation towards quality standards in manufacturing practices and identifying multiple ways of reaching the consumers, SHGs and Panchayats getting access to computers and computer-aided accounting are some of the benefits.

This is based on the premise that even the poor in the villages can aim for reasonable gain if they put in efforts, and change or upgrade the way they work. Globalisation requires people to remain relevant and deliver goods and services that the market demands. This is applicable to everyone including agriculturists, artisans, crafts-persons, business people and those in services. The youth in the villages are fast getting oriented towards delivering to the demands of the market, which is a good trend.

Conclusion

Policy initiatives that promote large-scale privatisation of natural resources, especially land and water are real challenges. This remains a real threat to the rural livelihoods. However, given the geographical area of India, and the size of population, the government argues that it is only miniscule. No matter whether it is miniscule or large-scale, if a policy initiative floated in the interest of privatisation would displace the poor, make the land owners landless, and distance the poor from accessing livelihood resources, such policy can only be addressed as retrogressive. No matter whatever be the contribution it makes to the growth prospects of the country, the poor does not understand what it is all about, and how it benefits him. No policy should, even inadvertently, attempt to marginalise the farming community, or further marginalise the poor.

Similarly, any policy that does not guarantee a fair price to the primary producers— when it can assure huge profit to the agents and secondary producers— could only be seen as retrogressive only. When setting up of industrial units in the SEZs can enjoy duty-free existence, and avail tax concessions in almost all their transactions for several years, while at the same time if any policy initiative was made to cut down subsidies for agriculture, it has to be addressed as retrogressive. Opening up to the introduction of technologies in various sectors without making sufficient domestic preparation, or capacity building, would be addressed as retrogressive.

The issues are, by and large, clear. The force of globalisation pushes subsistence agriculture to commercial agriculture. Moving from protectionism to competition is the trend. Moving from primary producer to value-addition is what the market demands. The state is not as big as it used to be. In the globalised economy, the market has grown in size and it can decide the direction an economy takes. This is true for India as well. The solid example is when the

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country faces an economic turmoil, the Prime Minister calls for the meeting of the private-player-giants in India not to aggravate the situation by taking knee-jerk steps.

The concern is if the rural people, small scale producers and agriculturists are aware of the developments, and the fix they are in. Some communities that feel the pinch raise their voices through Panchayat forums, NGOs and Civil Society Organisations. But, is there any one who has the time to study the direction the economy is taking, and to spell out in clear terms what the future holds for the rural people? Owing to the sporadic nature of the voice raised by the Civil Society Organisations, the physical and material supports are coming forth from the government

in the form of schemes and social safety nets. But, the psychic drive or cultural influence of globalisation is going deeper even in villages. They too are after 'cash income' and want to make carbon copies of city life at their levels stretching to the extent (im-)possible. The basket of suggestions given in this piece to manage globalisation is an outcome of a two day workshop held at Gandhigram. We intend to operationalise these suggestions in five selected Panchayats in Tamil Nadu. We would be extremely happy if there are others who would draw suggestions from here, improvise if necessary, and implement them to save the poor and the environmental resources that they depend on.




<http://www.wiseupjournal.com/images/articles/famine-roots.jpg>

A View from the Global South of Globalisation

Jacklyn Cock

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Edward Webster, Rob Lambert and Andries Bezuidenhout, *Grounding Globalization. Labour in the Age of Insecurity*, Blackwell Publishing, London, 2008, ISBN: 9781405129145, 280 Pages, 8 Illustrations, \$ 39.95.

In recent years there has been a plethora of books about globalisation marked by high levels of generality and abstraction. This book is different in several ways: First, it is written in a lively and accessible style, and while theoretically informed, is empirically rooted in people's everyday experiences in three very different places: Ezakheni (South Africa), Orange (Australia) and Changwon (Korea). The result makes for a fascinating reading.

