CONTENTS

Editorial

Articles

Kingsley Awang Ollong, *Sub Saharan Africa at Bay in the Wake of the 21st Century*

Nataliya Gorodnia, *Globalisation: Emergence and Evolution*

Antara Mitra, *Thickening the ‘Thin Globalisation’: Globalisation, Inequality and Human Insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa*

Symposia South

Jerome Teelucksingh, *Sources on Labour History in Trinidad and Tobago*

Archives and Field Notes: Experiencing Research

Zan Tao, *Meeting the Kurds in Turkey*

Across the South

Shilpa Phadke, *SEPHIS Workshop: Women and the Public Sphere*

Bidisha Dhar, *Short Report of the 2009 Cultural Studies Workshop*

Reviews

Anwesha Sengupta, *Re-reading the Process of Bengal Partition: Politics, Refugees and Non-Migrants*  

Jishnu Dasgupta, *‘Slum’-dog’s Day at the Oscars*  
*Slumdog Millionaire*, director Danny Boyle (co-director Loveleen Tandon), producer Christian Colston, Cleador Films and Film4, UK.

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Editorial

Much of the current issue is made up of the promised left-overs of the last issue– the special issue on Globalisation. It is perhaps a curious coincidence that we are dealing with this now, as the world slips ever deeper in the throes of what is seen by many as the biggest economic crisis since the Great Depression. As academics, how do we see this? Is it the time to say a collective “I told you so?” For it is true that many had seen the portents. Or does one see it merely as part of Capital’s inevitable and periodic churnings? Or does all this lead us to question the basic nature of the world order itself, if it periodically goes through crises of such proportions? Perhaps, what takes precedence often is not a studied reaction, but our participation, as members of society, in the pain and suffering wrought by this crisis. Who among us has not seen someone close– a friend, a relation, a neighbour– lose his/her job?

And yet, as academics and citizens, it is also part of our responsibility to keep looking at the problems and to think about possible solutions. Solutions that might not have the glamour of a Barrack Obama (who is already being asked to shed some of that ‘glam factor’ and get down to the messy business of governing) or the spectacularness of a new war (which might give the defence industries of a country and indeed an entire economy a fillip), but solutions that are rooted in understanding the problems and finding sustainable solutions.

This issue of Global South, is, at least in part, a step towards this. In the very first article, Kingsley Awang Ollong analyses how capital operates in Sub-Saharan Africa. He shows how capital has failed to create capitalism and the greater part of the continent continues to writhe in conditions of extreme poverty and inequities, both in the region and in comparison to others. Another article on the same area comes from Antara Mitra, who complicates the issue of globalisation by looking into a basic but seldom asked question– how are people’s lives? By taking up non-conventional indices, she shows how the region is doing under the globalisation regime.

In the third article of our current presentation, Nataliya Gorodnia talks about what can be the new forms of coping with globalisation. She shows how despite the rhetoric of an open field, states are taking recourse to regional groups and cooperation to deal with the challenges produced by globalisation itself.

This issue also sees the return of two sections that have not been their in the last few issues. In Symposia South, Jerome Teelucksingh does an extensive inventory and analyses of the primary and secondary sources of labour history of Trinidad and Tobago. We hope this will be of great help to students and others interested in the area. Zan Tao gives us a peek into his experiences as a researcher on Turkish issues. He shows how many of our closely held assumptions can be completely changed through experiences in the ‘field’.

There are also two workshop reports, both connected with various activities of SEPHIS. In the first Shilpa Phadke reports on the SEPHIS workshop on Women and the Public Sphere held in Baku, Azerbaijan last year. Also Bidisha Dhar reports on this years Cultural Studies Workshop jointly organised by CSSSC and SEPHIS in Shillong, India.

In the Reviews section, Anwesha Sengupta reviews the most recent work on partition studies, Joya Chatterjee’s Spoils of Partition. Also, Jishnu Dasgupta takes on the recent phenomenal success of Slumdog Millionaire, trying to undertand the politics of the film and its reception.

Happy reading.
Sub-Saharan Africa at Bay in the Wake of the 21st century

Kingsley Awang Ollong

Abstract
This article deals with the havoc wrought by globalisation and its policies in sub-Saharan Africa. It shows that these countries, already reeling under decades and centuries of deprivation and colonisation have also been at the wrong end of the stick of globalisation.

Introduction
If we define sub-Saharan Africa as excluding not only north Africa but also bracket off, for the moment, the continent’s southern cone, dominated by South Africa, the key fact about the rest – the greater part of the continent – is thrown sharply into relief: After eighty years of colonial rule and almost four decades of independence, in most of it there is some capital but not a lot of capitalism. The predominant social relations are still not capitalist, nor are the prevailing logic of production. Africa south of the Sahara exists in a capitalist world, which marks and constrains the lives of its inhabitants at every turn, but is not of it. This is the fundamental truth from which any honest analysis must begin. This is what explains why sub-Saharan Africa, with some 650 million people, over ten per cent of the world’s population, has just three per cent of its trade and only one per cent of its Gross Domestic Product; and why income per head – averaging 460 dollars in 1994 – has steadily fallen, relative to the industrialised world, and is now less than a fiftieth of what it is in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. It also explains why sub-Saharan Africa’s economies have responded worse than others to the market-oriented development policies urged on it by the World Bank and other outside agencies since the 1980s. Now the aid flow is declining, while population growth is still racing towards a barely imaginable 1 to 1.2 billion in the year 2020.

As we shall see, some forms of capital see plenty of profitable opportunities in sub-Saharan Africa, but the likelihood that the region is going to be developed by capitalism seems smaller than ever. On a continent of household-based agrarian economies with very limited long-distance trade, colonialism imposed cash-crop production for export, and mineral extraction, with manufacturing supposed to come later. Today, however, world demand is weakening for the export crops that African farmers produce – coffee, cocoa, tea, cotton, sugar, tobacco – and competition from much more productive capitalist agriculture in Asia and Latin America is intensifying; while industrial countries’ dependence on Africa’s minerals and metals is also declining (by about two per cent a year). And the take-off into manufacturing for internal consumption is blocked by an inability to compete with imports and by tiny domestic markets; meanwhile, collapsing infrastructures, political risk, and poorly trained workforces tend to make manufacturing for export uncompetitive, even at very low wages.

As the Economic Commission for Africa says, in most of Africa industrial expansion faces “impossible difficulties.” South Africa is, of course, the big exception, with a diversified and relatively sophisticated economy and a population growth rate well below that of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa: If we include all of southern Africa in our definition of sub-Saharan Africa (the more usual definition), South Africa alone accounts for about two-fifths of its total Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

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Africa and Global Capitalism

There are two ways of picturing Africa in the context of global capitalism. One is from the point of view of the people living and hoping to improve their lot in sub-Saharan Africa’s forty-eight nation-states with a considerable variety of kinds of “insertion” into the global capitalist economy, and a corresponding range of experiences of development (or the lack of it). The other is from the point of view of capital, for which Africa is not so much a system of states, still less a continent of people in need of a better life, as simply a geographic– or geological– terrain, offering this or that opportunity to make money.

On the first view, what stand out are two general features. First, besides South Africa, the one large industrialised country in the sub-continent, there are just six other countries with over twenty million inhabitants each: Congo/DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda– and one super-large country, Nigeria. Between them, these eight countries account for 61 per cent of all Africans south of the Sahara (and Nigeria, with an estimated 118 million inhabitants in 1997, contains almost one in five of them); the other forty are small, including twelve mini-states with populations of less than two million.

Second, however, is the fact that, in terms of income per head, size and wealth do not go together: Nigeria is one of the poorest African countries, in spite of its formidable oil production, with a per capita income of only 240 dollars in 1996. The so-called “middle-income” African countries are Senegal, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Cote d’Ivoire, Congo DR, Cameroon, Botswana, Gabon, and South Africa. Yet, with the exception of South Africa and its near neighbours, and the partial exception of Cote d’Ivoire, most of the citizens of these countries are often no better off than their apparently poorer neighbours: Most of the “middle income” countries are mineral exporters, their per capita income figures boosted by the value of the oil and other minerals that the big transnational corporations extract and export from them.

In most of Africa, even in countries with major mineral exports, economic life still largely revolves around an agricultural cycle that remains acutely dependent on capricious weather conditions.

Growing pressure of population means a constantly expanding landless labour force, partly working for subsistence wages on other people’s land, partly unemployed or underemployed in the cities, sometimes migrating to neighbouring countries (e.g., from Burkina Faso to Cote d’Ivoire), living on marginal incomes and with minimal state services, including education and health. This situation seems set to persist, or get worse; after a moment of optimism in the mid-1990s, no one now expects to see the five per cent growth in GDP per annum that is agreed to be necessary for any significant reduction in poverty (given average population growth in the sub-continent of 2.7 per cent per annum), let alone any hope of even beginning to close the gap with the industrialised (or post-industrial) world.

As the Economic Commission for Africa puts it, “according to current estimates, close to 50 percent of the population [of Africa] live in absolute poverty. This percentage is expected to increase at the beginning of the next millennium and to prevent that, African countries will need… to create seventeen million new jobs each year [merely] to stabilize the unemployment rate at the current level.” And this is not something the Commission seems to think likely. Even the 1998 Report of the much more market-oriented African Development Bank has, in spite of every effort to identify bright spots, a sombre tone overall, and understandably so. In the foreseeable future, there are no good reasons to think that capitalist development is going to transform the situation.

Africa in the spectra of economic globalisation

From a corporate viewpoint, in which the aim is not to develop countries but to exploit profitable opportunities, the prospects can still appear bright enough. Above all in the oil, natural gas, and minerals industries there is optimism, even excitement. Africa’s resources are still substantially untapped, many existing discoveries are yet to be developed and many new ones still to be made. The “investment climate” has been made easier, thanks, as we will see, to a decade and a half of aid “conditionality,” and the returns can be spectacular; the rates of return on U.S. direct investments in Africa are, for example, the highest of any region in the world (25.3 per cent

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6 The figure of forty-eight states actually includes a number of island states and statelets which are more or less near Africa and conventionally included in it; but whose history, resource endowment, present economic structures, and cultures distinguish them in various ways from Africa proper. These are Cape Verde (pop. 0.4 m.), Madagascar (pop. 15.8 m.), Mauritius (pop. 1.1 m.), Sao Tome and Principe (pop. less than 100,000), and Seychelles (pop. 100,000). Seychelles and Mauritius have relatively high per capita incomes, based on tourism and also, in the case of Mauritius, on clothing exports.

7 In the eight years leading up to 1997, thirty African countries had per capita income growth of over 1.5 per cent, while only twenty-three had less, or declining incomes (ADB, African Development Report, p. 3). This was markedly better than the 1980s, but starting from a lower base: Many countries had still to get back to the per capita income levels of 1980, and, in any case, counting countries rather than populations distorts the picture since many of the better-performing economies were small.

Articles

in 1997). Under World Bank-International Monetary Fund (IMF) prompting, stock markets have been established in fourteen African countries with another six in prospect, with brokers in London and New York beginning to take an interest in speculating on them; the Economist Intelligence Unit notes that in some of them annual returns “in excess of 100 percent” have been “generated.”

An economic profile of Africa drawn from this perspective would pay relatively little attention to countries or states, except as regards the physical security of fixed investments and the availability of communications and transport facilities. Instead it would highlight a group of large transnational corporations, especially mining companies, and a pattern of mineral deposits, coded according to their estimated size and value and the costs of exploiting them (which technical advances are constantly reducing)– and a few associated African stock exchanges worth gambling on.

This map would also include numerous agricultural opportunities, such as the plantation or out grower production of tea, coffee, cocoa, cotton, sugar, and the like; some low-tech manufacturing for local markets, such as beer and soft drinks, plastics, and cement; and a very limited amount of export manufacturing (e.g. textiles) by subsidiaries of foreign firms, especially under the Lome Convention which gave African countries special access to European markets. A larger-scale version of this map, for smaller capitalists, would, of course, show many more modest-scale opportunities from which individual fortunes may be made, ranging from construction to transportation, import-export businesses, hotels, and so on. And on no actual map, but existing in reality, are the illegal business opportunities, from diamond smuggling to gun-running and drug trafficking, that corruption and the collapse of state authority increasingly open up.

In short, a profile of “crude, neo-imperialist” capitalism, exploiting people and resources, but often not needing– and usually incapable of building– the wider social, economic, and political structures required for the development of capitalist production relations and sustained, broad-based capital accumulation.

The two perspectives just outlined raise a familiar question: Is Africa a victim of exploitation or of marginalisation? The short answer must be that it is both. In the popular meaning of exploitation, Africa suffers acutely from exploitation: Every packet of cheap Kenyan tea sold in New York, every overpriced tractor exported to Nigeria, every dollar of interest on ill-conceived and negligently supervised loans to African governments that accrues to western banks– not to mention every diamond illegally purchased from warlords in Sierra Leone or Angola– benefits people in the West at the expense of Africa’s impoverished populations. On the other hand, as Geoff Kay once provocatively suggested, in the Marxian sense of the term Africa has “suffered” not from being exploited, but from not being exploited enough; not enough capital has been invested; too few Africans have ever been employed productively enough to create relative surplus value; the reinvested surplus has been too small.

Either way, the result is relegation to the margins of the global economy, with no visible prospect for continental development along capitalist lines. Population growth has outstripped production growth; the chances of significantly raising per capita output are failing, not rising; the infrastructure is increasingly inadequate; the market for high value-added goods is minuscule. Global capital, in its constant search for new investment opportunities, finds them less and less in Africa. This does not mean that nothing is happening, let alone that no alternative is possible. It simply means that Africa’s development, and the dynamics of global capitalism, are no longer convergent, if they ever were.

What Africa should learn

This is not what was supposed to happen. At independence– between 1955 and 1965– the structural weaknesses of Africa’s economic position were generally recognised and it was assumed on all sides that active state intervention would be necessary to overcome them. Although Africa would still be expected to earn its way by playing its traditional role of primary-product exporter, the “developmental state” was to accumulate surpluses from the agricultural sector and apply them to the infrastructural and other requirements of import-substitution-driven industrialisation. And some left variants of the developmental state sought, in the name of various brands of socialism, to press this interventionist model even further.

For various reasons, internal and external, this project was not notably successful, even in mineral-rich countries. Globally, by the 1970s, the terms of trade had turned significantly against African agricultural products while rising oil prices also hit most of them hard. Loans, both public and private, advanced in the hey-
day of African optimism, became crippling burdens as the era of high interest rates set in, while Africa’s own economic backwardness discouraged any great influx of private capital from abroad. Internally, as well, the class basis was too weak for either a real capitalist or a real socialist project; under these circumstances the “developmental state” became primarily a site for opportunist elements to pursue spoils and lock themselves into power. The result: A stagnant Africa that has become “the most indebted area in the world,” one in which, “as a percentage of GNP, total external debt [rose] from 39.6 percent in 1980 to 78.7 percent in 1994; and as a percentage of the value of exports it went up from 97 percent in 1980 to 324 percent in 1990.”

Fatefully for Africa, this debt became due, in the 1980s, just as the premises of the dominant players in the development game were changing. The western Keynesian consensus that had sanctioned the agricultural levies, the industrialisation dream, the social services sensibility, and the activist state of the immediate post-independence decades—and lent money to support all this—was replaced by “neoliberalism.” For Africa this meant the winding down of any remnant of the developmental state. The new driving premise was to be a withdrawal of the state from the economy and the removal of all barriers, including exchange controls, protective tariffs and public ownership (and with such moves to be linked as well to massive social service cutbacks), to the operation of global market forces. Agriculture was key: Free markets, low taxes, and the abolition of urban food subsidies were now to stimulate a reassertion of the “comparative advantage” of rural Africa’s cash-crops within the global division of labor.

States in Africa felt compelled to comply: They were debtors, after all, and, with the decline of the Eastern Bloc, were also fast losing whatever limited leverage this alternative source of support had given them.

Enter then, crucially, “the age of structural adjustment” in which the neoliberal reorientation of economic policy became required medicine for virtually all sub-Saharan African economies. Given the fact that most of Africa’s debt was to the World Bank and other multilateral agencies, the Bank and the IMF emerged as particularly central to the process of dictating global capitalism’s new terms to Africa. As manifested in their aggressive administering of “Structural Adjustment Programmes” (SAPs), the invasive impact of the international financial institutions (IFIs) on the national sovereignty of target countries cannot be overstated: “What has emerged in Accra,” Eboe Hutchful once wrote of the Ghanaian SAP experience, “is a parallel government controlled (if not created) by the international lender agencies... [while] the other side of the external appropriation of policy-making powers is the deliberate de-politicalization that has occurred under the ERP [Economic Reconstruction Programme], and the displacement of popular participation and mobilization by a narrowly-based bureaucratic management.” Of course, as this process has proceeded the IFIs have come, in theory at least, to modify somewhat the more hard-boiled dictates of the 1983 document, the Berg Report, that first codified this approach. Subsequent reports have emphasised both the need to better protect the poorest of the poor against the “transitional” costs of adjustment, and also to permit a more active role for a transformed (“market-friendly”) state. Yet such fine-tuning changes little that is essential to the overall project: The sustained downgrading of the claims of the social vis à vis the counterclaims of the market—alongside the loss of any sense of what a genuinely democratic state (as distinct from an “enabling” state, “insulated” from popular pressures) might hope to accomplish.

