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The commonsensical understanding of agriculture as being rooted in the ‘elemental’, ‘unchanging’ aspects of life, has, in recent years, been severely critiqued, not least in the context of debates on development. It has been pointed out that agriculture, notwithstanding its moorings in natural resources, animal life, patterning of seasons, and ecological systems, is inalienable from the global economy, the field of international politics, and contestations of culture. In a globalising world, a range of actors – nation-states, international development agencies, environmentalists, multinational corporations, and social movement activists – are locked in conversations about the place of farming, industry, human- and animal rights, world trade, and land, in competing visions of national development. Far from being ‘timeless’, the global flow of information and peoples has seen the emergence of a new political economy of agriculture, one which has serious implications for agro-related labour, production, and consumption, particularly in the global south.

Three essays in this edition of Global South Sephis e-Magazine address these, and other themes related to agricultural systems, in diverse contexts within south countries. Jimena Martinez’s ethnography-based research paper offers a comparative analysis of two social movements that have claimed the right to land in Mexico and Indonesia, in the period of ‘democratic transition’ in these countries. Steering clear of simplistic narratives of either contrast or similarity that plagues many comparativist projects, Martinez demonstrates a more complex set of relations between the land question in development, its expropriation by the Mexican state for an airport project, the making of local people’s sense of self, and collective efforts in West Java to negotiate with the state on concerns of land reform implementation. The issue of land-grab by the state in collaboration with the private sector in Mexico bears uncanny resemblances to state rhetoric of development in the Indian subcontinent, be it the forced displacement of people to facilitate a dam project in Gujarat, or a motor car factory in West Bengal.
In an essay which furthers this discussion on the linkages between agriculture, development and the role of the state, Fred Opoku Agyeman and Seth Dankyi Boateng adopt a statistical approach to reflect on the role an agricultural extension system plays in agricultural development. Using the contemporary situation in Ghana as their case study, the authors contemplate the impact of agricultural extension activities on the rural economy, and their contribution to job-creation in non-urban areas and agro-based industrial growth. In a closely-related essay, Almaz Giziew and Ranjan S. Karippai make use of quantitative techniques, in additional to insights from psychology, to study the connection between farmers’ perception of new agricultural technologies and their adoption in practice. Giziew and Karippai draw empirical material for their study from two major chickpea production areas in East Shewa, Ethiopia. They argue that farmers’ perceptions should be given due attention by technology developers and development agents alike, and that agricultural extension programmes should work towards creating awareness of the benefits and disadvantages of new agro-based technologies for rural communities.

Ayodeji Olukoju’s essay shifts the focus of analysis from agriculture and land to the expansion of South African capital in the post-Apartheid period. Although the prominence of the South African economy in Africa has provoked much debate on politics within the African continent, an area that has received comparatively less attention is South Africa’s relations with the other major African power – Nigeria. Olukoju’s essay addresses this aspect of African economic relations by considering the growing presence of South African businesses in Nigeria. In doing so, it reveals the relationships of power that govern interactions between different countries of the global south.

The ‘Across the South’ section of this edition of the e-magazine documents the launch of the African-Arab Advanced Institute in Rabat, Morocco. Researchers from Africa and the Arab world participated in the inaugural workshop of the Institute to discuss both historical and contemporary aspects of relations between people commonly described as ‘Arab’ and ‘African’. The workshop saw lively interactions from diverse disciplinary frameworks on the changing political economy of Afro-Arab relations.

The relationship between traditional healing practices and modernity has been a contentious issue in the fields of medical anthropology, science studies and, more generally, among medical practitioners in non-western societies. In the book-review section, Vashti Bowlah focuses on a new publication that considers the role of women healers in post-natal healthcare in Trinidad. He argues that the wealth of information that the book makes available is certain to provoke public interest in folk remedies as a viable supplement, if not alternative, to modern medicine.

Capital formation, public-private cooperation, land reforms, and agriculture are all contentious issues in thinking about ‘development’. The essays in this edition of the e-magazine draw on diverse theoretical approaches and methodologies within the social sciences, to interrogate some relatively unexplored areas of study in the field. We hope that in their togetherness the essays have made a move towards furthering dialogue on this continually pertinent concern in the global south.
The Struggle for Land Access beyond Democratic Reforms: Social Movements and the Right to Land in Mexico and Indonesia

This paper makes an ethnography-led comparative analysis of two social movements in Mexico and Indonesia, in the period of ‘democratic transition’ in these two countries. Focussing on these movements’ bids to claim the right to land, the paper explores the vital role of land in development, and the tussle between movement actors and the state on this concern.