Secondly, the three authors are leading public intellectuals whose intention is to deepen our understanding of the world in order to **change** it. They write in the tradition of Richard Turner, the academic banned and later assassinated in 1978 by the Durban security police.

Drawing on this tradition, they expose the neoliberal strategy of manufacturing insecurity. Their central argument is that the insecurity in the reconfiguration of the employment relationship through the growing flexibility and casualisation of work, outsourcing, downsizing and retrenchments, not only produce a disorganised working class, but also impacts negatively on workers' households and the communities of which they are part. Through comprehensive and comparative research they enter "the hidden abode of reproduction" and show how, under the impact of global competition, managers are "displacing confrontation, antagonism and disorder into the family, the household and the community." This generates intra-household tensions, various forms of abuse and domestic violence, what the authors term "a crisis of social reproduction".

This analysis is innovative in several ways, particularly in the authors' geographical reach

and focus on the experience of workers "as a totality" in these different social spaces rather than the conventional concern only with the employment relationship. They demonstrate that in all three societies 'market despotism' operates to make insecurity the defining feature of workers' lives.

This is dangerous. Insecurity may lead to fascism, as the authors' theoretical compass, Karl Polanyi warned. In an insight that is relevant to the recent wave of xenophobic violence, Webster et al writes, "The danger is that individuals respond to this insecurity in authoritarian ways and draw new boundaries between insiders and outsiders".

Increasingly around the world the affluent are doing so quite literally by withdrawing into social enclaves such as gated communities and golf estates. While the book focuses on the insecurity that is rooted in the lack of permanent, well paid jobs, one of the paradoxes of corporate globalisation is that there is an inverse correlation between the amount of wealth held by individuals and their sense of personal security.¹ Factors such as social crime and climate change will intensify this insecurity.

Nevertheless, "*Grounding Globalization*" is a hopeful book. The authors detect a shift away from the market fundamentalism that is at the core of neoliberalism. A "potential counter movement" would involve constructing alliances between labour, gender, environmental and other progressive social movements. It involves going beyond a critique of the existing unstable and unjust social order, to engage in what Richard Turner called "utopian thinking", the exploration of realistic alternatives.

¹ Isabella Bakker and Stephen Gill, (eds.), *Power, Production and Social Reproduction*, Macmillan-Palgrave, London and New York, 2003, pp. 3-16.

Book Review

An Anthropology of Governmentality and Globalisation: Some Signs of Our Time



Mahmudul Sumon

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Jonathan Xavier Inda, (ed.), *Anthropologies of Modernity: Foucault, Governmentality, and Life Politics*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2005, ISBN: 978-0-631-22826-4, pp. 280, \$ 89.95.

This book is an important collection of essays by authors and researchers who have in recent years written on modernity, government and questions of subjectivities in the present we all live in. I say 'we all' because the editor makes it a point to incorporate a discussion of modernity which consists not only the West but the world over. The selection thus incorporates discussions of regions often neglected in the echelons of social science discourse on questions and theorisation of modernity.

The essayists in general have tried some Foucauldian perspectives in their respective articles thus justifying the subtitle of the book: Foucault, Governmentality, and Life Politics. The opening paragraph by Jonathan Inda summarises well the situation when he writes, "the essays gathered here treat modernity not in abstract terms but tangibly as an ethnographic object. Their aim, in other words, is not to come up with some grand, general account of modernity but to analyse its concrete manifestations." (p. 1)

The central theme of the book is Foucault's analysis of modern government. Referring to one of Foucault's publications titled *Governmentality*, the editor writes:

In these reflections, the term 'government' generally refers to the conduct of the conduct—that is, to all those more or less calculated and systematic ways of thinking and acting that aim to shape, regulate, or manage the comportment of others, whether these be workers in a factory, inmates in a prison, wards in a mental hospital, the inhabitants of a territory, or the members of a population.