What has been the upshot of this kind of structural adjustment even when measured in strictly economic terms? Certainly the economic weaknesses of Africa have not been overcome. As one leading academic commentator, John Ravenhill, concluded, “[A]ny expectations that adjustment would bring a swift turnaround in the continent’s economic conditions have been dashed—despite the occasional claims of the World Bank to the contrary.” Indeed, he continued, “looking back on Africa’s first decade of structural adjustment and looking forward to the end of the century, there are few grounds for optimism. Few countries have been able to sustain a multi-sector program of adjustment, while, in those that have, several key economic indicators give cause for concern—especially the increasing levels of indebtedness and the failure

13 As we will see, there was a rough, if misleading, plausibility to all of this. African states were not, by and large, “developmental” in any meaningful sense of the word, but had instead become predatory excessences, parasitic upon the peasantry certainly and with little residual popular legitimacy. It was therefore that much easier for outside actors to present Africa’s problems as being exclusively internal and as largely state-inspired.
14 This is the title Bill Freund gives to the last chapter—on Africa’s most recent period—of the new edition of his definitive short history of the continent, The Making of Contemporary Africa, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1998.
of investment to revive."\textsuperscript{16} This is also the considered judgment of many African experts. "During the past decade and a half, African countries have gone through the phase of adjusting their economies with the support of the World Bank and the IMF," writes the Economic Commission for Africa, but "an authoritative and candid evaluation of the ESAF [Structural Adjustment Facility agreements] programmes shows that the results were disappointing compared to the programme targets and to the performance of non-EAF countries.\textsuperscript{17}

Others have been even more critical: "[Africa's] crisis and the IMF and World Bank Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Programmes," writes Nigerian economist Bade Onimode, "have generated and exacerbated a serious decline in the African economy, and created the catastrophe of suffering facing the rural and urban poor, women, children, workers, peasants and other vulnerable social groups."\textsuperscript{18}

In an important article about Mozambique, David Plank echoes Onimode in defining the current phase of Africa's positioning within the global capitalist system as "recolonisation", a situation that, in his view, is more, not less, confining than the phase of formal colonialism itself. "Recent developments in Mozambique and elsewhere," he writes, "suggest that the most likely successor to post-colonial sovereignty will be neo-colonial vassalage, in which the Western powers assume direct and open-ended control over the administration, security and economic policies of 'deteriorated' states under the banner of the U.N. and various donors."\textsuperscript{19}

To be sure, even with Plank's suggestive elaboration in his text, the term "recolonisation" may remain more an evocative metaphor than a scientific concept. Nonetheless, it does capture much of the reality of contemporary Africa. Formal colonialism, sometimes consciously, sometimes not, subordinated sub-Saharan Africa's development to the needs of stronger economic centres. Nothing now on the official agenda significantly changes this. The situation in which Africa finds itself, shaped both by its long established weaknesses and by the terms of its current subordination, makes it a mere taker and its functionaries beyond the continent's borders.

**The Politics of Marginalisation**

What accounts for the degeneration of Africa's erstwhile "developmental states"? A sad story of inexperience, incompetence, corruption, ethnic competition, decline, indebtedness; then structural adjustment, state contraction, state breakdown, war; further decline, further war: Such is the consistently over generalised media account tinged, all too often, with a barely-concealed element of racism.\textsuperscript{20} But "it is merely in the night of Africa's ignorance that all alien shapes take on the same hue."\textsuperscript{21} In fact, several quite different trajectories are discernible in the histories of African states, with different potentials for the future.

To understand this we must backtrack briefly to the 1960s. The newly independent African states inherited the colonial state structures, geared to expanding export production of taxable primary crops and minerals. For political support, the new leaders had to rely not on urban working classes or middle classes, who hardly existed, but on rural notables, whose allegiance they secured through chains of patronage stretching from the ministers' offices to the villages. By the mid-1970s--sooner in many places--this system had become unstable. There was not enough patronage to go round and those excluded from it mobilised their districts and ethnic groups in increasingly unmanageable opposition. In response to this, "centralised bureaucratic" regimes were created in which an all-powerful President controlled the patronage system with the help of a centralised bureaucracy and army;\textsuperscript{22} the best-known examples are perhaps Nyerere's Tanzania, Kenyatta's (and Moi's) Kenya, and Mobutu's Zaire, but there were others. Where this kind of system was not created, "clientelism" persisted without central control and degenerated into ever more unstable "spoils" systems--Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, amongst others--in which everything was eventually up for plunder.

Economic decline tended to be faster and worse in spoils systems, but virtually no regime was immune from the economic regression of the early 1980s. The impact of the structural adjustment that followed was severe on both


\textsuperscript{17} ECA, \textit{African Economic Report}, 1998.

\textsuperscript{18} In his book, \textit{A Future for Africa: Beyond the politics of adjustment}, Earthscan, London, 1992, Onimode mounts a powerful case against structural adjustment, capping the point we have quoted here with the observation that, "a generation of Africans has been lost and a second is under serious threat, while the marginalization of Africa has accelerated alarmingly in most spheres" (p. 1).


\textsuperscript{20} A notorious example is Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy", \textit{The Atlantic Monthly}, February, 1994, pp. 44-76.


kinds of regime. Shorn of patronage by cuts in state spending and jobs, and under pressure to “democratise” – really, to liberalise– even the centralised bureaucratic regimes weakened, while the spoils systems staggered towards terminal crisis. At this point, however, significant differences emerged in the capacity of African states of both kinds to survive, due to important differences in their underlying economic and social structures.

States that relied on peasant export production for revenue and growth had to build robust links with the rural areas and these proved surprisingly resilient even in face of the acute stresses of structural adjustment, especially when centralised bureaucratism had maintained a degree of prudential control over inequality and injustice in the way state patronage was deployed.23 States that depended on mineral exports from foreign-run mining enclaves, however, had not needed to develop such widespread networks of support, and this proved a crucial weakness in the new situation. Moreover mineral exports offered extremely rich and vulnerable pickings to well-armed gangs that armies were less and less able or willing to combat; indeed in many cases the new warlords were former military officers who had struck out on their own as army pay and privileges dried up and armies disintegrated in the wake of coups, counter-coups, and civil wars. It is therefore in mineral-rich countries like Angola and Congo/DRC, with less developed political links to the rural areas– and especially where extreme “spoils politics” had already ruined the state (as in Sierra Leone and Liberia) – that warlordism, fueled by oil and diamonds, threatens to become endemic.24 In this region of Africa, says defence specialist Dale Grant, “what is left of the old Belgian Congo has become a vast pipeline for African rebel movements to smuggle gems and minerals out of their own nations and into the world market.” He adds:

Even the promise of concessions before a victory is won is a marketable commodity, a sort of futures’ market in African outcomes. In early 1997, Kabila sent a representative to Toronto to talk to the mining companies about “investment opportunities.” This man may have raised as much as $50 million to support Kabila’s march on the capital of Kinshasa. A few months later, the Canadian mining industry was reading announcements like this May 1997 press release [before Kabila was in power]: “Vancouver, B.C. Tenke Mining Corp. . . . is pleased to announce that the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the liberation of Congo-Zaire has signed an agreement…” Kabila was not in power when this statement was made. The AFDL is a political fig leaf for his personal rule. His final push to power was spearheaded by fresh troops with new uniforms, weapons and vehicles.25

Of course export crop economies are not immune to the risk of warlordism, which can spill over from neighbouring countries (e.g. from the Congo and Sudan to northern and western Uganda) or arise from other causes; the originally ethno-religious conflict in southern Sudan is a tragic case in point, and also illustrates the way humanitarian aid to the victims of warlordism can become another source of funding for warlordism, with rival forces extracting a large share for themselves as the price of allowing any of it to reach sick and starving civilians.26 But in the long run warlordism probably does need a source of revenues greater than peasant-export crop production can provide, and by no means are all African countries doomed to undergo it. On the other hand, small-scale production of export crops alone spells continuing economic marginalisation. It is hardly credible that successive generations of young Africans will be content to accept this, and political networks of rural notables held together by patronage, as the last word in African economic and political development.

The Way Forward

In sum, the destiny of Africa under actually existing global capitalism is stark; not even the World Bank’s experts pretend otherwise.27 Without a change in World Bank/IMF policy on debt relief, without the end of dogmatic market liberalism as a condition of aid, without a clampdown on predatory outside forces, without protection of all sorts, Africa seems doomed to stay marginalised. Yet American policy remains blindly market-oriented, as is shown by the U.S. Congress’ new “Hope for Africa” bill that seeks to make market-oriented policies obligatory for African states seeking free trade with the United States that relied on peasant-export crop production for revenue and growth had to build robust links with the rural areas and these proved surprisingly resilient even in face of the acute stresses of structural adjustment, especially when centralised bureaucratism had maintained a degree of prudential control over inequality and injustice in the way state patronage was deployed.23 States that depended on mineral exports from foreign-run mining enclaves, however, had not needed to develop such widespread networks of support, and this proved a crucial weakness in the new situation. Moreover mineral exports offered extremely rich and vulnerable pickings to well-armed gangs that armies were less and less able or willing to combat; indeed in many cases the new warlords were former military officers who had struck out on their own as army pay and privileges dried up and armies disintegrated in the wake of coups, counter-coups, and civil wars. It is therefore in mineral-rich countries like Angola and Congo/DRC, with less developed political links to the rural areas– and especially where extreme “spoils politics” had already ruined the state (as in Sierra Leone and Liberia) – that warlordism, fueled by oil and diamonds, threatens to become endemic.24 In this region of Africa, says defence specialist Dale Grant, “what is left of the old Belgian Congo has become a vast pipeline for African rebel movements to smuggle gems and minerals out of their own nations and into the world market.” He adds:

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The Way Forward

In sum, the destiny of Africa under actually existing global capitalism is stark; not even the World Bank’s experts pretend otherwise.27 Without a change in World Bank/IMF policy on debt relief, without the end of dogmatic market liberalism as a condition of aid, without a clampdown on predatory outside forces, without protection of all sorts, Africa seems doomed to stay marginalised. Yet American policy remains blindly market-oriented, as is shown by the U.S. Congress’ new “Hope for Africa” bill that seeks to make market-oriented policies obligatory for African states seeking free trade with the United States that relied on peasant-export crop production for revenue and growth had to build robust links with the rural areas and these proved surprisingly resilient even in face of the acute stresses of structural adjustment, especially when centralised bureaucratism had maintained a degree of prudential control over inequality and injustice in the way state patronage was deployed.23 States that depended on mineral exports from foreign-run mining enclaves, however, had not needed to develop such widespread networks of support, and this proved a crucial weakness in the new situation. Moreover mineral exports offered extremely rich and vulnerable pickings to well-armed gangs that armies were less and less able or willing to combat; indeed in many cases the new warlords were former military officers who had struck out on their own as army pay and privileges dried up and armies disintegrated in the wake of coups, counter-coups, and civil wars. It is therefore in mineral-rich countries like Angola and Congo/DRC, with less developed political links to the rural areas– and especially where extreme “spoils politics” had already ruined the state (as in Sierra Leone and Liberia) – that warlordism, fueled by oil and diamonds, threatens to become endemic.24 In this region of Africa, says defence specialist Dale Grant, “what is left of the old Belgian Congo has become a vast pipeline for African rebel movements to smuggle gems and minerals out of their own nations and into the world market.” He adds:

Even the promise of concessions before a victory is won is a marketable commodity, a sort of futures’ market in African outcomes. In early 1997, Kabila sent a representative to Toronto to talk to the mining companies about “investment opportunities.” This man may have raised as much as $50 million to support Kabila’s march on the capital of Kinshasa. A few months later, the Canadian mining industry was reading announcements like this May 1997 press release [before Kabila was in power]: “Vancouver, B.C. Tenke Mining Corp. . . . is pleased to announce that the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the liberation of Congo-Zaire has signed an agreement…” Kabila was not in power when this statement was made. The AFDL is a political fig leaf for his personal rule. His final push to power was spearheaded by fresh troops with new uniforms, weapons and vehicles.25

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States. What chance is there of change in this external context, without which all independent African initiatives seem so painfully vulnerable?

In the short run, not much, perhaps. In the medium run, however, a lot seems likely to change. First, African countries will present increasing dangers to the rest of the world: Leading exporters of AIDS and other diseases, happy hunting grounds for Mafiaos and mercenaries, anomic black markets for money, weapons, unlicensed drugs, untested blood, dangerous food additives. As this becomes clear, Africa will gradually move back towards the head of the aid queue. Second, the climate of opinion is changing in the countries of the “north” as the social costs of global deregulation become more and more evident. The hegemony of the “Washington consensus” is in decline. As a new generation of Africans is forced by worsening conditions to go beyond the all too understandable political cynicism that tends to prevail now, and to spearhead new movements for reform and development based once more on collective goals and traditions, it will find new sympathy abroad.

Third, global capitalism is unquestionably coming up against the limits of the environment; within a few decades continued broad-based growth will be increasingly impossible, and market logic will be questioned on all sides. What role can Africans—and African states—themselves be expected to play at this global level in any attempts to transform capitalist structures that negatively frame the continent’s prospects? Africans have certainly been participants in debates about the possibilities of debt relief, both in the assertions of “global civil society” around this issue (the church-driven Jubilee 2000 initiative, for example) and, through their states, in attempts to extract such adjustments from the international financial institutions (IFIs) are prepared to grant, for example, in the recent (and extremely limited) “Highly Indebted Poor Countries” (HIPC) initiative. African states have also sought, since the 1980s, to formulate continental terms of reference for modifying global imperatives through such initiatives as the Lagos Plan of Action and the All-African Alternative Framework.

And they have attempted regional undertakings—the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), for example—that, in various stages of gestation, seek in proposed common markets (and modest regional planning mechanisms) the kind of scale that might make greater global leverage possible.

However, these diverse initiatives must remain limited since such actions of African states to roll back the debt and/or secure the benefits of the larger scale units are premised precisely on the kind of quasi-capitalist national economies whose vulnerabilities we have sketched above. Insofar as these economies remain unlikely to generate investment of a more productive and transformative variety—whether from (still extremely weak) domestic bourgeoisies, from international capital, or from complementary state initiatives—investment of the hit-and-run variety is likely to remain the commonest kind, with predictable lack of developmental results—continentally, regionally, and nationally. In sum, the dream of a transformative capitalism in Africa remains just that: A dream.

But what are the signs that Africans may generate the will and the resources to go further? There are, of course, multiple developmental assertions at the very local level that demand to be chronicled. Thus Jonathan Barker speaks of the existence, in Africa and beyond, of “thousands of activist groups addressing the issues of conserving jobs and livelihoods, community health, power of women, provision of housing, functioning of local markets, availability of local social services, provision and standard of education, and abusive and damaging working conditions.” And there are also resistances directed more broadly and self-consciously against the kind of parasitic governments that attempt to ride the African crisis to their own advantage. What is more, IFI-induced austerity has rendered such governments even more vulnerable to challenge from below: In response to economic adjustment measures, write Riley and Parfitt, “African peoples have adopted many diverse strategies to challenge, deflect, or avoid bearing the costs of austerity involved and to seek a political alternative to the politicians they hold responsible.”

They also document an impressive range of (primarily urban) actors—“lawyers, students, copper miners, organisations of rural women, urban workers and the unemployed, journalists, clergymen and others”—whose direct action in recent years has shaken numerous African governments.

Such resistances—what Célestin Monga refers to as the “collective insubordination” of Africa—have been one factor driving the renewed sa-
liency of democratic demands on the continent. True, democracy of a sort has also been high on the agenda of western interests. For the latter see some limited form of “liberal democracy” as both a possible means for helping legitimise their broader agenda, and a possible check upon state elites that have become just too corrupt to stabilise a viable business climate. To the extent, however, that this latter project has taken hold in some countries it will have achieved little more than to stabilise property-threatening situations by a momentary re-circulation of elites. The class and productive bases for a stable hegemonic bourgeois democracy are just not there, making likely, as Riley and Parfitt argue, “persistent domestic unrest over further austerity.” “In Africa, as perhaps globally, ‘democracy cannot sustain the debt; the debt cannot sustain democracy.”

But to what extent might this climate of democratisation also open up space for popular initiatives that could prove more transformative? For, in the end, the greatest obstacles confronting the mounting of an African alternative remain as much internal as external: How to act collectively when the mass of the society is still grounded in precapitalist production relations, and already under growing economic and social stress? It is still easier to mobilise people in terms of ethnicity, or religion, than in terms of a social and economic project beyond the local level. Moreover, those with the education and experience to develop a project for radical change are often cut off from the majority by language and distance. Well over a quarter of a million African professionals are now living outside Africa altogether, a very significant proportion of the continent’s intelligentsia. For those who remain, the natural desire to live like a “normal” (Western) person tugs constantly against the poverty, insecurity, and constant setbacks of a life dedicated to the struggle for radical change, and the old problems of democratic and accountable leadership that have dogged all popular movements in history reappear.

Yet the fact remains that more dramatic possibilities are in the air, and even beginning to take organisational form. Crude predatory capitalism is already being confronted, in Ogoniland and elsewhere, most often in the name of democracy but also with a redistributive thrust that the idea of “democracy” cannot in the end entirely encompass. As the need to attach the demand for socio-economic rights more self-consciously to the demand for political rights becomes even more widely felt, so too can the popular critique of power be expected to expand its focus beyond local abuses of office to confront global injustices (from the abusive Nigerian state, in the Ogoni case, via Shell Oil to a fresh perspective on the workings of the global system, perhaps). In Zambia, for example, the broad trade union-led democratic movement that brought down the autocratic Kaunda government throws up only the far more IFI-dominated, austerity-driven and authoritarian Chiluba regime. Can one expect to find Zambians asking much more searching questions about the nature of power, national and global, next time round while also beginning to imagine struggles that could narrow the sweeping prerogatives of capital which now frame their negative circumstances? And when merely “democratic” challenges to power in countries like Kenya collapse into squabbling, often cast in ethnic terms, between rival opposition leaders—entirely to the electoral advantage of the ruling Moi clique—a younger generation of political activists seems likely to draw lessons relevant for crafting more progressive political practices in the future.