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Introduction

The aim of this article is to present a comparison between two social movements claiming the right to land in Mexico and Indonesia, both of which arose during the so-called ‘democratic transition’ in these countries, during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Ongoing disputes over land are the main focus of this essay, with particular emphasis on their emergence and forms of organised people-led action. Data for this essay has been drawn from semi-structured interviews with members of two organisations, and from available literature on these organisations, and the history of land conflicts in Mexico and Indonesia. Field research was conducted in both countries between July 2010 and July 2011.

I begin by presenting a comparison of the general contexts in which these movements have emerged, specifically the global agrarian transition and the opening of new land markets which facilitated the rise of social movements defending and reclaiming right to land. Following that, the two social movements – The People’s Front in Defense of Land (in Spanish, Frente de Pueblos en Defensa de la Tierra – FPDT) and the Pasundan Peasant Union (in Bahasa Indonesia, Serikat Petani Pasundan – SPP) – are presented. The first case is about a grassroots organisation that emerged in response to the attempt by the Mexican central government to expropriate collective land (known as ejidos) for the construction of a new international airport on the outskirts of Mexico City. The second case is about a peasant organisation based in West Java province which, because of the lack of implementation of the recently promised redistributive land reform, occupies and cultivates state-owned land, making land reform a social practice. Both movements have arisen in the context of recent democratisation processes and have been challenging state power; in doing so, they help reveal the role of political and social mobilisation in safeguarding people’s land and avoiding indiscriminate financial speculation over farmlands.

Across the south, the problem of land has emerged in ambivalent ways since the 1980s. In general terms, within national agrarian development, there is a trend towards the elimination of small farming and its social meanings. This tendency becomes evident in new land tenure and land uses developed during the recent agrarian transition. In recent times, the agrarian debate has incorporated issues related to the rapid large-scale land acquisition that followed food, energy and environmental crises and increased land value. However, land policies, land acquisition, and agrarian transitions are a contentious field in which different social movements are fighting to intervene in the fate of land. Scholars studying social movements have justifiably paid much attention to democratic transitions of the previous decade. Unfortunately, while important progress has been made in terms of electoral reform and the advancement of human rights in many countries, international focus on the markers of democracy – freedom of press, political party development, elections – have tended to overshadow the issue of economic rights of rural peoples. All too often, efforts to defend local agricultural markets, to recapture control of ancestral lands, to maintain control over collectively-owned land or secure fair land policies, are regarded as part of the chaos of democratisation, rather than integral steps in the process of rights consolidation necessary to ensure the participation of marginalised groups in the political process. This comparative study of contemporary social movements intends to use, analyse, and extend the understanding of some of the campaigns and strategies developed by activist groups seeking to protect the right to land. Bringing attention to the current problems of land, this effort considers the agitation of people as a key element in the democratisation process with respect to land tenure. From these processes some differences emerge concerning the structure and the identity of activists involved in the struggle for land, and around the value and the imaginary attached to the land.

The decision to conduct a comparative study of experiences in developing countries arises from the understanding that new social movements show a much more marked tendency to extend their spectrum of activity and social organisation, using transnational connections. Many movements in different south countries show similar concerns and levels of awareness of struggles in other parts of the world. Local actors, when engaged in social movements, see themselves as part of broader efforts and thus tend to reinforce their connections with actors who have a similar stance with respect to their cause. However, it is worth mentioning that the organisations analysed in this essay are not linked directly to each other; comparing two separate experiences that share certain features makes the analysis more
challenging and fruitful. Comparative research in social sciences, as distinct from singular case-studies, is useful in finding out the specificities of and similarities between different social occurrences.

Global agrarian transition and the opening of land market: Trends in Mexico and Indonesia

After the crises of the 1970s, the concern about the fate of agriculture and the peasantry—the agrarian question—was redirected, revealing divergent understandings but, in general, indicating global trends. It is important to highlight some features of the recent agrarian transition and how they affected rural populations in Mexico and Indonesia.