Looked in this way, the editor summarises that we can then re-conceptualise modern rule not only in terms of state and its institutions but also in terms of "multiple networks of actors, organizations, and entities involved in exercising authority over the conduct of individuals and populations." (pp. 1-2)

These are pretty useful statements for people wanting to use Foucault's perspective in understanding the contemporary modern states we live in today. After a short but as I mentioned useful discussion of Foucault's art of government and its newness compared to Machiavelli's notions of sovereignty, the readers are taken

straight away to the contributions of this volume. The first two essays respectively by David Scott and Peter Redfield are more theoretical in nature and are grouped under the rubrics of Colonial Reasons. Scott in his article sets himself off from authors like Partha Chatterjee, who has written in recent past about governmentality in respect to Colonial India. Scott's argument and point of dissociation is about the need for an understanding of the varied configurations of colonialism. He calls this broadly political rationality of colonial power. Scott wants to introduce a problematic that is

not centrally concerned with whether or how power works to include or exclude portions of the colonized, and that in consequence is not concerned with the arrogance or even with the 'epistemic violence' (p. 25) of the colonialist discourse.

Here Scott is pointing to some of the textual analysis done in the tradition of Said, and I suspect, the Subaltern Studies group. Adopting a Foucauldian perspective, Scott is showing his intent to unearth his *political rationalities* of colonial power. For him, political rationalities means "historically constituted complexes of knowledge/ power that give shape to colonial projects of political sovereignty" (p. 25). Scott is critiquing that aspect of Subaltern Studies work which in recent years made some 'provincializing' efforts in understanding Indian history and people. The article quotes Asad who talks about dominant political power and concomitant changes *within* modern world in terms of "re-formation of subjectivities and the re-organization of social spaces in which subjects act and are acted upon." (p. 23) So, implied in this Asadian trajectory is that a simple opposition (between West and East) will not do.

A brilliant effort to drag down Foucault to the tropics is by Peter Redfield. In a lengthy essay, the author tries to discuss a historical form of penal colony he encountered in French Guiana and compared it with Foucault's work on prisons. The essay tends to focus on both the continuity and modernity of both Panopticon, (Jeremy Bentham's "simple idea of Architecture") for a new 'rational' prison based on principle of visibil-

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ity, which was not so simple as in Foucault's reading, this tended to be, according to Redfield, "a key mechanism of disciplinary formations of power and knowledge" (p. 53).

This book is a good example of how Foucault's perspectives can be used in common anthropological parlance and here what is productive is the discussion of state and how it can be conceptualised in the age of globalisation. The articles in the section titled Global Governance perhaps mark the beginning of a discussion of state in the era of globalisation by anthropologists. Particularly innovative is Aihwa Ong's discussion on governmentality in the context of South East Asian emerging economies! Apparently a distant proposal, (Foucault in Malaysia) Ong's essay can be a good example of showing how South East Asian states have responded and maneuvered to increasing pressures from transnational bodies such as World Bank and WTO and generally, relations with the 'West' with a mix of governing practices and military repression. Ong is explicit in using Foucauldian notions of art of governance in understanding the South East Asian states, an aspect of governance which is often overlooked in the discussion of state sovereignty which revolves around territory and the safeguarding of the same. Her discussion of models of graduated sovereignty in the context of Globalisation brings into fore the increasingly growing field of literature which deals with questions of weak nation states, and its relationship with the transnational governmentality, an area of interest particularly pursued by Gupta and Ferguson in this volume. With this South East Asian case where the state is still operative and a body to be reckoned with,

readers are invited to go across another article by Ferguson and Gupta which deals with the recent additions of the neo-liberal governmentality in Africa. Ong's is a familiar narrative when we look at some of the Third World countries'/ nation-states' efforts at trade liberalisation and other implementations of the neo-liberal procedures such as 'good governance' and 'civil society movement'. It reminds us much of what is happening in South East and South Asia. But Africa perhaps is a case in point where the authors get a chance to propose radically different thoughts on conceptions of state and how it is conceptualised traditionally and what we need to do now in the context of Neoliberal Governmentality.