Conclusion
Africa requires a new internationalism, led by anti-imperialism/anti-globalisation forces and pan-Africanist movements, to challenge the present order. This has to be done if the African State is to be have more relevance in the process of development in the continent. In the history of the world no country has developed without the state playing a central role. A lot more needs to be done to shake off the “debilitating economic and geopolitical aggression” in the present hegemonic offensive. The neo-liberal agenda on democracy, human rights, good governance, accountability and the economic policies are not presently determined by the African people. Africans need to do more to keep the memories of the past and present alive, which would enable them to shape their destiny for a better future. What Edward Said, in his last days, called on the people of the Middle East to do is also worth some deep reflections and expanded rethinking in Africa. Let Africans expand the frontiers of their memories and do a rethinking on the historical and other complex and hard processes that have been their bondage, including the experiences of slavery, colonialism and racism, anti-colonial nationalism, independence and the post-colonial projects and proxy regimes that serve the Western interests. Reflect and rethink the scourges of coups and

counter coups, civil wars, inter-state wars and sectarian conflicts.

Fundamentally there ought to be a rethink about the promoters of the scourges and the beneficiaries at the different phases. It is worth noting that in each of these processes there have always been those who stood and struggled for the larger interests of the continent and the people, on the one hand, and those who have never relented in keeping the continent within the hegemonic noose, on the other.

Africa has to do a rethinking about its dominant political leaders, ruling classes and governments that have been brutalising their own citizens and those that were (and indeed are) at the centre of igniting xenophobia against sections of the citizenry.

Africa has to do more to solidify regional and continental integration and employ more mechanisms towards the resolution of violent intra-and-inter state conflicts. The AU has to take the question of citizenship more vigorously. Citizens, civil organisations and all stakeholders have to take up the challenges and work out positions to be pursued in concrete terms so that the control, development, and distribution of resources are primarily guided by the interest of Africa in all spheres. There is need for pan-African peoples’ movements and political parties to intensify the struggles for democratic governance on the continent, as alternative to the superimposed neo-liberal hegemonic variant. Instructive is the stark reality that defiance can only be meaningful if real power in all spheres is taken seriously. For defiance without power would be as if nothing has been learned over the centuries. Africa has to do more for better management of pluralism and constitutionalism.

If Africa has to free itself, determine its place in the present world, and be a strong player in global politics, there is the need to beat its tragic internal swords into ploughshares. The continent must put in place mechanisms to achieve true independence, and advance its interests, in the face of the hegemonic hurricane. Only when Africa abandons erecting its economic, political and social systems– as well as their structures and institutions– on weak and subservient foundations, thereby building itself on solid grounds, that it will achieve lofty heights for present and future generations.

Globalisation: Emergence and Evolution

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Abstract

The paper analyses the history of globalisation, its rise and evolution as well as its future in the context of new tendencies in early twenty-first century world development.

We argue that globalisation started in late nineteenth century with the rapid industrial growth in a number of countries and prominent achievements in science and technology. A new role of multinational corporations in the world economy since the 1960s, the collapse of the socialist system and the Soviet Union (the late 1980s to the early 1990s) and creation of the WTO (1995) marked its new stages. Essential changes in the process of globalisation were provoked by the current economic crisis.

As the new tendencies in the globalising world first appeared after the 1997-1998 Asian crisis the paper focuses on some of them, including regional integration and the shift to a new paradigm in developmental models. The current financial and economic crisis reveals the same global trends related to a decline of liberalism and strengthening of the regions as economic centres. It is playing a formative role in a transformation of the global world order.

The roots of globalisation as interdependency among nations on a world scale can be found deep in History. Perhaps the first project was implemented by Alexander the Great (fourth century B.C.) and the ancient Romans. Some authors trace globalisation to the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries– the period of great geographic explorations. This paper argues that globalisation proper started in late nineteenth century with rapid industrial growth in a number of countries and prominent achievements in science and technology. The transition of these nation-states to industrial ones pushed them to explore the world more intensively, establish their control on “free” lands as well as territories of other states. New types of weaponry and maritime vessels, followed by such innovations as the telegraph and telephone, railways etc. facilitated the process.

New tendencies in economic life appeared after the financial crisis in Europe in 1873 and the long economic depression that lasted till 1896. As a result of the crisis, the process of concentration of production and capital in the more advanced states got a fillip. It promoted more balanced production, better competing position of aggregate companies and technological improvements. In some cases, concentration even led to monopolies in certain spheres of production. Finance capital gained considerable power in the spheres of production, trade and politics. It is in this period that the transition from free trade (since 1860) to protectionist policy took place in a number of states, starting with Germany (1879).

Seeking natural resources, marketing outlets and investment opportunities for their companies to increase profits during stagnation and growing protectionism in Europe these advanced countries turned colonies and dependent territories into integral parts of their economies. With a new stage of colonialism, the global market was being constructed. The period was marked by what is called “imperialism”– a policy of rapid aggressive territorial expansion of the major and most dynamic powers– first Britain, France, Russia, then Italy, Japan, USA, Germany. In the early part of the twentieth century, the first transnational corporations (TNC), also called multinational corporations (MNC), appeared as international cartels to share marketing outlets, coordinate price policy etc. But in general, it was a period when the national economies of the major powers were involved in strong mutual competition, which finally led to the first global war (1914-1918). Before World War I, there had been no wars between great powers for more than forty years: A theory about world economic interdependency, which argued that war between great powers was impossible, had become popular, a theory that was proved false.

In time, the network of marketing outlets, production and property internalisation became noticeably stronger, caused, in part, by multinationals’ activities and their new role in the world economy. Between 1960s and 1970s their
number and influence grew noticeably, as a result of scientific and technical revolution, significant progress in transport and communication. If in 1939 there were about thirty TNCs, in 1970, there were approximately 7,300 with 27,300 branches and by 1976, 11,000 with 86,000 branches. In 1983, the term “globalisation” was used for the first time to describe the appearance of new relations in the economic system with multinationals playing a leading role. However till the late 1980s, and even the early 1990s, globalisation was limited by a global split between two world systems—socialism and market economy— and their competition for the “third world”. With the collapse of the socialist system and the Soviet Union, barriers against economic liberalisation broke down. The new stage of globalisation can be dated from this time.

Since then, the role of multinationals in the world economy has grown tremendously. In 2004 there were about 64,000 TNC with 830,000 foreign branches; they controlled about a half of the world’s production and about two-thirds of world trade. The hundred top multinationals (less than 0.2 per cent) controlled twelve per cent of total foreign assets and sixteen per cent of total foreign sale volume. Now, their wealth and economic power exceed those of many states. As it was a hundred years ago, they are seeking better conditions to lower production expenses and improve approaches to marketing outlets. The terms “new imperialism” and “neo-colonialism” have come back into parlance to describe the exploitation of poorer countries by richer ones.

The process was dialectically repeated at a higher level. Contemporary TNC are more international in their origin. Though they are still dominated by Western corporations, in our time, the number and the role of multinationals from developing, mainly East Asian, economies is increasing. Especially, there has been a rapid growth in the activities of Chinese multinationals in Africa and Latin America. Contemporary TNC are investing not only in extraction of raw materials as it was in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but also in advanced sectors like electronics and services, thus enabling a transfer of more advanced technologies and management techniques. By creating stable economic ties between different states, multinationals’ activity promotes economic integration, thereby constructing a global economy.

But the positive impact on national and world economies are accompanied by negative ones as well. The interests of the multinationals themBut the positive impact on national and world economies are accompanied by negative ones as well. The interests of the multinationals them selves do not necessarily correspond to interests of the societies in which they originate or operate. For example, transfer of production to countries with lower labour costs leads to deindustrialisation and loss of jobs in their mother countries. Intra-TNC trade (about thirty per cent of world trade), because of their own transfer prices, allows them to escape taxes and other payments. Free capital flows of multinationals between states can cause rapid disinvestment in troubled economies and lead to financial crisis.

The dominance of multinationals radically alters the global system of economic management. Its main regulators—the sovereign states, including major powers, are losing their authority and regulatory power to TNC and international organisations like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, whose influence extend over not only the economic but also the political sphere. That brings up the issue of democracy. Whereas national governments (at least in theory) represent the people, this does not apply to the executive bodies of multinationals and international finance institutions. The gap between state power as responsible to the whole society and the corporations with their decisive role in the economy without any responsibility is among the main causes of the current financial and economic crisis.

The dissemination of ideas of liberalism and democracy in the whole world is another determining factor in the contemporary stage of globalisation. In the long struggle between socialism and capitalism, state and market economies, one-party ruling system and plural democratic values, the latter won, largely because the liberal values prevailing in the USA and Western Europe since the late 1980s were promoted by winners as the most productive for the whole world, including the area of the erstwhile Soviet bloc, Africa and the Middle East. The term “globalisation” thus covers not only economic but also cultural, political and other spheres.

The first signal that something was wrong was given by the 1997–1998 financial and economic crisis in South-East Asia caused by mass withdrawal of foreign investments from Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea; the second one by 11 September 2001. As George Soros confessed, the Asian crisis showed the threats posed by liberalisation and a deficient understanding of the functioning of capital markets. September 11’ proved that involving traditional societies in globalisation can be accompanied by a strengthening of their traditional culture, including religion. Along with the westernisation of consumer tastes, another leading tendency in a globalising world is revival

of cultural values, especially in the Islamic world. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism and growth of radical Islamic organisations can be explained as a defensive reaction against the invasion of new values, conflicting with traditional ones. Though globalisation is regarded in the developing world as a new form of imperialism, it carries not only threats but chances for some states like China, India, Iran and Russia with histories of ancient civilisation, large territory and population, considerable natural and intellectual resources etc. to utilise the opportunities offered by globalisation for their own benefits, it is important for these states to choose a developmental model corresponding to the historic, cultural and other specificities of these nations. Analysis of the economic success in East Asia shows that the “Asian miracle” was achieved on the basis of developmental models different from Western patterns. Started by Japan, the benefits of the Japanese experience as well as Japanese capital investment was transferred to New Industrial Countries (NIC) (Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore), and then to ASEAN-4 (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines). China’s development since the late 1980s showcases a new “miracle”, built on the basis of a gradual transition from socialist to market economy under strict government control. East Asian economies achievements prove that models other than the Atlantic developmental model (though that is not homogeneous either) can be successful. In spite of the differences between East Asian (Japanese, New Industrial Countries, ASEAN-4 and Chinese) models, all of them have certain common features– traditionally strong and decisive role of the state in the economy; good governance and political stability playing a more important role than democracy (or its alternative understanding); the correspondence of developmental models to the historic and cultural peculiarities of the nations involved: In short, an emphasis on common “Asian values” as different from western ones. Globalisation is constructing a world based on regional groupings. The process started in Europe in the 1950s with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (1951-1952), the European Atomic Energy Community (1957) and the European Economic Community (EEC, Common Market, 1957) and completed in 1993, when a new type of integrative unity– European Community (EC)– was born. In North America, it started with the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (1988) to promote a free market between the two nations and was completed with Mexico aligning itself with these two nations that led to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1993-1994). European and American economic integration and their growing protectionism caused East Asian countries to form the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum for 21 Pacific Rim economies to promote regional cooperation, trade and investment. In 1994, it established a free trade area (FTA) in the Pacific region for ten years. In South-East Asia, economic regionalism can be dated from 1992 with the decision to establish a FTA among ASEAN members for ten years to defend regional economies from European and American regionalism as well as a threat of dilution within the wider APEC group. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 can be seen as contradictory to the world trend towards integration. As the Soviet economy represented a single economic unit, the snapping of economic ties between post-Soviet states made the process of their economic recovery slow and tortuous. Their sharp move to liberal model reversing their previous practice was another reason for recession. The World Trade Organization (WTO), created in January 1995 to supervise and liberalise international trade, soon became a strong tool of globalisation. Today WTO members represent more than ninety-five per cent of total world trade. According to Zbignev Brzezinski, with the creation of the WTO as well as the adoption a new role by the International Monetary Fund with its bailout fund and the increased anticorruption agenda of the World Bank, globalisation was institutionalised. New tendencies in the globalising world appeared after the 1997-1998 Asian crisis. Emergence of East Asian regionalism was its most important result. Before the crisis, regional cooperation in East Asia as a whole was not actualised because of the prevalent distrust and hostility in political relations between Japan, Republic of Korea (ROK) and China; anxiety that regionalism under Japan’s leadership would lead to shutting the region for internal trade (in respect to Japanese domination of production networks and her practice of shutting its domestic market to foreigners); the U.S.’s anxiety about possible anti-Western feelings in the region; local governments’ euphoria about regionalisation; the reliance on multilateral talks within APEC, GATT/WTO, and the rejection of regional negotiations without U.S. participation. The crisis made East Asian states understand their interdependence better. East Asian governments realised they could not rely only on global institutions to defend their interests and drastically changed their previous position towards common regional mechanisms to overcome the crisis, revitalise their economies and avoid such crises in future. The taboo on only-Asian forums was raised. The crisis encouraged ROK’s reconciliation with Japan to promote Japanese

investments in the Korean economy and made Japan, China and Korea form relationships with ASEAN countries. The crisis shifted the centre of economic gravity away from ASEAN to China and ROK (after the latter’s sharp recovery) and prompted ASEAN to forge closer links with North-East Asia. The crisis erased the fear of Japanese and Chinese economic domination, making other East Asian countries more comfortable with institutionalised cooperation with them. As a result, the “ASEAN Plus Three” (APT) framework was formed and became the main forum for East Asian dialogue. For the first time in history it united South-East and North-East Asia in a regional structure. Though the idea of such a forum appeared as early as 1994 (as a form of defensive regionalism in response to NAFTA) it did not receive acceptance then. The first meeting of the APT was held in December 1997 to launch a mechanism of financial cooperation during the crisis. Since then it has expanded to cover economic and security frameworks.

Before the crisis, a sort of regionalisation had been in operation in East Asia. Then it was an objective process determined by market forces on the basis of Japanese investments in the region. This had been in operation since the late 1980s without any significant governmental support. After the crisis, regionalism in East Asia appeared as a political process in which the governments played a definitive role. A narrower form of regionalism (an Asian only forum) appeared to serve regional goals better in a globalising world.

In November 2000, a decision was taken to establish a Free Trade Area within “Large East Asia” (ASEAN, Japan, China, ROK) (EAFTA) to make the region, as an economic power, more competitive with NAFTA and the EU. As the possibility of bilateral free trade agreements between East Asian states (Japan-China, ROK-China) looked remote, the way out was sought by strengthening bilateral relations between ASEAN and China, Japan and ROK. EAFTA is supposed to remain in existence till 2016. That is giving a fillip to ASEAN-10 to accelerate the creation of the South-East Asian Common Market by 2015 to be ready to work in the “Large East Asian” free trade zone.

As a result of the 1997-1998 crisis, East Asia was shaped as a third regional centre of global economic influence. So far there are some explicit forms of regionalism in East Asia that circle and intersect each other: ASEAN (1967) within Southeast Asia; “ASEAN Plus Three” framework (1997) within wider East Asia, including Japan, China and ROK; East Asian Summit (EAS) or “ASEAN Plus Six” framework (2005) including Australia, New Zealand, India; APEC (1989) as trans-Pacific definition of regionalism, including the USA, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Canada, Chile, Russia etc. Though the future of the East Asian regionalism is uncertain, it looks like it will be developed simultaneously within different regional structures with various reassurance mechanisms to avoid one-way dependency on regional leaders and to generate the highest amount of economic benefits possible for all concerned. Economic relations with the USA and the EU retain their importance for the region’s countries though the recession plaguing American and European economies as a result of the current crisis has directly led to the growth of China’s role as the only motor of the regional and the world economy.

Another important result of the Asian crisis was the shift to a new paradigm in developmental models in the post-crisis economies with emphasis on promotion of internal consumption, development of the service sector and strengthening the governments’ role in the economy. The current crisis (2008-2009) reveals the same global trends related to a decline of liberalism and a return to Keynesian economics principles. Anti-crisis arrangements in all crisis-affected economies as well as Barak Obama’s election as the U.S. president attest to a growing tendency towards more regulated economies.

Will globalisation continue on its course? Some experts argue that globalisation has reached its peak and is slowing down. They cite the complications in WTO talks and the proliferation of bilateral free trade agreements as the most effective way of solving short-term economic problems. There appears to be a shift away from multilateral negotiations within global institutions.

The race between different states and groups of states for FTAs started after failure of the WTO talks in Seattle (1999) and the Japan-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (October 2000). Till June 2007 there were 37 FTAs existence, with forty more being negotiated and 26 at the stage of proposals. They involve primarily five of the largest and the most dynamic East Asian economies– Singapore, Japan, South Korea, China, and Thailand. The agreements are mainly bilateral (75 per cent); some of them are multilateral (for example ASEAN FTA, ASEAN-China FTA, ASEAN-EU FTA); they cover both states from within and without a region, including the EU, India, Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Pakistan etc. What is important is that they include the issues that go beyond the WTO

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5 Rawi Abdelal and Adam Segal, “Has Globalization Passed Its Peak?”, Foreign Affairs, Jan-Feb, 2007, 86, 1, p. 103; http://find.galegroup.com/itx/start.do?prodId=ITOF.
framework (trade facilitation, investment, government procurement, competition, intellectual property, environment and labour etc). Other phenomena that are increasingly coming into the ambit of globalisation include limitation of labour force movement from poorer to richer states or increasing inter-state competition for energy supplies. Thus globalisation is not “global”, it covers only separate spheres, primarily in the multinational’s interests. The issue of public regulation of globalisation is today more crucial than ever before.