By the 1970s, there was a general trend to abandon weak industrialisation processes in developing countries and direct their economies to export agriculture. Overall, the global political economy, since the 70s, has been related to 1) the deregulation of financial markets, 2) shifts in the production, sourcing and sales strategies, and technologies of transnational manufacturing and agribusiness corporations, 3) the ideological and political ascendancy of neoliberalism in a highly selective rolling-back of the state, and 4) the attendant structural adjustment programmes necessary for economic liberalisation. To this synthesis must be added the current environmental problems that harm the countryside and agriculture. At the same time, redistributive land reform led by the state in Mexico and Indonesia—though partial in scope in the latter—was totally abandoned and even attacked in the Mexican context. Both countries, after the 1970 regulations went in the opposite direction, sought higher profits from land while neglecting rural livelihoods and the social meanings of land. Because of this, the decade of 1990 witnessed the emergence of several peasant- and indigenous movements in the political scene. This organised contestation of neoliberal reforms that promoted the creation of land markets caught the attention of various international development agencies, as well as national governments.

In Mexico, the boost of neoliberal reforms on land was crystallised in the constitutional reform of 1992, during the presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari. The reform changed the supplementary regulations of the land legal framework, allowing the mortgage, lease, transfer, and sale of collective agricultural land with the consent of two thirds of the villagers (known as ejidatarios). Thereafter, each ejidatario acquired the formal right to obtain his individual land title so he could sell it as he pleased or needed. These reforms began to break up the ejidos as farmers opted to sell their own plots, usually for new nonagricultural use.

In the 70s, the need for land in Mexico had increased and land redistribution and ejido formalisation were limited, as urban centers grew steadily. Since then, agricultural incentives were mostly addressed to private and large farmlands rather than to communal or ejido lands which had restricted access to credit, infrastructure and irrigation projects. This situation was increasing the agricultural development disparity between collectively owned lands and privately owned lands, and thereby legitimising the reforms of the early 90s. Three decades of disincentives to production gave way to a dismantling of ejido rights and land access generated by reform. In line with these policies, in 2001, the central government initiated a project to build a new international airport outside Mexico City, which entailed the expropriation of hundreds of hectares of ejido lands in the municipality of San Salvador Atenco and its surrounding areas. Villagers who owned and lived there, immediately organised themselves and formed the People’s Front in Defense of Land, as a reaction against new regulations that were going to change agrarian social relations and land tenure in the region.

In Indonesia, the coup d’etat by General Suharto in 1965 brought an end to land policies in favour of small farmers and the landless; conversely, in 1967, the government passed the Forestry Law, whereby 70 per cent of Indonesia’s land was declared state-owned. Using several new agricultural regulations, the government established a process of pro-market reforms that unfolded during the thirty-two-year dictatorship of the New Order (1966-1998). In most cases, the land that had been redistributed during the last years of Sukarno’s government was taken over by their former owners – local elites – since the beneficiaries of land redistribution had either been arrested or killed. Land recovery campaign, launched in part by the military, was facilitated by the existence of records that indicated which land had been redistributed. With the exception of the Nationalist Party’s (Partai Nasional Indonesia - PNI) peasant organisation, the other rural organisations formed in the 50s and 60s, quickly abandoned support for the
Agrarian Law, considering it a ‘communist’ trend in addition to the risks that it inferred under the new military regime. Although the BAL continued in force, new regulations on the cultivation and exploitation of forests, mining and land use replaced the validity of the previous government regulations. Somehow, these new laws overturned those derived from the BAL, but the BAL itself was not amended or revoked for fear of mass protests about disrespect to a nationalist symbol. However, after 1971, land reform was no longer a government priority.

Democratisation and new political opportunities of social organisation: The unfolding of two destinies

The new millennium saw the transition from single party rule – as in Mexico – and military governments – as in Indonesia – towards the establishment of new governments identified with the democratic turn. However, as is known, these political transitions across the south are not of the same order. It is not uncommon to find references to the great advantages brought by the decline of single-party rule after seventy-two years or an authoritarian military regime giving way to transparent elections, after thirty-two years, and the rise of new groups in power. Along with the new governments, it is expected that the freedom of the press and a more organised civil society will contribute to the reduction of conflicts within society and the attainment of goals which were previously denied by authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, Mexico and Indonesia represent two examples where political opportunities opened up in the early 2000s but were utilised differently, demonstrating the cleavages of democratic processes in the south.

People’s Front in Defense of Land (FPDT), San Salvador Atenco, Mexico state

San Salvador Atenco is located northeast of Mexico City within the state of Mexico. It is a town made up of several villages settled in ejido lands. These collective lands are used for purposes of settlement, farming and include common use areas earmarked for livestock feeding or collective projects developed by the community. The landscape is dominated by a semi-arid plain between the federal highway No. 142, known as Texcoco-Lecheria, and houses scattered among the few crops fed by summer rains. These ejido lands were formed early in the century, probably as a result of the massive land redistribution made by President Cardenas, around the now dissected Texcoco Lake. Today, these lands are arid, with a high salt content, making agricultural production difficult. This has led, along with the urban expansion of Mexico City, to the diversification of economic activities in the community whose incomes now come from the service sector. Although the area has an average agricultural production, the population still has a strong rural identity because of their past and their families being ejidatarios. Among the small crops that are seen while walking through these lands, the majority is used for livestock; but there are also corn, onion, tomato, bean, wheat and spirulina crops.