This article along with a couple of others will have deep implication in so far as dichotomies such as local/ global and other conventional specialisations of the state in anthropology and other academic disciplines are concerned. The authors have pointed to verticality and encompassment, which are perhaps the commonest form of spatialisation practices in most ethnographic treatises. Often these have a monographic quality, deeply embedded in a place and a time. The article's general thrust towards ethnography of neo-liberal governmentality is deeply suggestive and may have wide ranging implications for the practice of anthropology and some other disciplines. It may call into question some of the long cherished practices of anthropology where the ethnographers are expected to deeply submerge in a particular location of a 'field' and argue in favor of extending it beyond the notion of 'actual' field. Foucault's relevance once again can be felt here.



<http://www.luiss.it/internationalisation/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/globalization.jpg>

Book Review

Dealing with Being Poor: 'The Bottom Billion'



Sati U. Fwatshak

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Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can be Done About it*, Oxford University Press, London, 2007, ISBN: 0195311450, pp. Xiii, 205, Index, £ 16.

In this book Paul Collier sets out to identify, and propose solutions to, the problems militating against the growth and development of poor countries— whose populations total about 5 billion. Such countries are found mainly in Africa but also in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle-East, i.e. countries in the Global South, which he code names "Africa +" (p. 7). These countries are generally small in size, average life expectancy in them is about fifty years while it is seventy years in other developing countries, their infantile mortality rate is fourteen per cent as against four per cent in other developing countries, the proportion of children with symptoms of malnutrition is thirty per cent as against twenty per cent for other developing countries (pp. 7-8). His central argument is that the bottom poor countries are stuck in one or more of four traps namely, the conflict trap, the natural resources trap, the trap of being landlocked, and the trap of bad governance (p. 5). In the civil war trap he finds that seventy per cent of people in the bottom billion have either been through or are going through a civil war, which induces low income as low income itself induces or "heightens the risk of civil war". Other aggravating conditions that make a country prone to civil war include slow growth and stagnation or decline, primary commodity exports dependence, donations from diasporic communities, ethnic dominance in countries with majority-minority populations. Civil wars have a negative correlation to development as they reduce growth by 2.3 per cent; in addition to human casualties.

Coups, a component of the conflict trap, are provoked by low income, low growth and ethnic dominance. The natural resources trap arises from the "Dutch disease" syndrome in natural resource exports make a country's currency to rise against other currencies with the ultimate result that the export activities of the country become uncompetitive. Moreover, the abundance of resources encourages a large public sector with its inefficiency. In the political arena, resource surplus makes the government

rentier in character and creates the politics of patronage. In effect, resource abundance turns out to inhibit rather than enhance growth. The trap of being landlocked characterises 38 per cent of people in the bottom billion. But being landlocked is not typically an *Africa +* problem. The difference is in the type of neighbours the landlocked countries have. In other developing countries, landlocked countries enjoy good neighbourliness; the reverse being the case in *Africa +*, where countries like Uganda find themselves. Uganda's neighbours have either stagnated or are/were embroiled in one type of conflict or the other. Proposals are made on what landlocked countries can do, but most of the strategies are outside the full control of the victim-landlocked state, and that calls for sympathetic action from neighbours and the developing world. The trap of bad governance is largely the state of internal affairs of countries in *Africa +*. Mugabe's Zimbabwe is cited as an example. What is needed is a regime with "moderate taxation, macroeconomic stability, and a few transport facilities" (p. 65). A turnaround is possible with a good population with secondary education.