We are standing in front of a transformation of the global world order and a new stage of globalisation, in which the current financial and economic crisis is playing a formative role. What kind of transformation is it? We argue that the main tendencies of the future world development can be found in Asian post-crisis experience.

The crisis creates the environment for more public managed globalisation, based on decay of liberalism and return of the state into economic life. The G-20 summit in Washington in November 2008 revealed the willingness of world leaders to cooperate on the issue on a global scale.

The future world order can be conceived of as one with greater emphasis on regional cooperation with a balance of power among the regions as economic centres. While the emergence of three economic centres (the EU, NAFTA and East Asia) is evident so far, regionalism will cover the rest of the world- Africa, Latin America, Middle East, post-Soviet area (with some exceptions).

Just as the Asian crisis of 1997-1998 accelerated East Asian regionalism, a repeat of the same process can be foreseen in other regions as a result of the current financial and economic crisis. It has already forced the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth of Independent States to come together (November 2008) to work on common approaches to combat the crisis. This holds the promise of strengthening their economic cooperation in spite of anxiety about Russian domination (as it was in the Chinese case).

This new regionalism will be determined by economic interests. The economies with the greatest potential will appear as the regional leaders, the vehicles of regional development. Interdependence among neighbours as economic partners will contribute to the balance of power both inside the regions and on the global stage. Thus the world order that is emerging would be a non-polar region-centered system of global coordination among regions with common global interests being the determining factor. The scheme is economically expedient and promises to make the world more balanced and more harmonious. Otherwise easily found similarities between contemporary and early twentieth century world development patterns may lead to similar devastating results.
Thickening the ‘Thin Globalisation’: Globalisation, Inequality and Human Insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa

Antara Mitra

This article seeks to debunk the traditional assumption of globalisation being an objective force of transition. By using the income-based variable of the net earning, and health as the chief non-income-based variable, it is being argued that globalisation involves little equity, homogeneity and universality. Rather, the distributive impact of globalisation is contingent on endogenous variables like macro-economic development of the state, its GDP etc, and hence, is largely differential across the regions. The sub-Saharan African case serves to illustrate how the onslaught of globalisation and neo-liberalism has orchestrated poverty and human insecurity because it is a-historical, irrational and ill-timed due to general structural unpreparedness of the region for globalisation. Thus, the region is severely plagued by what can be termed as thin globalisation characterised by intense poverty, inequity and insecurity, as opposed to thick globalisation in developed countries.

Abstract

This article seeks to debunk the traditional assumption of globalisation being an objective force of transition. By using the income-based variable of the net earning, and health as the chief non-income-based variable, it is being argued that globalisation involves little equity, homogeneity and universality. Rather, the distributive impact of globalisation is contingent on endogenous variables like macro-economic development of the state, its GDP etc, and hence, is largely differential across the regions. The sub-Saharan African case serves to illustrate how the onslaught of globalisation and neo-liberalism has orchestrated poverty and human insecurity because it is a-historical, irrational and ill-timed due to general structural unpreparedness of the region for globalisation. Thus, the region is severely plagued by what can be termed as thin globalisation characterised by intense poverty, inequity and insecurity, as opposed to thick globalisation in developed countries.

Exacerbating the ‘triple crises’ of Modernisation: Problematising Globalisation in African context

If democratisation and industrialisation characterised the economic North’s passage through modernity, then globalisation, neo-liberal privatisation and rise of transnational corpora-tions can be claimed to have marked the dawn of its post-modern era that rejuvenates the institutional tools and functional modes of the neo-Gramscian regime of hegemonic power relations in its newest avatar. If economic globalisation and political neo-liberalisation have been officially hailed and institutionalised by the IMF, WTO and the World Bank as the only verifiable policy alternatives in a politico-economic context shaped by the Bretton-Woods system and Washington Consensus, the counter-argument can be simultaneously posited that such a fallacious understanding of global economy drives forth the tempo of the a-historical, indiscriminate and asymmetric dynamics, that usurp the organic elements of historicity and vertically impose their interest-driven structures, policies and ideologies on the latter regardless of the region-specific historical contexts and structural requirements. Conceptually, it is startling that even the most moderate advocates of globalisation inadvertently discard the fact that the fundamental structural and developmental precondition for globalisation is the resolution of the triple crisis of modernisation – economic transition from original accumulation to primitive accumulation, democratisation and saturated capitalist development. Contextualised against the backdrop of the under-developed regions like sub-Saharan Africa, globalisation in the form of openness, de-regulation, privatisation and adoption of stabilisation and adjustment policies represents an involuntary and non-spontaneous process enforced vertically by the developed world. With incomplete primitive accumulation, poor industrialisation, and hence a sheer minuscule floating proletariat working class, the historical setting of the dark continent does not yet provide the optimum structural pre-conditions in which neo-liberalism ought to crystallise. Against the backdrop of incomplete modernisation and politico-economically essentially a pre-modern context which structurally proves anachronistic for globalisation, the African experience with globalisation paradoxically reinforces the anti-modern forces which not only impedes her unfinished historical journey through modernisation, but also seriously restrains the state capacity to cope with the onslaught of

1 These refer to the set of policies of those countries which have accepted one or more structural adjustment loans from the World Bank since this term was introduced (Rolph von der Hoeven, Poverty and Structural Adjustments: Some Remarks, Working Paper 2000/4, International Labour Organization, Geneva, 2000, pp. 1-2). The central aim of these stabilization and adjustment policies, as laid down by the World Bank regulations, has been the reduction of subjective ‘obstacles’ in the markets like subsidies and price controls to allow for the better functioning of the objective forces of market that would promote greater growth; liberalisation of trade, and privatisation of the state-owned enterprises to reduce the dependency culture and actively promote enterprise and competition; fiscal regulation to prevent inflation, decline in currency exchange rates and fiscal and budget deficit by cutting off public welfare expenditure by the state.

2 The state capacity includes such powers and functions of the state vis-à-vis the citizens as legitimised by the social contract. It encompasses sovereignty, prerogative of legitimate use of force in and outside the territory, public services including welfare and the mediation of the process of human resource development and endowment. This massive problem of the structural condition of the typical African state is significantly due to the contradictions arising from globalisation and the dependent character of the African state.

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post-modernity\textsuperscript{3}. Given the dependent character of the economic sectors on African states,\textsuperscript{4} the neo-liberal re-structuring and privatisation of public policy instruments, subsidies and various channels of income distribution— the income before tax (wages, profits etc), the income after taxation and the net income which refer to the total benefits of public services and welfarism— succeed only in reversing the trends in growth. Rather, as this paper shows, the distributional impact of globalisation has been highly inequitable being contingent on the necessary endogenous conditions of efficiency of national macro-economic governance, high industrial growth and high demand elasticity for labour. The consequence is an un-forewarned insecurity at the level of individual human beings, which Amartya Sen refers to as the ‘miniaturization of the individual’\textsuperscript{5}, and the inequitable phenomenon of thin globalisation and creation of ‘20/80 societies’: Negative globalisation resulting in increasing poverty of the majority of the population and the increasing affluence of a small minority.

To examine the structural nexus between globalisation and human insecurity, this article not only deploys the income-based variable of human security, but also includes one most important non-income variable— health— as comprehensive proxy for deepening human security crisis. Human security, in the broadest sense of the term, is the symmetric intersection between income-based and non-income based variables that assure most fundamental of human existential concerns: Physical well-being, health and longevity. First, the article explicates the different indices of globalisation in sub-Saharan Africa and its incomplete and unequal integration into the global market, and then it proceeds to link these up with different variables of insecurity.

**Incomplete Integration into Global Market: Necessary Condition for ‘Thin Globalisation’** An examination of various watch points and indicators of liberalisation and integration into the global market and economy— FDI, international trade share etc.— indicates that while only Botswana, Mauritius and Ghana fall under the quartile of ‘fast integrators’\textsuperscript{6} the rest of Africa is concentrated in the quartile of ‘weak’ or ‘slow integrators’. The UNDP report revealed that while the number of people of daily wage of $1 or less has still remained static without signs of improvement at 1.2 billion, while those earning less than $2 rose from 2.55 billion to 2.8 billion.\textsuperscript{7} Figure 1, 2 and 3 illustrate the marginalisation of the sub-Saharan region from international market.

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3 The opportunity of speedy modernisation that de-colonisation and end of Cold War offered to Africa, has been hijacked by the anti-statism, exclusionary democracy and the inherent social segregation and of the neo-liberalism and privatisation agenda.

4 This regressive *dependencia* derives from the residual vestiges of colonial legacy of parasitic political and socio-economic and psycho-cultural meta-structures and institutions which decelerates the unfolding of the process of autonomous capacity-building by the state.

5 The intensified individual and social insecurity resulting from these multiple sources has been associated with a range of adverse effects. Its immediate effect at the individual and family levels is an increase in mental stress and strain. This is manifested in different forms of psychological and physical ailments including depression, alienation, suicide, high blood pressure, strokes and heart attacks. When confronted with the malaise induced by insecurity, people tend to turn for support to institutions such as the state, work organisations, communities and families. However, as argued above, the ability of such institutions to offer material and psychological support has declined significantly. The void so created is filled increasingly by ethnic and religious bodies. At moments of deep anxiety for their people, such organisations supply material needs, cultural identity and secure values. Unfortunately, in many circumstances these organisations espouse extremist visions characterised by intolerance, exclusion, hatred and violence. Material deprivation and cultural crisis provide a fertile ground for the operation of ethnic and religious entrepreneurs with their own power and ideological agenda. All too often, these initiatives end up in religious and ethnic violence and wars of secession, with their inevitable accompaniment of mass killings, physical destruction and forced displacement of people as external and internal refugees.

6 Botswana government has recently committed itself to human development and is encouraging efficient export mechanisms, and has shown a steady, though slow, rise in GDP. Mauritius government has now been offering attractive tax incentives and other packages to attract FDI and transnational corporations. For details, see Brahmbhatt, M.and Uri Dadush (1996) “Disparities in Global Integration,” *Finance and Development*, Washington, D.C.

7 UNDP, 1999.
Since trade and FDI in Africa refer to her incomplete integration into the international market, it might be spuriously concluded that its inequality and poverty cannot be structurally ascribed to economic globalisation, and hence the region is invulnerable to global market fluctuations. However, though Africa’s openness is extremely limited in relative terms, in its own absolute terms, it is extremely important in African economy, given the fact that trade constitutes eighty per cent of Africa’s GDP. The heavy external debt and heavy aid-reliance also exposes Africa to outside pressures and increases its external dependence and therefore renders her vulnerable to global slumps and depression. For example, the total volume of exports in primary products like metal, cocoa and coffee is always fluctuating due to price fluctuations and low-income elasticity demand of the same in global market. This in turn adversely affects the GDP provided that trade constitutes a major share in GDP.

The direct impact of this ‘thin’ and incomplete globalisation is on household welfare in the region. Intensification of poverty and income inequity have magnified human insecurity due to a marked decline in income of the households in traditional sectors of occupation and agriculture. The highly inequitable distribution pattern and economic injustice of trade liberalisation has been evident in the fact that while underdeveloped regions like sub-Saharan Africa have reduced as much as forty per cent of import tariff and hundred per cent of non-tariff barriers, developed countries have shied away from this commitment making the burden of inequity fall completely on the latter. This inequitable distributional pattern of liberalisation results in flooding the domestic markets with cheap import goods (especially non-food items from East Asia) thereby destabilises many small scale traditional private and public enterprises, and the subsequent loss of a high volume of domestic jobs. This, along with the abolition of minimum wage laws, imposition of newer indirect taxes by the state and reduction of social welfare spending (to compensate for the budget deficits) as a part of stabilisation and adjustment reforms, have reduced the purchasing power and earnings of low-income families which mostly spend on consumption rather than on social spending. It has been estimated, that a total forty per cent

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<td>30.1</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>23.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSA/World Exports</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
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<td>0.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSA/Developing Countries Exports</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
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<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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Figure 2: Share of African Exports in World Exports, 1970-2001; source: Geda, “Openness, Inequality and Poverty”, p. 5

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Terms of Trade Index, 1995=100</th>
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<td>2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average</td>
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Figure 3: Deterioration of African global export trade, 1990-2001; source: Geda, “Openness, Inequality and Poverty”, p. 7
reduction in import tariffs has entailed a substantial 35 per cent income loss of the urban employers, 41 per cent for the recipients of tariffs with a minuscule 2.5 per cent total gain in African gain.8

Moreover, due to globalisation of the food market, and the substantial curtailment of agricultural subsidies by the state, the African farmers now confront the unequal competition from the US and European farmers who are protected by agricultural subsidies. While the EU spends forty per cent of its budget on agricultural subsidies, the US farmers receive an average of $16,000 p.a. as subsidies.9 As production becomes more expensive with no governmental subsidies, the domestic producers suffer a serious setback of capital and the cost of food items rises considerably. It perpetuates the cycle of food insecurity and poverty. In commodity dependent countries like Africa, trade liberalisation does not lead to demand elasticity for labour, but rather reduction of income.10 As for instance, the extremely expensive agricultural input has hit hard the agriculture-based rural households in Tunisia, Zambia, Tanzania.11 The withdrawal of maize marketing monopoly by the state that allowed the rural households to purchase huge maize stocks at subsidised price has isolated the rural maize-producing households due to their significant income reduction in Zambia with no available alternative productive assets to contain the declining trends in maize production.12

Uganda first attempted to overcome this agricultural productivity crisis due to slump in capital by shifting from production of food crops to commercial cash crops. But the unintended consequence of this on rural household was that while it promoted a positive supply response and hence, income, cultivation of cash crops demanded more labour time, especially of the female workers, which was causally linked to poor reproductive health of these female workers in the fields and increased child malnutrition thereby affecting the general household health in Uganda.13 In response to import competition at a time of general infrastructural unpreparedness for international competition, absence of state-regulated policies to promote investment and technological development, firms in Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Tanzania have contracted their activity outside resulting marked loss of urban industrial employment.14

Thus, though general growth and rise in average GDP are largely affected by openness in trade and integration of into global market, a positive correlation between the two can only exist in presence of certain necessary endogenous preconditions—efficient and stable macro-economic governance, proper utilisation and adequate presence of human capital, proper legal procedures regulating foreign trade and investment—which are severely underdeveloped in Africa providing an anachronistic setting for globalisation.15

The Structural Nexus between Globalisation and Human Insecurity: Using Health as a Proxy

Given the steady ascending curve in declining income and consequent poverty in Africa over last two decades, and the coincidence of eco-

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8 Alemayehu Geda, Ibid.
10 UNCTAD report (2004) has shown that in commodity dependent countries, poverty and income inequality is hastened by the liberalisation of trade because the traditional sectors of economy have been heavily reliant on state protection and subsidies. In the under-developed regions of sub-Saharan Africa the number of people living below the absolute poverty line and $1/day has alarmingly risen from 61 per cent in 1981-1983 to 82 per cent in 1997-1999. This has been most astonishing in Tunisia where the chief manufacturing industries in Africa are located, and which witnessed a marked fall in demand elasticity for labour. For further details, see UNCTAD, The Least Developed Countries Report 2004: Linking International Trade with Poverty Reduction, UNCTAD, Geneva, 2004; and Ilham Haouas and Mahmoud Yagoubi, Trade Liberalization and Labour Demand Elasticities: Evidence from Tunisia. Processed, University of Paris I, Paris, 2003.
13 Apart from Zimbabwe, Uganda registers the largest number of children suffering from malnutrition, and poor reproductive health of the female who have been working overtime in the fields, and receiving little payment in return. See Winters et al, Ibid.
15 Francisco Rodriguez and Dani Rodrik, Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Sceptic’s Guide to The Cross-National Evidence, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, and Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2000. It is precisely due to these structural preconditions that international capital flow and FDI are concentrated into the developed and some of the developing, and not the under-developed countries. In the 1990s, it was estimated that while 58 per cent of the FDI was concentrated in the developed countries, a staggering 85 per cent of the FDI flowing to developing and transition economies were unequally distributed between only 20 countries around the world which did not include any country from Sub-Saharan Africa. The transfer of technology, knowledge and skills also follows uneven pattern of concentration in the countries with higher education standards and levels and with already existent modern technologies like internet and telecommunications. By the late 1990s the fifth of the world people living in the highest-income countries had 86 percent of world GDP, 68 percent of world export markets, 74 percent of world telephone lines*. Benefits of the international trade agreements are also inequitably developed with seventy per cent concentrated in developed and thirty per cent unevenly distributed among the developing countries.
nomic globalisation of Africa over this period, a correlation, if not a causality, can be established between globalisation and growing human insecurity. In the existent literature on globalisation and its effect on inequality and poverty, the dominant trend is to use income and its proxies as the variable to measure poverty and resultant human insecurity. However, an appraisal of Human Development Index in Africa underscores the significance of non-income variables as well—especially consumption and health—as significant proxies of human security, poverty and income inequality. Given the fact that the lower-income households spend substantial income on consumption and health rather than on social spending, it can be stated that the income-based poverty automatically translates into non-income poverty like food and health insecurities as it reduces the purchasing ability of the concerned households. Considering the notion of human security both as freedom from want and as freedom from fear, health security is not only an independent variable and proxy of human security and a biomedical issue, but it is also inextricably linked with the other socio-economic gradients of human security, especially food security, physical efficiency, good health, high life expectancy and economic savings by the households. A notable drop in both urban and rural employment in sub-Saharan Africa commensurate with market liberalisation, as discussed in the previous section, and political de-regulation of public sectors thereby suggests a significant intensification of poverty due to plummeting of public sectors thereby suggesting a significant intensification of poverty due to plummeting of infant mortality. This triggered subsequent fertility decline, and hence, greater income, better health standards, and thus, in turn greater productivity of the working population. In economic terms, this implies that there are increasing immediate social investments being made in educational standards, physical capital and other infrastructure. The recent ‘economic miracle’ in East Asia serves an example of how ‘virtual spirals’ can evolve from demographic transition and state commitment to health investments resulting in higher productivity and income, which again ensures better public health.

Human Development Index in Africa underscores the significance of non-income variables as well—especially consumption and health—as significant proxies of human security, poverty and income inequality. Given the fact that the lower-income households spend substantial income on consumption and health rather than on social spending, it can be stated that the income-based poverty automatically translates into non-income poverty like food and health insecurities as it reduces the purchasing ability of the concerned households. Considering the notion of human security both as freedom from want and as freedom from fear, health security is not only an independent variable and proxy of human security and a biomedical issue, but it is also inextricably linked with the other socio-economic gradients of human security, especially food security, physical efficiency, good health, high life expectancy and economic savings by the households. A notable drop in both urban and rural employment in sub-Saharan Africa commensurate with market liberalisation, as discussed in the previous section, and political de-regulation of public sectors thereby suggests a significant intensification of poverty due to plummeting of public sectors thereby suggesting a significant intensification of poverty due to plummeting of infant mortality. This triggered subsequent fertility decline, and hence, greater income, better health standards, and thus, in turn greater productivity of the working population. In economic terms, this implies that there are increasing immediate social investments being made in educational standards, physical capital and other infrastructure. The recent ‘economic miracle’ in East Asia serves an example of how ‘virtual spirals’ can evolve from demographic transition and state commitment to health investments resulting in higher productivity and income, which again ensures better public health.

18 Healthier workers are indeed more productive than the unhealthier ones owing to full utilisation of physical and mental labour and less wastage of working potential due to illness, fewer costs for health problems. While education is most essential for the acquisition of skills to utilise the benefit of market forces and competition, and to contribute to general productivity, health is essential in attainment of education because healthier people with longer life expectancy generally invest more time and resources to education. Healthy population also promotes investment as longer the individual lives, more will he be investing for future. Moreover, a healthy working force also promotes better functioning of market, and hence in a way, can be said to be attracting foreign investments.
19 Throughout 1960s to 1990s, the working age population in East Asia grew much faster than the dependent population owing to the impressive public health improvements by the state (especially mother and child care) and rapid decline in infant mortality. This triggered subsequent fertility decline, and hence, a much favourable low worker-dependents ratio with higher income and available resources per capita, provided the macro-economic mechanisms of the state provided for absorption of workers in productive employment.
Articles

However, this positive mutual reinforcement also suggests that there also exists a negative mutual reinforcement. The sub-Saharan Africa serves the most potent illustration. With eighty per cent of global AIDS mortality occurring here, the disease, along with other diseases, poses an enormous public economic burden. Moreover, most of them dying in their prime age, the income, growth and output losses of the disease are substantial. While most of the meagre governmental resources are allocated to the curing of this in vain, the other serious diseases are not addressed adequately. With eight per cent of African adults now suffering from HIV, 56 per cent of the total population in sub-Sahara is expected not to reach their age of retirement—sixty—the age when the dependency is least and investment and savings high. The sub-Saharan Africa has not yet reportedly entered the much-needed demographic transition. High fertility period ensures for an uneven age structure of the demography with unfavourable ratio between the workers and dependants and an extremely high child-dependency rate—as high as forty per cent. This ensures the imperative of child labour and extremely high labour supply and resultant youth unemployment: With fewer working population, the ratio of capital to labour would have been more favourable to the latter with rise in productivity and income per capita. With high fertility as well as mortality rate due to deadly diseases and under-consumption, thus only a tiny part of the demography is constituted by the middle aged people, the age where people are most prone to make savings and invest-

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<th>2000</th>
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<tr>
<td>Promote gender equality and empower women</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under five mortality rate (per 1,000 births)</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>174</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maternal mortality rate (per 1,000,000 live births)</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>917</td>
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<td>Access to an improved water source</td>
<td>54</td>
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<td>Access to improved sanitation facilities</td>
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<td>54</td>
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Figure 5: Status of Human Development in Sub-Saharan Africa

...and health insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, child mortality, which is 240 times higher in sub-Saharan region than rest of the world, and the HIV/AIDS pandemic—some sixty per cent of all HIV patients over the world are in sub-Saharan Africa whose total population is not more than ten per cent of the world population—not only underscores poor public health but also acute food shortage, poor sanitation and hygiene, lack of health care for diseases. Governmental de-regulation of important public sectors like primary healthcare—the internal political and neo-liberal dimension of economic globalisation—further accentuate human insecurity. Since the publication of the World Bank policy document in 1987, privatisation of public services, especially health care, has become an integral policy component of the structural adjustments for the internationally indebted regions like sub-Saharan Africa. The introduction of the ‘user fee system’, private finance and out-of-pocket expenses in health care has been legitimised as being the subsidiary objective of generating revenue for qualitative improvements and efficiency of health-care services. For Kenya, Uganda and Somalia this World Bank strategy has been fortified by making the privatisation of health care as a policy precondition for loans and aids from international donors. Consequently, social expenditure of the African states has been reduced to less than two per cent of the total budget.

However, this system represents what Gilson and McIntyre term as ‘the most regressive of healthcare financing’ lacking governmental risk-sharing, which makes the entire brunt of the costs of treatment and health-care fall directly on the poor and the sick— who need urgent treatment—rather than healthy people. In absence of proper policy formulation for skill developments and education the privatised health-care system has failed to generate revenue for health improvements. The social expenditures of the welfare states on health and social determinants of health, often termed as ‘social wages’, have significant buffering effects.

during the critical periods of life cycle in public health. "Cross nationally, higher levels of both social expenditure and taxation as a proportion of gross domestic product are associated with longer life expectancy, lower maternal mortality, and a smaller proportion of low birthweight deliveries". Moreover, in view of the extremely high rate of susceptibility of the population to HIV/AIDS and other deadly diseases, the rise in out-of-pocket costs for health-care has impoverished many households and accentuated the poverty of the already poor—a phenomenon termed as medical poverty gap. The ramifications of this have been long-term impoverishment, extremely restricted access to healthcare and hence, most importantly, untreated morbidity: The diseases mostly go untreated. The most explicit illustration of this is how tuberculosis and malaria, which actually accounts for larger numbers of deaths in Africa than HIV/AIDS taken alone, is being largely untreated. Since rate of co-infections of tuberculosis, malaria and HIV/AIDS is extremely high, the patients, who are mostly poverty-stricken, cannot afford the simultaneous treatment of two or more diseases. As for instance, in 2001 nearly seventy per cent of all tuberculosis patients on the continent were also infected with HIV, while with regard to malaria, it is estimated that this affects 300-500 million people each year; 85 per cent of the resulting deaths occur in sub-Saharan Africa.

In economic terms, the health insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa, and especially the epidemic HIV/AIDS, is the veritable stumbling bloc in impeding the human capital formation, business investment and proper natural and human resource management—the key to the alleviation of poverty against the backdrop of uneven global competition. The deceased and infected people are valuable economic actors—producers and consumers—and labourers.

The labour force in a number of key sectors in African economy—agriculture, mining and transport—has been substantially decimated by HIV/AIDS. People suffering from AIDS as well as other contagious and lethal diseases are less efficient and less productive with high absence rates thereby affecting the general productivity of the concerned economic sectors. The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) publication in 1993 established the linkage between health and food security. As it documented, in Somalia, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Zambia, Mozambique and Malawi, the acute food crisis, among other factors, is due to the prevalence of HIV/AIDS: About eight million farmers—more than twenty per cent of the agricultural labour force—have been estimated to die from HIV/AIDS that outnumbered the total number of farmers in North America and EU. A substantial part of the working population, especially female, is also pulled away from income-and-productivity-generating activities due to care that the infected members of their families require. This indirect economic wastage of labour productivity and power affects around 14.6 million people in Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Most important, the poor reproductive health of the sub-Saharan Africa multiplies the most adverse interaction outcome between health and income. Of 33.6 million people living under AIDS, 46 per cent are adult women of working and reproductive age. Considering the prime role of women in ensuring household food security and household economy, the rising female mortality rate not only affects the household welfare but the national welfare and growth. As Mutangadura comments, "Women exhibit certain nurturing and allocative behaviours that enhance the food and nutrition security of the entire household and of children in particular… The health and life situation of any woman is critical to the health and life chances of her children, not only during pregnancy, childbirth and the early months of life but throughout the entire childhood". Thus, female mortality not only changes the demographic structure of the household but reverses the most important function of family as a social community of being ‘safety net’. In sub-Saharan Africa, women are 2-4 times more vulnerable than men to HIV infection and other diseases due to their precarious labour status in unskilled and semi-skilled labour intensive economic sectors, their low access to education and required skills, low income, little societal security, little ownership of investment or property, and most of all, little sexual autonomy, especially when it comes to use of contraceptives, and condoms. In sub-Saharan Africa, especially in Zimbabwe, the infection of HIV is roughly distributed between

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22 George Davey Smith, quoted in David Doburn, "Income Inequality, Social Cohesion and the Health Status of the Populations: the role of Neo-liberalism", Social Science and Medicine, 51, 2000, p. 139.
24 Ibid.
26 Jacques du Guerny and Lee-Nah Hsu, Environmental and Agricultural Interactions: Implications for HIV and other infectious diseases; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), New York, 2004
29 Ibid, pp. 2-3.
female and male with the former more prone to be infected at younger age than men— the pick age group being 19-29 years— while that of men being 30-39 years. And because of this young age of infection, the death toll of HIV/AIDS is mostly on the productive age group.

In Zimbabwe, till 1999, more than 200,000 people have died of AIDS since its epidemic in 1985. The average costs of the treatment are Z$20,000 per month, which is beyond the reach of even the highest paid experienced civil servants. Reversing the national health gains, with mortality rate reaching to 62 years in 1994 has been reversed by the drop in mortality rate to 46 years in 1998.

The recent studies have indicated the inclination among the working women to spend more on the daily subsistence and nutrition of the family. Because, the women earnings are in form of frequent and smaller units of wages, due to their employment in informal sectors like agriculture, and the men’s earnings are in form of seasonal and bigger units, the latter are mostly utilised on more expensive provisions rather than daily subsistence. In sub-Saharan Africa, seventy-eighty per cent of agricultural workforce is female. The AIDS related death of females here not only account for the low productivity in food sectors but also adverse social impact on the households depending, fully or partially, on a female’s earnings. In Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe the decline in variety of crops being cultivated over last ten years owes to this substantial loss of female work force. Death of a female member in AIDS not only implies direct costs like costs of treatment prior to death and funeral costs, but also indirect costs like decline in nutritional standards, education, sale of assets etc., reinforcing poverty. Given the fact that a substantial share of demography in its prime working age is suffering from AIDS, and that many male workers also die, women play significant economic role in the families and households in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, Mutangadura’s study shows that in Zimbabwe, 24 per cent of the households were reported to have sold assets and holdings, ranging from furniture, clothing, land to cattle and livestock to meet the funeral and treatment costs as well as decline after death in the household’s income. The sale of livestock again reinforces poverty by affecting the family’s ability to contribute to production. In the urban settings, seventy per cent of the households where the adult women died, experienced a withdrawal of children from school, especially due to inability to pay the school fees, while the percentage is sixty per cent in rural areas. And majority of the households showed a veritable decline in nutritional standards of the children.

Moreover, this AIDS epidemic has also significantly eroded the structural framework of the extended family as a socio-economic and psychological ‘safety net’ against poverty and economic hardship. The increasing emergence of poverty-stricken and under-nourished child-headed households illustrates the exhaustion of the socio-economic capacity of absorption of the inter-household and kinship units crumbling the social cement of cohesion. Lack of resources and high dependency rates cause 23 out of thirty child-headed households in Uganda and Mutare being deserted by their relatives, while the share rises as high as 89 per cent in Zimbabwe, resulting in absolute disappearance of many such households due to poverty, malnutrition and diseases.

Conclusions
The sub-Saharan African case illustrates how the forces of globalisation can be operating against the dynamics of development and modernisation, arresting growth, reversing previous health gains and threatening human security, in absence of efficient macro-economic governance and slump in GDP. Due to this essentially inequitable distributive impact of globalisation, poverty still remains crucial even if growth rate and income per capita grow on average, and hence, a substantial majority of population suffers under the evils of ‘thin globalization’. Thus, the relationship between growth and income distribution has been taken to be one of

30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
33 Mutangadura, “Household welfare impacts of mortality”.
34 Ibid.
35 Especially is sub-Saharan Africa, this extended family has been of particular importance in society and economy. In Zimbabwe, this extended family takes form of urban-rural and rural-urban resource transfers: during crop failure or draught, the urban relatives, friends or neighbour are known to bring in money and food to rural side with the expectation of future reciprocation in case of needs in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Uganda, Burkin Faso, Kwaramba, Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia. Moreover, the orphans are also taken care of by the extended family, especially the maternal kin, the percentage of which is as high as 85 per cent.
37 Mutangadura, “Household welfare impacts of mortality”.

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Very low inequality, characteristically a socialist policy adopted largely till the 1980s, arrests growth because an excessively compressed wage distribution does not adequately reward for the differential individual abilities, entrepreneurship and skills and hence does not encourage incentives, resulting in shirking. Similarly, when the gap between the rich and the poor widens substantially, not only the work incentives of the poor are eroded, but this high distributive inequity also encourage centrifugal forces leading to political instability and social cohesion. Social tensions affect domestic savings, erode the security of property rights, augment the threat of expropriation, drive away domestic and foreign investment, and increase the cost of business security and contract enforcement, and in turn, adversely affects growth.
Sources on Labour History in Trinidad and Tobago

Jerome Teelucksingh

Extant primary and secondary literature, inclusive of dissertations and research papers on early twentieth century labour history, constitute valuable resources for an understanding of working class struggles and the evolution of labour organisations in colonial and post-colonial societies and more specifically in Trinidad and Tobago. The focus of scholars on the labour history of the twin island republic is understandable, given the importance of working class struggle in the emancipation and decolonisation movements. This article surveys primary and secondary sources which deal with the period 1845 to 2008.

In his doctoral dissertation on the achievements of labour in the larger West Indian colonies, Francis X. Mark adopted a comparative approach in his analysis of early working class organisations and the subsequent evolution of mass movements during the period 1896 to the early 1950s. Overand Padmore’s thesis on the trade union movement examined the impact of a growing demand for labour’s services and its subsequent effect on the evolution of trade unionism from the 1930s to the fifties. He made brief reference to the Trinidad Workingmen’s Association (TWA) and its role in the growth of trade unionism in the colony.

Basil Ince analysed the colony’s political development from 1925 to 1956 and he included an examination of the socio-economic factors contributing to the early successes of labour representatives in the general elections of 1925, 1928, 1933 and 1938. Brinsley Samaroo’s dissertation “The Constitutional and Political Development of Trinidad 1898-1925” sought to highlight the role of the TWA and the reform movement of the late 1890s and the early twentieth century. He analysed the rise of political radicalism and its contribution to semi-representative government.

Complementing these academic endeavours were studies by Wendy Charles and Susan Campbell. Charles’ thesis is a broad-based survey which examined the early period of the TWA, its activities during the 1920s and Tubal Uriah Butler’s involvement in the 1937 labour protests. Butler was a Grenadian who migrated to Trinidad in 1921 and was employed in the oilfield in South Trinidad. Campbell’s doctoral dissertation gives a comprehensive examination of the responses of Britain’s Colonial Office during four decades of working class activity in Trinidad.

Two recent doctoral dissertations from the History Department of The University of the West Indies (in Trinidad) have focused on the working class. These include my study entitled “The Contribution of Labour to the Social and Political Development of Trinidad and Tobago 1897-1950” and Radica Mahase’s “Indian Indentured Labour in Trinidad: Towards Abolition, 1870-1920.”

During the nineteen thirties, there were noteworthy studies which featured outstanding labour leaders of the early twentieth century and...

5. Butler was the founder of the Grenada Union of Returned Soldiers and member of the Grenada Representative Government Movement. Butler was a volunteer in the British West Indies regiment in World War One and, in 1931 he joined the TWA.
labour conditions in the British West Indies. For instance, C.L.R James in *The Life of Captain Cipriani* dealt primarily with the achievements of Captain Arthur Cipriani, leader of the TWA and elected member in the Legislative Council, in the context of political events in the colony. James included brief references to Cipriani's links with England, particularly with the British Labour Party. Also, W. Arthur Lewis' 1939 radical publication, *Labour in the West Indies* described the intolerable conditions that served as a catalyst for protests which inspired the emergence of mass labour movements in the Caribbean during the 1930s.

Studies based on personal involvement in the labour struggle include Albert Gomes' *Through a Maze of Colour*. His work is a particularly enlightening analysis of Trinidad from the nineteen thirties to the nineteen sixties. This autobiography from one of the colony's foremost politicians provides an analysis of the electoral system before the introduction of a formal party system, the conditions that led to the evolution of trade unions and the socio-economic problems facing the working class of the colony. Likewise, Bukka Rennie's *History of the Working Class in Twentieth Century Trinidad and Tobago* combined components of the early history of labour and he chronicled the role of the working class and its influence on the development of labour organisations, reform groups, trade unions and political parties.