Has globalisation helped *Africa +*? The answer is not very positive with respect to globalisation's three components: Trade in goods, capital flows and migration of people. Trade in goods is difficult due to import restrictions imposed by the developing world and also by trade restrictions by *Africa +* themselves which make their exports to the developing world uncompetitive, as their manufactures are not cost competitive. Moreover, with the establishment of China and India in the global markets, *Africa +* will find it harder to break into the global markets. With respect to capital flows, capital scarce *Africa +* needs more of private capital. But globalisation is not giving the bottom billion much capital flow as the largest capital flows are bypassing them for Asia, China and Malaysia, for example. *Africa +* suffers neglect on account of, among other factors, poor governance and policy which raises the

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“perceived risk of investment in the economies of the bottom billion” (p. 88). Other causes of neglect are the small size of their economies, fragile policy improvements and the problem of reform credibility. Internally, *Africa +* suffers from capital flight occasioned by illegal transfers by looters. For example, by 1990, 38 per cent of private wealth from the bottom billion countries was held abroad (p. 92). The negative aspect of globalisation for the bottom billion is migration of the educated to richer countries, thereby draining them of much needed human capital for development.

Collier then considers four instruments to get *Africa +* on the path of growth and development. These are aid, military intervention, laws and charters and trade policy. He finds a positive correlation between aid and the propensity for coups in the bottom billion countries, as it somehow worsens the conflict trap. Conversely, aid can also better things. In post conflict situations aid comes too soon and dries up too soon. Aid was, however, found to be impotent in relation to the natural resource trap. On the other hand, aid to landlocked countries raises domestic consumption but does less for growth. He suggests that aid to these countries should be channelled towards improvement of coastal infrastructure of neighbours and of regional transportation. In relation to the bad governance trap he suggests three ways by which aid can help turnarounds namely, incentives, skills, and reinforcement. To these extents, aid should not be given for a promise of reform but based on levels of reforms achieved. With respect to military intervention, he proposes that external intervention is necessary in a failing state but it should not be longer than a decade, so as to prevent the feeling among citizens of an occupation force. It should not be too brief either in order to consolidate any peace earned. International laws/codes and charters need to be enacted to set standards useful for pulling the bottom billion through. But the rules for the bottom billion should be ones that “are appropriate for their societies at their level of development, that address the problems they face” (p. 139). Charters can be made for democracy, budget transparency, post conflict situations, and for investments. Regarding trade policy, Paul Collier advocates that both the rich and the poor countries need to liberalise their trade. At present, both have trade restrictions that are inimical to the bottom billion. In addition, the bottom billion needs to diversify

their export base, while the rich countries need to grant them some temporary protection against Asia, as the WTO needs to “add a transfer role to its bargaining role” in the interest of the bottom billion.

Finally, Paul Collier sets the agenda for action when he observes that of the four instruments, aid has been used badly, while the three others have been scarcely used by the rich countries. The action plan is for breaking the conflict trap through aid to be given to the poor countries in phases rather than rushed. Security in poor societies requires external military for at least a decade. International norms need to be enforced. The plan for breaking the natural resource trap is through rich country laws and international norms. Substantial aid based on governance conditionality is required to solve the problem of the landlocked countries; reformers in poor countries need to be encouraged through aid in the form of technical assistance, as international laws can also assist reformers fight corrupt poor country governments. As solving the problem of the bottom billion is a public good, aid agencies should concentrate on very difficult environments; rich countries like Germany and Japan should get involved with military intervention in the poor countries as has been the case with the USA, Britain and France. International charters have key roles to play in empowering reformers in the poor countries. Bodies like the UN, the Commonwealth, and regional associations/clubs can be useful in this respect. Temporary protection against Asia in favour of poor countries is desirable. It is important for the rich countries to “redefine the development problem as being about the countries of the bottom billion” (p. 190). The governments of the poor countries also need to develop strategies appropriate to their situations, as ordinary people in rich countries also have a role to play.

The book is reader friendly and tries to change thinking by showing gaps in existing strategies on aid and military intervention and how they could be reorganised. It also has portions where it matters for the G8. However, the reading between *the instruments* (part 4) and *the struggle for the bottom billion* (part 5), i.e., pp. 100-192 is to some extent repetitive. From a poor country perspective, the ten years of international military intervention in the bottom countries is capable of being misread as a reintroduction of the re-colonisation debate.

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