The turbulent thirties in Trinidad and Tobago which was dominated by major working class protests, have been fertile ground for social and political researchers of the nineteen seventies and nineteen eighties. W. Richard Jacobs in *Butler versus the King* analysed the trial of Butler. Jacobs used primary sources including court documents and colonial correspondence to illustrate that Butler was a victim of a biased judiciary and an oppressive Crown Colony system. Ron Ramdin in *Chattel Slave to Wage Earner* provided a generalised account of the early origins of Trinidad's working class movement with emphasis on the 1937 protests. Nyahuma Obika's *An Introduction to the Life and Times of T.U.B Butler* focused overwhelmingly on Butler's role on 1937. This semi-biographical work lucidly illustrates Butler's invaluable contribution to labour development in the post-1937 era and the formation of his trade union. In 1987, Roy Thomas edited *The Trinidad Labour Riots of 1937*, a compilation of papers written on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the 1937 labour protests. The study embraces a variety of themes inclusive of ruling class response, factors leading to the workers' protests and the resultant investigations and commissions. Other academics who examined the 1930s included Susan Craig with *Smiles and Blood* in which she examined the socio-economic cleavages between labor and capital and the attitudes of the ruling class which created a volatile environment for the social eruption of 1937. And, included in this category is Rhoda Reddock's *Elma Francois and Women, Labour and Politics in Trinidad and Tobago*.

In the 1990s and early twenty-first century, there were historical works on labour development throughout the Caribbean. Kelvin Singh's *Race and Class Struggles in a Colonial State* examined the complex relationships between classes and racial groups in the colony. Singh analysed the rise of working class protests within the context of local and imperial policy. O. Nigel Bolland in *On the March* gave a refreshing overview of the factors and consequences of labour protests in various Caribbean colonies. In 1996, Ray Kiely in *The Politics of Labour and Development in Trinidad* employed Marxist methodology in his sociological analysis of the politics of labour in Trinidad from 1937 to the early nineteen nineties. He argued that the consoli-

dation of a united working class never materialised because of historically inherited social and economic divisions existing in the colony. In *The Politics of Labour in the British Caribbean*, O. Nigel Bolland provided an insight into the ferment and the labour rebellions of the 1930s, the rise of trade unionism and the prominence of working class organisations in the British West Indies.21

Basdeo in *Labour Organisation and Labour Reform in Trinidad* focuses on pre-World War Two labour reform as he highlights the uniqueness of Trinidad’s labour organisation among the British colonies.22 This he attributed to a strong reform impulse in the TWA and later trade unions which convinced the colonial government, local employers and the British Parliament of the need for improvements in conditions of labour.

There were regional and international forces inclusive of Garveyism which guided and influenced the ideological and social outlook of the early labour leaders and working class organisations. The secondary works which analysed Marcus Garvey’s influence on the British West Indies include W.F. Elkins’ “Marcus Garvey, the Negro World and the British West Indies: 1919-1920.”23 He delved into the impact of Garvey’s newspaper *Negro World* and the various attempts by West Indian governments to ban this publication. Tony Martin in *Race First* comprehensively examined the impact of the *Negro World* and the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) on the African diaspora in the circum-Caribbean and North America.24 This work examined the strong links at the leadership level between the UNIA and TWA. The edited work of Rupert Lewis and Maureen Warner-Lewis, *Garvey: Africa, Europe, The Americas*, placed considerable emphasis on the international appeal of Garveyism and his impact on the African diaspora in Europe.25

Selected articles in certain publications critically examine labour-related topics in the twentieth century. In 1972, Brinsley Samaroo in “The Trinidad Workingmen’s Association and the Origins of Popular Protest in a Crown Colony” considered the role of the TWA in improving workers’ conditions and the influence of the Association in the protest movements of the period 1897-1920.26 Barry Simpson-Holley with “Members for Trinidad” added to the historiography on labour through his recognition of the contributions of two parliamentarians in the British House of Commons, Joseph Pointer and Thomas Summerbell, who raised and debated pertinent colonial labour issues, especially the concerns of the TWA in Trinidad and Tobago.27 Additionally, W. Richard Jacobs in “The Politics of Protest in Trinidad: The Strikes and Disturbances of 1937” emphasised that in 1937 there existed a strong interrelationship between the industrial subsystem and the larger socio-political structure in the colony.28

Sahadeo Basdeo in “Colonial Policy and Labour Organisation in the British Caribbean 1937-1939–An Issue in Political Sovereignty” sought to examine the comprehensive and far-reaching effect of international events and policies in colonies such as Trinidad.29 In two other works, “The Role of the British Labour Movement in the Development of Labour Organisations in Trinidad 1929-1938,” and “Indian Participation in Labour Politics in Trinidad 1919-1939,” Basdeo considered the British assistance rendered to the TWA and colony’s early trade unions and the political involvement of Indo-Trinidadians during a twenty year period.30 Likewise in “Foundations of British Working Class cooperation: The Case of Trinidad and British Guiana, 1906-1914,” Basdeo placed within the context of regional integration the efforts of the working class relations between the two neighbouring colonies.31

Kelvin Singh’s study “Adrian Cola Rienzi and the Labour Movement in Trinidad (1925-1944) explored the extensive contributions of one of the architects of the labour movement in Trinidad. Singh examined Rienzi’s relationship with other labour leaders in the colony and his efforts in organising the working class particularly oil and sugar workers during the formative

years of trade unionism. Rhoda Reddock in an article in the *Caribbean Quarterly* examined the challenges facing Indian women in the colony during indentureship. Secondly, Radica Mahase’s “Caste, religion and Gender Differentiation amongst Indentured Labouerers from Bihar to Trinidad, 1870-1900,” discussed the reasons for fleeing the estates.

Some historians, in chapters in edited books, have analysed in greater detail the struggles and achievements of the working class during indentureship and in the post World War One era. These include Radica Mahase’s “Plenty a Dem Run Away” – Resistance by Indian Indentured Labourers in Trinidad, 1870-1920,” discussed the reasons for fleeing the estates. In 1939, Calder-Marshall in *Glory Dead*, provided an investigative report, partly impressionistic in highlighting obstacles confronting the unions. These included the negative stereotyping of unions by the colonial authorities which were anti-labour. One of Ralph Boissiere’s fictional characters served in Mesopotamia during World War One but returned to Trinidad to work in the oilfield in Point Fortin. In the novel, the author mentioned the problems facing the early labour movement and the incidence of strikes in the colony.

Michael Anthony in *The Chieftain’s Carnival and other stories* sought to recreate the scenario at one of Butler’s meetings, “Workers calling on me, right now workers calling on me to call a strike. And let me make this clear, workers in this colony will shed blood in fighting for their rights. Yes, friends, we mustn’t be faint-hearted and ‘fraid the police. We have to march forward to a better and brighter day." Other novelists also portrayed the police as being anti-labour. V. S. Naipaul in *The Mystic Masseur* mentioned the reaction of a labour leader to the security forces, “The police reporters scribbled conscientiously in longhand in their note-books. “Let them write it down,” the leader said. “Let them write down in their dirty little black books that we ain’t fraid them. Tell me, we fraid them?”

The musical genre of Calypso is a unique mode of social commentary in Trinidad and Tobago; and, in the period under review the art form was used as a medium both to expose perceived injustices and also to express the grievances of the working class. During 1925-1946, such topics as the general elections, poverty, labour, class differences, administration of the colony, the Italian-Ethiopian War of 1935 and the 1937 riots provided material for calypsonians.

Commissions appointed by the Colonial Office, secret despatches, and reports from colonial officials portray labour in Trinidad and the British West Indies as subversive and incapable of operating as orderly British trade unions. On the other extreme, pro-labour literature, which were anti-government seemed to exaggerate membership in organisations, crowd participation at meetings and influence of labour leaders. This illustrates how perilous and delicate the exercise can be to determine the veracity of extent
Symposia South

material.

Primary sources include the despatches between the Governor of Trinidad and Tobago and the Secretary of State for the Colonies and similar correspondence relating to the administration of the colony. Valuable documents are located at both the National Archives in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and the Public Records Office in London. Furthermore, the Chancellor Papers at Oxford University, relevant labour files at the Trade Union Congress Library at the University of North London and the Modern Records Centre at Warwick University provide vital statistical information, some of which is not available in Trinidad.

The reports of various Commissions sent to the West Indies reflect significant issues which affected the lives of workers in the British Caribbean. Documents in this category include the Report by the Honourable E.F.L. Wood (1922), Report of the West Indian Sugar Commission (1930), West Indian Report of the Closer Union Commission (1933), Report of Major Orde-Browne (1938) and F. Dalley Trade Union Organisation and Industrial Relations in Trinidad (1947). Publications such as United Empire and The West India Committee Circular offer historical and statistical information; these were pro-British and emphasised the paternal role of Britain among her colonies.

The Hansard of the Legislative Council in Trinidad and Tobago, Council Papers and Committee Reports provide invaluable information on social, political and economic conditions in the colony. Local pamphlets also proved to be a vital storehouse of primary information on the evolution of the colony’s working class movement. Among these were David Headley’s Labour and Life (1921), and two undated works: Trinidad in Parliament by Howard-Bishop and Why and How the Workers Should Organize? published by the vibrant Oilfield Workers’ Trade Union.

The daily newspapers included the Port-of-Spain Gazette which was generally pro-government and opposed to the TWA and the constitutional reformists; the Trinidad Guardian which supported the White ruling class in Trinidad; and The Mirror which sympathised with the political reform movements of the late nineteenth century. Both the Port-of-Spain Gazette and the Trinidad Guardian were often anti-labour and identified with the conservative status quo of the planters, merchants and the elite.

During the 1920s and 1930s, there were two weekly labour-oriented publications, The Labour Leader (official organ of the TWA) and The People (representing African opinion), which targeted working class audiences and addressed labour issues ignored by the pro-capitalist daily newspapers. Additionally, the Argos, New Dawn, The Vanguard and the Clarion provided a reflection of the struggles of the working class both in Trinidad and other British colonies. Their selective coverage of the contributions of labour organisations was intended both to inform and educate the working class. Some of the feature articles in these publications examine the difficulties experienced by Africans and Indians of the diaspora.

The Beacon, an anti-Establishment publication, came off the press in Trinidad in March 1931. It was printed monthly but it later became irregular and publication eventually ceased in November 1933. Although constantly opposed to the daily newspapers, The Beacon briefly resurfaced in November 1939. It contained fiction, political and social commentary, reviews, poems and historical articles. Contributors included C. L. R James and labour leaders such as A. A. Cipriani, Tito Achong, Ralph Mentor and Albert Gomes.

Historical data are preserved in correspondence and official despatches between governors and administrators in the Colonial Office. Similarly, the reports of Commissions appointed by the Colonial Office assist in appreciating political, economic and social conditions in Trinidad and Tobago. The cultural and literary sources reflect the extent in which labour has transformed the society. Both primary and secondary sources are crucial for any researcher or reader seeking to understand the dynamics of the working class during 1845 to 2008.
When I began to write this essay, the Turkish army was busy with their cross-border military operation of hunting members of Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Kurdish region of Northern Iraq. The Kurdish issue, having cost tens of thousands people’s lives up to now, has trapped Turkey for more than eighty years since the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923. As a researcher of Turkish nationalism, minority issues undoubtedly entered the scope of my academic concerns from the beginning. In this short article, I would like to introduce some of my personal experiences with Kurds in Turkey, and some of my perspectives about the current development of Turkish nationalism and the Kurdish issue.

Personal experience: Some fragments

From July 2005 to January 2006 – with a SEPHIS Ph. D. grant, I finally managed to visit Turkey where my research was supposed be done. For the most part of my half-year in Turkey I stayed at Middle East Technical University (METU), an international university in Ankara, the capital of Turkey. From the first day I arrived in Ankara, I was told by my Turkish friend that METU is a very special university in the country. According to my personal observation, the specialty of METU lies in at least the two following aspects: (1) Most METU students and teachers offer firm support to the country’s secular orientation, and (2) there are lots of leftist (solcu) students on the METU campus, who were said to be against Turkey’s accession to the European Union.

Besides these, some of my Kurdish friends also left deep impressions in my mind. In this part, I would like to relate some fragments of my communication with Kurds in Turkey.

The first time I met a Kurdish student was at METU, where I found a dormitory for graduates to stay. One of my neighbours in the dorm was a Kurdish graduate named Mustafa (alias), who was very kind to me. The first day I moved into the new room, I found that the Turkish electricity outlets did not fit my plug. It was Mustafa who helped me out. But when I first met Mustafa, I didn’t know that he was Kurdish. The next day, Mustafa introduced some of his friends to me. Then, I realised that they were speaking a very different language, neither Turkish nor English. My curiosity led me to ask why their tongue was so different. They laughed and told me that all of them are Kurds. Of these Kurds, I made two new friends: Ziya (alias) and Ufuk (alias). Neither Ziya nor Ufuk is a Turkish citizen. They both come from Syria. They came to METU to study as foreign students. Since they had been in Turkey for a couple of years, their Turkish was very good.

Although I had some bookish knowledge about Kurds before I came to Turkey, at that time I knew nearly nothing about their life, beliefs or customs. Here is not the place to introduce these complicated issues, but what I want to say is that I really got abundant information about Kurds thanks to the communication with my Kurdish friends. From time to time, there were two or three Kurdish students who would come visit Mustafa. Sometimes, if two or more friends came, they would prefer to sleep on the floor together, since there were not enough beds. I did not understand what they were talking about. But I know that what they often did was just joking, singing Kurdish songs, watching Kurdish films, and so on. Almost all the time, these people were acting in a small group. In my eyes, their group was exclusive, for other people do not know their language. But for me, there was something different. They were...
excited and eager to introduce their hometown and their culture to me. In case I forgot what they told me, they would write down some key points including some websites in my notebook. When I was invited to join their smoking and music, they even managed to teach me some simple motions of Kurdish dancing. But I am too clumsy to learn.

One evening, when I was alone in my room, surfing through the internet, Ziya knocked on my door. After the exchange of some conventional greetings, he began to complain that he had failed his English exam. He said he preferred Turkish to English. Then he asked me whether I like chatting on the internet. After getting my reply in the affirmative, Ziya asked me to show him how to connect with Chinese nationals online. He is so clever that he learned everything in only two minutes. In the end, I saw him chatting with a Chinese girl from Shanghai in English. Ziya told me that I could observe their conversation. The Chinese girl asked Ziya where he is from. Ziya’s answer left me startled. Instead of saying Syria or Turkey, he replied: “I am from Kurdistan.” The Chinese girl was obviously confused, and asked: “I never heard about this country. Is there such a country? Where is it?” Ziya’s reply was: “It is hard to explain. But I promise you that there will be a Kurdistan in future.” Then their subject of conversation moved onto other aspects of each other’s personal life, which I do not remember with any clarity.

When Ziya had stopped chatting, I asked him to depict the Kurdistan that he mentioned. On my world map, with a pencil, he pictured an outline of ‘Kurdistan’, which contains nearly half of Anatolia, Armenia, big parts of Iran, Iraq and Syria. Ziya affirmed to me that Kurdistan would be the biggest country in the Middle East in future.

One day in August, while I was reading a Turkish book titled Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene (How Happy The One Is Who Says I Am A Turk)³ in the living room, Mustafa came in. After seeing the title of the book, he shouted to me, “No, no, no, this is not good; it is too nationalistic!” I was astounded by his reaction, and then I asked him: “Aren’t you a Turk?” Instead of answering me directly, he said: “I live in Turkey, but I am a Kurd.” I asked him: “Who is a Turk then?” My neighbour, who heard our conversation, came out of his room and said: “I am a Turk.” Then a debate over national/ethnic identity began. But my Kurdish friend did not participate.

Another day, the Turkish newspaper reported a terrorist attack on the local authority in the Southeast by PKK. Taking this news to my Kurdish friends, I asked whether they could explain such conflicts that were reported from time to time. Ziya was a little unhappy and told me that this was not true, and then he added, “All these things are created by the Government. They did this to frame a case against we Kurds. But nobody dares to speak out this truth. We are not terrorists! You know me well, and you know that I am a good man. We believe in humanism. We are against terrorism. The Government is the biggest terrorist, and so is the US.” In the end, Ziya encouraged me by saying: “I don’t know why you are so interested in Turkish issues. Why don’t you change your subject to the Kurdish issue? We need you more. You see, all the Kurdish friends could help you. We could teach you our language and even Arabic, and we can take you to our hometown. You could get all the materials you want.”

On the other hand, for my Turkish friends who are not Kurds, they always tried to tell me that most Kurds and Turks could be good friends. They even pointed to some cases that they personally encountered or experienced. For example, they would tell me that they have good Kurdish friends, and besides this, some Kurds and Turks could even marry each other. The Turkish friends would say that the terrorists, who are just a small group of people, do exist, while common people, whether Turks or Kurds, do not care too much about politics. According to my own observation, however, the relationship between Turks and Kurds is sensitive; they often try to avoid talking about identity issues.

These experiences made me realise that the Kurdish problem has a close relationship with my research on Turkish nationalism. One month later, when my Turkish adviser asked me: “What do you think about Turkey? And what is your first and deepest impression about our country?” My answer was: “The Kurdish issue! I met them everyday and they are in the news.”

From Assimilation to Recognition: Current Changes of Discourse and Policy

It is through Yılmaz Beşikçi’s work that I got my first ideas about Turkey’s official policy towards Kurds. I encountered Yılmaz Beşikçi’s name in the Turkish newspaper Milliyet, according to which Mr. Beşikçi is an intellectual who has close knowledge of the Kurdish issue in Turkey.⁴ Then I asked my Kurdish friend Mustafa whether he knew about Yılmaz Beşikçi. Mustafa replied, “Of course, I know about him, so would every Kurdish intellectual. He is a great Kurdologist. You have to read his book.” My Kurdish friends told me that Beşikçi is a brave intellectual who firmly and publicly defends the rights of Kurds, and also that because of this, Beşikçi was imprisoned many times by the Turkish authorities, who banned Beşikçi’s book in Turkey for a long time. In the end, I found Beşikçi’s book at the Turkish History Society.

³ In fact, the title is a citation from a speech made by Turkey’s founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.


⁵ Yılmaz Beşikçi, Türk Tarih Tezi, Güneþ-Dil Teorisi ve Kürt Sorunu, Komal Yayýnlar, Ýstanbul, 1977.
According to Bebikci, the important pillar of the ideology of Turkish official nationalism is an unchangeable assumption which claims that all the Muslims in Turkey are Turks. Ysmail Bebikci demonstrates that Turkey's official policy towards Kurds since Atatürk is just assimilation and denying the existence of Kurds as a separate/distinct ethnic group. As argued by Bebikci, it is those Kemalist scholars who committed themselves to the defence of the correctness of "Turkish History Thesis" (Turk Tarih Tezi) and the "Sun-Language Theory" (Guneb-Dil Teorisi) that fabricated the proofs to serve the assertion that Kurds in origin were racially pure Turks. Even, for a time, the Kurds were called "mountain Turks", who were said to have forgotten their ethnic origin. This official ideology of Turkish nationalism, I observed, is really a very sensitive subject in Turkey. Even today, the hard-liners of the Kemalist bloc in Turkey still strongly refuse to make any concession in their nationalist claim.

However, facing more and more frequent terrorist attacks from PKK, the current Erdoğan government has recognised the seriousness of Kurdish problem, which has cost nearly forty thousand people's lives. The government is finally attempting to make some progress in solving the Kurdish problem.

According to some Turkish critics, the "turning point" of Turkey's policy towards Kurdish people was in mid-August of 2005, when prime minister Erdoğan gave a new signal to the Kurds. On 12 August, in Diyarbakir, a city populated mostly by Kurds in southeastern Turkey, Erdoğan delivered a speech, in which the Prime Minister stressed that to solve the Kurdish issue and PKK terrorism Turkey needs to have "more democracy." In this speech, Erdoğan implied that his government would admit a differentiation between higher identity and sub-identity. By higher identity, he means Turkish citizenship, while for the sub-identity, he was referring to the diversity of ethnicities. According to Erdoğan, his Justice and Development Party (AKP) has always been being against three sorts of nationalism—ethnic nationalism, local nationalism and religious nationalism. Erdoğan stressed that his government recognises the existence of many different ethnic groups in Turkey, and they should be treated equally. The ethnic identity is a sub-identity under the bond of Turkish citizenship. This classification of identities was repeated by Erdoğan in a speech delivered in Pemendili in November 2005. In this speech the PM explicitly told his audience that in the Turkish Republic, citizenship is the basic and highest identity. At the same time, the PM sought to placate the Kurds by saying that under Turkish citizenship, Kurdish people are free to define their identity as a different ethnic group. Erdoğan explained that everyone has other sub-identities except for being a citizen, and nobody should be ostracised for his sub-identity. He said: "A Kurd could say: 'I am a Kurd.'" To my great surprise, the PM's declaration evoked a war over identity. He was criticised for his violation of the "one nation" policy of this country. At that time, as a Chinese, I was really confused by some Turkish people's burning excitement over the division of levels of different identities, for, in China, for nearly sixty years, the government always admits there are fifty-six ethnicities within the country, and even several autonomous regions were established within the territory of People's Republic of China. Those who are identified as a member of certain minority in our country are given preferential treatments in many aspects.

It is worth pointing out that before he came to Diyarbakir in August 2005, Erdoğan met fifteen public intellectuals in Istanbul. It was said that this was the first time that a Turkish leader listened to intellectuals on state affairs. But some also criticised these intellectuals by saying that they were not real experts in this field, and they were ineligible to participate in this process of policy making. As far as I know, these intellectuals were selected members of a special group ("Working Group on Minority and Cultural Rights") under the leadership of the office of the PM. On 17 October 2004, the working group published a report, in which the reasons for misunderstanding of the minority issue in Turkey were listed. The last reason was: "While talking about the Turks, it was not realised that the term 'Turk' was simultaneously understood as an ethnic, or in fact, religious-group." The report attempts to help to develop a civil national identity in Turkey, suggesting the use of "Türkîyeli (people of Turkey) instead of "Türk" to

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6 This thesis believes that the highest civilisation in the history of humankind was created by Turks, a white-skinned people who lived in the area of Central Asia tens of thousands of years ago. Later, due to sharp change of climate in Central Asia, most of these Turks were forced to emigrate out of their homeland. With these travels, Turks brought their higher civilisation to all the other people around the world. This thesis was the fundamental axis for rewriting Turkish history in the Kemalist era. According to my own research, in Turkey, the "Thesis" was formulated originally for strengthening Turks' national self-esteem, confidence and their national identity.

7 This is a theory officially propagated by the Turkish authorities in the mid-1930s. The general viewpoint of this theory is that almost all the languages around the world originated from a so-called ancient Turkic language.

8 Turkish Daily News, 13 August, 2005.

9 Milliyet, 13 August 2005.

10 Turkish Daily News, November 25, 2005.

refer to Turkish citizens. I think this is a good idea. Just like the situation in China, although the dominant ethnicity is the Han, the country’s name is “zhongguo” (China) and all citizens are called “zhong guo ren” (Chinese people). In doing so, the existence and rights of many different ethnic groups would be recognised and guaranteed, and the diversity of culture could survive in a time of globalisation.

More importantly, Erdoğan does not only recognise the existence of Kurds, but also he admits the existence of the “Kurdish problem” in Turkey. This is a bolder step, according to some observers. The importance of this step lies in the fact that the PM regards the Kurdish issue as a political/national one. According to the former Turkish president Demirler, “Before 1990, we didn’t recognize the ethnic difference among Turkish people. Every person is ethnically a Turk. This is the official discourse of Turkey before 1990. I changed this. As president, I said we recognize the existence of Kurds. That means in the Turkish nation there are other ethnicities. It is necessary to accept this idea. That is what I said. The importance of discourse lies here. But I did not regard it as a national issue. I just said there were different ethnicities.”

The steps taken by PM Erdoğan demonstrates the resolve of his government to solve the Kurdish issue and PKK terrorism. In the Diyarbakır speech, Erdoğan said: “Diyabakýr is a city as important as Ankara, Erzurum, Konya and Istanbul. Everyone of you should know this. Every country makes mistakes. As a big state, Turkey is advancing forward in a process of correcting her own mistakes. A great state, or one aspiring to greatness, should not be afraid to admit its past mistakes. A great nation and state should face her mistakes with stronger will that is what our government believes.” To talk about mistakes of a country would mean that, as a statesman, PM Erdoğan was declaring that the old policy towards Kurds was wrong. Erdoğan continued, “When I was once put into jail because of a citation of a poem, I believed that I had sent a message to the people. I said in my message: ‘I am not uncomfortable or angry at my country. This country and the flag is ours. The day that these mistakes are corrected will surely come.’”

Erdoğan expressed his opinion about the “Working Group” by mentioning the party with the intellectuals: “The party received wide praise; then we saw that some political men couldn’t even tolerate the party. Those who don’t respect intelligence are unqualified to talk about freedom of expression. Those who cannot bear freedom are unqualified to talk about freedom. These kind of people and groups are destined to die out.”

In my understanding, Erdoğan’s government is using a three pronged strategy to tackle the Kurdish problem in Turkey: Development, democracy and countering PKK terrorism. Each of the three prongs is very strong. Development means more investment in the economy and education in the southeast of Turkey; democracy means the rights of Kurds as a minority; and countering PKK terrorism is embodied in the government’s firm stance on the cross-border military operation in northern Iraq. The policies of the Erdoğan government has been successful to an extent in winning the hearts of many Kurds in Turkey. Recently however, Turkey’s Constitution Court is considering a case that is asking for a ban on Erdoğan’s AKP. The appeal for the ban is based on the hypothesis that AKP violated Turkey’s most important principle of secularism by trying to Islamise the country through constitutional amendments. The case is regarded as a reaction from the hard-liner Kemalists, who regard themselves as protectors of the state. The case is called a “judiciary coup” by many Turkish writers. It is notable that along with Turks, the Kurds have also stood up to say “no” to the case. This sent a very delicate message to both Kemalists and the public. We will wait and see the results.

Epilogue
In the twenty first century, the “identity problem,” has risen to challenge the existing order in many places around the world, partly as a result of the end of cold war. Internationally, with the raising of the “iron curtain,” many countries face greater difficulty in defining their role and identity in the emerging international system than just choosing to stay behind this or that side of the curtain. Domestically, the bond of a certain dominant ideology has gone, leaving people with a sense of uncertainty and instability. It is under these conditions that the issue of identity is becoming more and more important.

If the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were a time of nationalism, the twenty first will be a time of identity. For countries like Turkey and China, in seeking a way to solve their respective minority issues, they could learn from each other’s success and failure. What I would like to suggest is, for example, that Turkey could use China’s system of autonomous regions for reference, while China should attach importance to Turkey’s lessons and experiences of official nationalism and the three prongs (development, democracy and anti-terrorism) of the Erdoğan government.

13 Ibid.
This SEPHIS workshop focused on the theme of Women and the Public Sphere. The participants were from different corners of the world: Azerbaijan of course and Bolivia, Brazil, India, Lesotho, Mongolia, Peru, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Zimbabwe. The resource persons and steering committee members also represented a variety of different countries and locations: Azerbaijan, India, Jamaica, Philippines, South Africa, and The Netherlands.

Setting the tone for the workshop, Samita Sen gave a comprehensive lecture examining the concept of the public sphere and particularly women’s access to and participation in it. She engaged theoretical debates as well as everyday politics locating historically and socially the gendered nature of the discourse. The lecture provided the framework against which the rest of the sessions could be located. In their presentation, participants focused on themes ranging from education, politics and movements to media, religion, violence and symbolism. The approaches ranged from an analysis of photographs, to a critique of media representations, analysing movement politics, historically locating educational access, engaging theoretical arguments in relation to the public sphere. Many of the papers also provided a detailed analysis of their country contexts.

One of the most salutary features of the SEPHIS workshop is how much it reminds one of the depth of one’s own ignorance about some cultures. It is very instructive to be in a context which is not just informative but which also fundamentally disrupts the familiarity of one’s dialogues with the Euro-American academia. Sometimes focused research isolates us in particular spheres of engagement. Diverse workshops such as this one compel one to expand the universe of people one must engage with. The conversations I participated in and overheard centred as much, perhaps more, on the details of how politics, electoral processes and cultural divisions in our different countries worked as it did on the papers we presented.

In a workshop of this kind, the toss up is often between a complexity of dialogue versus a diversity of voices and both have an important space in the South-South exchange, speaking to each other across our linguistic, racial and disciplinary backgrounds. As someone who has spent the last five years engaging questions of public space, I am not sure how much these discussions expanded my understanding of the public sphere– though of course this is not intended as a totalising comment. However, I feel my engagement with a world outside my comfort zone has been expanded tremendously. Engaging with questions of women’s education in Mongolia, Ukraine or even indeed Nigeria, a context more familiar than the former two, and the exchange of information this facilitates has considerably expanded my understanding of the larger world polity. If I had to offer a one line summary I’d say that while it did not necessarily significantly complicate my understanding of the public sphere in these contexts or indeed of the debates in the spaces, it immeasurably complicated my understanding of the diversity and messiness of the world– arguably an exercise that is just as important.

This complex intersection of the personal, political and global was best reflected in the closing panel chaired by Samita Sen on “Women’s Activism in the South Today” where presentations were made by Rena Mirzazadeh (Azerbaijan), Ana Lopez Molina (Guatemala), Enna Gudhlanga (Zimbabwe), and Tsetsegjargal Tseden (Mongolia). The discussion that followed not just highlighted the similarities and differences in our varied contexts but also demonstrated marvellously our capacity to speak the same language. The conversation focused on the various challenges, not just from the right wing and other conservative agencies but also from those that challenged us from marginal positions as raced, classed and sexualised sub-

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Across the south

In a world where academic exchanges can often be intensely competitive, spaces for exchange of ideas that are dialogic rather than combative are invaluable. Azeri hospitality was warm and effusive. Food was plentiful and wine and vodka flowing perhaps more easily than water, the mood was celebratory and the atmosphere friendly and supportive.

Our camaraderie was often tainted however, by our awareness that contemporary geopolitical formations even within the global South are complex and exclusionary. Many colleagues were kept waiting for hours without explanation at the immigration in Baku. As Elisa Guarana de Castro put it in an e-mail she wrote to all the participants after she returned to Brazil, “We also were slapped in our faces with racial prejudice and its cruel repetition. The always same “identification” of the “dangerous people”: black, non white, women, Latinos, Africans. To whom the frontiers are closed, even to cross south-south borders.” Even as these experiences caution us, they remind us now more than ever the relevance of open and facilitative forums like SEPHIS workshops, as borders are policed ever more stringently.
Short report of the 2009 Cultural Studies Workshop organised by CSSS-Calcutta in association with SEPHIS

The Fourteenth Annual Cultural Studies Workshop, (CSW), Urban Cultures was jointly organized by the Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, (CSSS, Calcutta, India), The South-South Exchange Programme for Research in the History of Development, (SEPHIS, the Netherlands) and the Ford Foundation, (India) at the North-Eastern Hill University, Umshing Mawkynrh, Shillong, Meghalaya, India from the 1 February to 6 February 2009.

The first theme, Cities and Citizenship, focused on the idea of the 'public', discussed in different contexts in all the three papers of the first session. Nancy Fraser critiques Habermas’ bourgeois conception of the public sphere as a normative ideal inadequate for understanding the limits of the actually existing democracy in late capitalist societies. An ideal theory, she proposes, should expose the limits of the specific form of democracy of the contemporary capitalist societies which might help to push back those limits while cautioning people in other parts of the world against heeding the call to install them. The idea of the ‘private’ and the ‘public’ as Richard Sennett’s articles suggest, evolved from the oppositions of nature and culture in eighteenth century England, France, northern Italy, and northeastern America and found expression through the distinction between public and private. However, the theoretical divorce between the home and the great world, which seemed to be absolute by the nineteenth century, was often blurred, for instance, by the ‘silent spectator’. Partha Chatterjee discussed how the ‘city’ was gradually identified as the ‘cultural’ and the ‘rural’ as the ‘natural’ as part of the project of modernity. In the city, ‘citizens’ were entitled to inhabit the ‘good space’ and not everyone was qualified to be a member of the ‘good space’. Large sections of the population were members of the ‘other spaces’ which could not always be ruled or disciplined. The city, thus, was the space for the ‘properly cultured’ which means that the classical bourgeois ideology continues to provide for the normative ideas of what is ‘proper’. In this context, the cities of Sao Paulo, Brazil, Delhi, Aizawl and Lucknow came up for discussion during the student presentations in the second half of the day.

The discussion on ‘space’ continued with the second day theme of Constructing sites and spaces. James Holston’s article describes the ‘modern’ city of Brasilia where streets have been eliminated as a prerequisite of modern...
urban organisation because it views it as a cesspool of disease, an impediment to progress because it fails to accommodate the needs of the machine age. In Paris, modernisation or Haussmanisation was a process which tried to evict the working class of Paris from the centre of the city. In many ways, however, Paris remained very much a working class city which is the highlight of the article which also discussed the limits of Haussmanisation. Ravi Vasudevan weaves the idea of the modern city and the body into the narrative space of the cinema. His exploration goes beyond the city of Bombay including the spaces of the rural life and global forms which are configured through the body space articulation, the body as an object and vehicle of violence and also as a vehicle of performance.

The nineteenth century witnessed cities as becoming ‘modern’ landscapes of consumption and a ‘space’ for the acquisition of cultural capital. ‘Space’, both represented and representational, was ‘constructed’ and ‘produced’ and ‘site’ was its twin category. The third theme Cultures of Leisure and Consumption highlighted that alternative lifestyles which helped cities to become modern cosmopolitan cities. Certain consumption patterns, for instance, late nineteenth century world exhibitions and fairs in the western cities and late twentieth century, ‘fake economies’ in the non-western cities, help connect cities economically and culturally across the globe. Also local politics becomes very important if one looks at consumption patterns at the international level. In fact, globalisation connected the local and the international levels of politics.

The fourth day’s theme of Livelihood, work cultures, and the Right to the City was discussed through Ananya Roy’s paper in the context of Calcutta where she uses ‘domestication’ as a multivalent category which reveals a terrain of material and symbolic contestations comprising the politics of poverty, that is, how poverty persists through the contingent and open-ended contestation of social identities. There are sites at which the logic of double gendering congeals and squatter settlements are prime expressions of such “moments of articulation”. Saskia Sassen analyses the changes that have occurred in New York, London, and Tokyo in their respective nation states and in the world economy. Have those changes brought about a significant realignment in the social and economic structure of the city, the global city? And if so, how does this affect the urban hierarchy? Is there a new type of urban hierarchy, a new urban system, as a consequence of the global role of major cities, or is this transformation just affecting these cities themselves? Finally, what happens to city politics when the leading economic forces are oriented to the world market? In the context of Bangalore, Janaki Nair’s article examined the question of how symbolic space in Bangalore city has been appropriated, deployed or controlled by competing interests and ideologies over the five decades since 1949. What emblems of the colonial past, for instance, have been replaced or found a fresh lease of life within the newly dominant corporate cultural order? What nationalist fictions have found symbolic expression in the city? How has the increasing domination of the global capital, on the one hand, or older cultural formations, on the
other, been challenged by the spatial strategies of relatively newer claims on the city? The last theme of the workshop, Law, Violence and Securitization, witnessed intense discussions of the papers of Thomas Blom Hansen, Mamadou Diouf and Mike Davis. The first paper discussed the contradictory notions about Bombay pivotal to the linguistic movement in the 1950s, the agrarian populism of the Congress party and the Shiv Sena’s aggressive populist discourses over the last three decades. These notions about Bombay as national and modern but also the home of amoral, excessive and corrupted elites and lifestyles also amounts to an ongoing negotiation of the “urban” and the experience of urban culture. Mamadou Diouf analyses the social movements, in particular those led by the young people that violently shook the Senegalese political scene at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. During this period youth marked their territory, painting the city walls throughout Dakar and its suburbs with representations that fashioned, in however hesitant a manner, a new way of being, of living— and a new rhythm. Their practices expressed a will to break with the historic memory that accompanied the nationalist generation’s rise to power at the end of the Second World War. It is this memory whose expressions, however rhetorical, still furnish the guidelines for the political discourse of consensus and unanimity and for public displays like commemoration as the convocations of memory and independence parades as institutional celebrations of the army and youth. Mike Davis’ focus is Los Angeles, a city on the bad edge of post modernity where one observes an unprecedented tendency to merge urban design, architecture and the police apparatus into a single, comprehensive security effort. The Second Civil War which began with Richard Nixon’s 1969 National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence has been institutionalised into the very structure of the urban space. The old liberal paradigm of social control, attempting to balance repression with reform, has long been superseded by rhetoric of social warfare that calculates the interests of the urban poor and the middle classes as a zero-sum game. Overall, the workshop proved to be very productive and enriching for research scholars pursuing their doctoral work.

17 Janaki Nair, “Battles for Bangalore: Reterritorialising the city”, in The Promise of the Metropolis: Bangalore’s Twentieth Century, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 2005, pp. 271-98, 403-409.


18 The student presentations of the last day were Diego Antonio Galeona, “The Law of the Street: Security, Police and Urban Space in South America”; Anish Vanaik, “Spaces of War, Spaces of Peace: The Peculiar Fate of Militarized Space in post-1857 Delhi”; Mario Sergio Brum, “From favela to favela: the history and memories from Cidade Alta Housing Estate’s inhabitants— Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (1969-2008)”.


Re-reading the Process of Bengal Partition: Politics, Refugees and Non-Migrants

Anwesha Sengupta


The Spoils of Partition: Bengal and India, 1947-1967, by Joya Chatterjee, is an important contribution to the field of partition studies precisely for two reasons– A) unlike the bulk of the scholarly works on partition, the main focus of the book is not on the event itself, but on the process that unfolded with partition; B) the book primarily deals with the impact of partition on West Bengal, a state created and severely affected by the event, but somehow yet to receive enough attention from the scholars working on partition.1 Strikingly rich in factual details and very lucid in style, Spoils of Partition has three parts titled ‘Hopes and fears’, ‘The Bengal diaspora’ and ‘The politics of a partitioned state’.

The first part deals with the political insecurities, negotiations and strategies of the Hindu political elite from Bengal on the eve of the partition. The first chapter, which may be said to be complementary to Chatterjee’s famous article ‘The Fashioning of a Frontier’,2 shows that the general perception of the international borders of Bengal being hastily and arbitrarily drawn is wrong. Rather, as the author argues, the provincial politicians had ample room to voice their opinion regarding the fixing of the frontier. These would-be power brokers were keen to ensure their future status which prompted them to float plans that would suit their individual/party interests. The second chapter tells us how the political elite from West Bengal tried to befriend the Congress High Command and explicitly supported its attempt to create a strong centre with the false hope that their ‘special relationship’ with the centre would come handy while dealing with difficulties created by partition.

The second part, consisting of two chapters, deals respectively with the refugees from East Pakistan and the Muslims who did not leave West Bengal after partition. The chapter on refugees in West Bengal briefly discusses the reasons behind their migration from East Bengal, highlighting that the various sections of the Hindu community had different reasons behind their decision to migrate or not. But the major part of the chapter is about the lives of the refugees in West Bengal, the places of their settlement, the initiatives taken by them in their own rehabilitation. It focuses on the ineffective, inadequate and oppressive state policies for refugee rehabilitation resulting in collision between the government and the refugees. Also, the chapter deals with the ways in which refugee lives were reshaped– with more women coming out of the domestic sphere and taking up jobs, joint families being replaced by smaller family units, ties of caste and kinship going through changes. The impact of such a huge influx of population on the economy and society of West Bengal in general is also discussed, though very briefly, in this chapter.

For Chatterji, refugees were not mere victims awaiting government aid; they were active agents in shaping their lives in this foreign land. But, this otherwise detailed chapter, does not discuss the relations/ negotiations of the host Bengali Hindu population (known as ‘Ghoti’ in Bengali) of West Bengal and the refugees, which I think is a serious omission. As Chatterji has pointed out, the rate of education and employment among the refugee population was significantly higher than the host population. But how did the host population react to such a situation and on what terms the refugees interacted with the Hindus of West Bengal are some of the questions that the book does not address. (In the following chapter, however, Chatterji refers to the tension between the refugees and the Muslims who did not leave West Bengal after partition.) Also while going through this chapter one may justly feel that Chatterji, on one hand has glorified the refugees and on the other, demonised the government unilaterally. But in the government and in the administration, refugees from time to time did find sympathetic audience, especially in those who themselves were ‘optees’,3 hailng originally from East Bengal. Autobiographical accounts like Udabastu (‘up-rooted’) by Hiranmoy Bandyopadhyay, (an ‘optee’ located in a high post under West Bengal government) and Bijoygarh Ekti Udavastu

1 For a fairly detailed discussion on partition historiography see http://bengalpartitionstudies.blogspot.com/search?updated-min=2006-01-01T00%3A00%3A00%2B05%3A30&updated-max=2007-01-01T00%3A00%3A00%2B05%3A30&max-results=5 (last accessed on 7.03.2009).
The flourishing jute industry, paper industry and East Bengal to West Bengal, it also took away triggered off a huge influx of population from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh is yet to receive enough attention from scholars. Joya Chatterji’s chapter on Muslims of West Bengal ably addresses this lacuna. How the Muslims of West Bengal reacted to partition is the crucial question that Chatterji tries to answer. Just like their Hindu counterparts, West Bengal Muslims, who became a minority all of a sudden, reacted in a heterogeneous manner to partition. Migration, especially for the urban and wealthier section of the Muslim society, was a viable option. Many migrated temporarily during moments of tension, but came back again. The political and social strategies taken up by the Muslims in West Bengal after partition have been discussed by Chatterji. These strategies included repudiating links with the League, supporting the Congress and often vital compromises on their religious practices to satisfy Hindu community. Also, as a result of partition, “the physical space occupied by Muslims was progressively reduced and rearranged” [p. 181]. Muslims were pushed together into “discrete, densely packed clusters or ghettos.” [p. 181], which affected the future course of minority politics in West Bengal.

In the third and the final section, the author maps the complexities of West Bengal politics, taking partition as the starting point and the decline of the Congress in the state in 1967 as the concluding date. Written in a fashion that would satisfy the so-called ‘Cambridge School’ of Indian history, chapter five is about the collaborations of an internally fractured and corrupt Congress with various sections of the Bengali society (various caste groups, non-Bengali sections, traders and middlemen, ex-Muslim League supporters, etc.) to ensure electoral support. But more importantly, the chapter traces the “brutal consequences of partition on the economy of West Bengal” [p. 253], something that has strangely escaped the attention of historians of partition. Partition not only triggered off a huge influx of population from East Bengal to West Bengal, it also took away some of the most fertile lands (thus devastating the flourishing jute industry, paper industry and also creating a severe shortage of food), disrupted the transport system and struck the already vulnerable industrial sector very badly. The Nehru government at the centre, in spite of being previously helped by the leaders from Bengal on crucial issues, did not help the state out of its critical situation. Though Bidhan Roy, the Chief Minister of West Bengal, belatedly made a gallant attempt to rescue the state, the situation was by then beyond recovery and pushed the Congress to the abyss.

With Muslims becoming a minority in the state and large sections of Hindus migrating to West Bengal with presumably marked communal sentiments, the Hindu Mahasabha had reasons to feel optimistic about their future electoral performances. However, as Joya Chatterji shows in the final chapter, they failed to translate these potentials into electoral success for several reasons including intra-party rivalry and disputes over various issues (like what will be the position of members who are from East Pakistan, whether to include Muslims within the party fold and whether the party has any more role to play at all in the political realm in independent and partitioned India, etc.), lack of patronage from the wealthy section of the society, a failed attempt at populist politics and most importantly lack of support from the refugees. Resignation of the most highly respected leader of Hindu Mahasabha, S.P Mookerjee, from the party came as another major blow. The left parties (Forward Bloc, Revolutionary Socialist Party and most importantly Communist Party of India) were the real winners in West Bengal politics after partition due to complex and diverse reasons. Unlike other parties the Left parties, without wasting their time in inter/intra party squabbles, worked towards building a strong support base among the refugees and the Muslims. The ascendency of Left parties reached a high with their massive success in resisting the tram fare hike (1953) and the food agitation (1959).

Contemporary scholars working on partition generally give supreme importance to the oral/written narratives of those who experienced partition. With Joya Chatterji the focus shifts again to conventional sources like government records, private papers, census reports, newspapers and journals (she has used only six interviews and two transcripts of interviews). As a result the story she builds up essentially lacks the ‘human’ perspective. How did the refugees feel in their new home, how did it feel to be a minority, how it felt to leave his/her home, how did the host population feel when their own city became crowded and dirty within a very short span of

3 In the time of partition, government employees were given the choice to opt for posting in either side of the new borders. Hindus, posted in eastern part of Bengal, naturally opted for postings in western part of the state as they wanted to live in India. These government employees are known as ‘optees’.

4 I am deeply grateful to Uditi Sen for this point. She highlighted this aspect in a paper titled “Narratives of Victory and Victimhood: Refugee Histories and Questions of Agency” in a seminar held in Kolkata under the aegis of Oitihashik on 17.01.2009.
Reviews

time, are not Chatterji’s concern. Even her narratives on the refugees and Muslim minorities are at times dispassionate and technical, punctuated frequently with charts and tables containing statistical details. And the issue of communalism, so intimately linked with partition, finds no explicit place in this account though the period under study witnessed communal tension at times culminating in full fledged riots.

In conclusion, one however has to admit that this is a very important contribution in the field of partition studies. Based on solid empirical research, Chatterji’s book is penetrating, thought-provoking and most importantly a good read.
The first question a reader might ask is this, what is a UK film doing in the reviews section, or on the e-Magazine at all? What has it got to do with the South? The answer is twofold. The first part is obvious enough. It is a film shot in the South (India) and is about India. But the second part is the crucial one: That this is not just a review. It is a look, through the film, its reception and the controversies it generated about aspects of portrayals of the South by the North, and of the South’s self-perception.

The film, as many of you have known, won eight Academy Awards, including Best Picture and Best Director, seven BAFTA Awards (again including Best Film and Best Director), four Golden Globe Awards (including Best Motion Picture Drama and Best Director), five Critics’ Choice Awards and many others. These victories not only created ripples across the movie world as a multiple-award winning film usually does, but alsogenerated hysteria of support in India, with many supporting it as passionately as the cricket team, virtually claiming the film to be ‘Indian’. Still others panned it for its negative portrayal of India as a land of poverty and misery, of violence and crime. All this makes Slumdog Millionaire much more than a film.

For those of you who have not yet seen the film, here is a brief plot summary. Jamal Malik (Dev Patel), a former slum-dweller from Dharavi, is on the verge of winning twenty million dollars on a game show, ”Who wants to be a Millionaire”/”Kaun Banega Crorepati’’. But as the show breaks before the last question to be resumed the next day, he is arrested, suspected of being a cheat by the game show host Prem (Anil Kapoor). During the torture and interrogation, he reveals his life, through flashback, and shows how the extraordinary incidents of his past equipped him with the answers to the questions asked. And all this brings him to the love of his life, Latika (Freida Pinto), who has been forcibly rescued by the don and the person responsible for Latika’s state, sacrificing himself to kill the badman. Latika and Jamal are united on a late night railway station that was a rendezvous for them earlier and break into a Bollywood style song and dance sequence.

The film had few takers as distributors initially, but it quickly picked up pace after critical and popular acclaim and went on to be the most awarded film of the year. It was hailed for several reasons: Its realistic portrayal of slum life in Mumbai, the triumphal underdog story, the acting of lesser-known actors and its blending of Bollywood with a more international style of filmmaking. Both the UK and India celebrated its success for their own.

But the film was controversial from the very beginning. A lot of criticism came from India, particularly from those who thought that the film portrayed India in a negative light. It was compared with Roland Joffe’s City of Joy (1992), that sparked protests which led to the shooting having to be relocated for similar accusations of negative portrayals of an Indian City, in this case Calcutta (now Kolkata). Noted filmmaker Priyadarshan, for instance, commented, ”The West loves to see us as a wasteland, filled with horror stories of exploitation and degradation. But is that all there’s to our beautiful city of Mumbai?” He also said about his experience of watching the film with a mixed international audience that ”All the Indians hated it” for this very reason.1

And this was not just a reaction that came from him. Many critics and also members of the public slammed the film for the same reason. But there were other voices too. While it is true that Boyle undoubtedly saw Mumbai slums with Western/Northern eyes, it is also true that there have been numerous moving depictions of Indian poverty.

And as someone whose taste in film was bred on a mixture of Bollywood fare and Indian Neo-Realistic Cinema, depictions of poverty could not be a problem for me. Nor does this author share a position of patriotic zeal.

This is not to deny that Boyle’s film does take

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a view of the world it is depicting that is shaped by the Western eye. The dizzying speed and the wonderfully reproduced squalor of the Third World slum and city are undoubtedly brilliant. But, there are distinct elements of exoticisation. For instance, the local railway of Mumbaiyas long been viewed as the city’s lifeline. But instead of the modern ‘local trains’, all the trains depicted in the film are old-style steam engine ones, sitting well with many Orientalist ideas of India. The project of showing the ‘real’ India also becomes apparent when Jamal, as a tour guide claims to have shown the ‘real India’ to two American tourists– an India of poverty and crime. What makes the scene even more objectionable is the fact that the tourists who had been robbed then tip him off with a hundred dollar bill, saying “Now we’ll show you the real America.”

But even that is not all. Where I found an even greater lack in the film was its inability to stick to even realism. As some commentators have pointed out, there have been many more realistic portrayals of the slum life in Dharavi. Sudhir Mishra’s Dharavi (1991) and Mira Nair’s Salaam Bombay! (1988) being just two of the more well-known. Boyle himself claimed to have been inspired by Ram Gopal Varma’s Satya (1998) – a gritty portrayal of Mumbai’s underbelly that gave birth to the genre now known as ‘Mumbai Noire’. Compared to these films, Slumdog comes across as loose and Boyle can be accused of taking the pain out of the dehumanising existence of slums. As Sudip Mazumdar, who grew up in slums himself, pointed out, “Slum life is a cage. It robs you of confidence in the face of the rich and the advantaged. It steals your pride, deadens your ambition, limits your imagination and psychologically cripples you whenever you step outside the comfort zone of your own neighborhood.”

What Boyle looked for in the trap and mess that is slum life is hope and triumph. That becomes a concern as he trivialises the hardships and the disasters. Even Jamal and Salim’s mother’s killing in riots/pogroms by right-wing Hindu fanatics is placed fleetingly. And, as many commentators have pointed out, the boys, speaking in a ‘Mumbaiya’ Hindi as children grow up to speak English with an oh-so-propah British accent. They even manage to converse between themselves in that language, which would never happen with either denizens of slums or members of the underworld. The police officer (Irrfan Khan) and his constable (Saurabh Shukla) also carry out their interrogation of someone they see as a mere ‘slumdog’ in English, adding a further unrealistic touch to the film, as does the Mafia Don Salim’s reliance on continental snacks at home. As Mukul Kesavan pointed out, the use of Hindi in the first third of the film appears as an authenticating décor and not a tool of realistic portrayal.

But that is the market Boyle was aiming for. It was not only one that wanted to see the Third World/South as slums, it was also one that is coming increasingly face-to-face with the supposed growing power of India and its ilk. The cultural mores of Bollywood have, in tandem with India’s new status, gained a wider spread than ever before. And Boyle’s penchant for the authenticating décor leads him to another– Bollywood’s style of storytelling. There is triumph and happiness at the end, with boy finding girl in true melodramatic style. There are clearly defined bad men, sacrifice, unreal situations and over the top characters. But this is done without the in-you-face lack of realism that Bollywood has.

Add to this Boyle’s Northern position. This allows him to do a film on a topic he acknowledged he knew nothing about. First, the obvious point would be that if an Indian (or any Southern) filmmaker chose to do a film on New York, London or Paris, laying bare his ignorance and still got down to doing a film on the subject, he would have been critically murdered and not praised for his creative daring. Also, this led to some obvious mistakes, to correct some of them, he employed an Indian co-director. But, as he himself said, he did not always listen to her, for reasons of creativity.

In the end, all this makes Slumdog Millionaire a kitsch, a film that is neither here nor there. It is, as one commentator on IMDB put it, “This is essentially ‘Sleepless in Seattle’ meets ‘City of God’. For a better portrayal of slum life, check out ‘Salaam Bombay!’ and ‘Los Olvidados’. For a better Cinderella story, check out ‘Rocky’.”

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