The FPDT is a front organisation composed of diverse peoples, whose main connection is the resistance raised during 2001 and 2002 against the government airport project. The idea of choosing an alternative location for the International Airport Benito Juarez was present for many years among different governments. Finally, on October 2001, the government of President Vicente Fox, an icon of the political alternation, announced that the location for the new airport would be Texcoco, the municipality adjacent to San Salvador Atenco. Soon after, several decrees of expropriation of collective lands were ordered, involving three different municipalities: Atenco, Texcoco and Chimalhuacan. For a total of 5,400 hectares, this ambitious project offered to pay $7.20 per square meter of rain-fed...
ejidatarios whose land was going to be expropriated. This propelled them to organise and challenge the arbitrariness of the new ruling party, the National Action Party (Partido de Accion Nacional - PAN).

Overall, the discourse trying to legitimise the development of the airport project was based on common elements found in different processes of global land-grab during the previous fifteen years. The government’s arguments were based on the progress and development that the new airport would supposedly bring to the area. Also, bolstered by the opinion that the land was unproductive because of its high salt content, the government ignored the emotional attachment to the land that the settlers had. Basically, the project was based on the idea of land as commodity, as opposed to local perceptions of land as part of life; the latter is related to the understanding that land cannot be sold but only inherited. Due to the people’s attachment to the form of collective land tenure in the project area, strong opposition among the settlers quickly emerged. Undoubtedly, the new airport project was consistent with neoliberal policies developed by the Mexican government since the 80s and the well-known history of land dispossession for incorporation into the market.

At this point we can say that the resistance against the airport project that emerged was built on a sense of local identity and territory. One of the arguments made by the settlers was their right not to sell their land, which, although not highly productive, was a crucial part of their everyday life. This logic has been socially constructed through several generations, according to which land has been kept out of market mechanisms and is regarded as a source of staple food (maize and beans), commonly used for various festivals and ceremonies throughout the year. So, the airport project and land expropriation ‘represented for the settlers a threat to their collective identity, both a source of work and livelihood, and a space for social and cultural reproduction’.

Despite the emergence of the FPDT, it is worth mentioning that were successful in promoting the sale of lands; the majority of landowners in the area, mainly in the municipality of Chimalhuacan, sold their land a few years later when the offered price rose. However, 2001 and 2002, were exceptional moments for the rise of a social movement capable of opposing a government that was adopting undemocratic methods of governance.

The ejidatarios affected by the expropriation decrees went to federal court to challenge the announcement. The organisation also began, along with the people who supported them (students, teachers, workers, independent activists), a wide repertoire of organised collective action in the form of demonstrations, roadblocks, legal appeals, and even kidnapping authorities, as a way of pressurising the government. Occasionally, violent encounters transpired until August 2002 when the government canceled the expropriation decrees and the airport project, in accordance with a court decision.

The struggle against the airport construction in 2001-2002 is one of the key elements in identifying the FPDT as a collective action emerging from a struggle based on the right of access to land. Shortly after the revocation of the expropriation decrees, many members did not participate actively with the FPDT anymore. Once the battle against the expropriation of their lands was won, the organisation underwent an internal rearrangement around the debate of what would now become the main objectives and demands. Later, the story of FPDT was cruelly marked by the events of 3-4 May 2006, when supporting the resistance of a group of florists in downtown San Salvador Atenco, some front members and other supporters clashed with the police. For two days the road No. 142 became a battlefield between federal and state police and the residents of the area. Two young people were killed and over two hundred people arrested; nine were sentenced to thirty-two years of prison through an irregular legal process and three leaders identified with the resistance of 2001-2002 were sentenced to a maximum security prison. Since then, the struggle of FPDT focused on the release of political prisoners, until June 2010 when the last nine prisoners were released.

Today, with leaders back in the villages, the organisation has new plans. The FPDT suffered a major decline in participation during the struggle for the liberation of the political prisoners which was led mainly by the prisoners’ wives. Many of the members who participated in the struggle of 2001-2002 have already sold their land to obtain large amounts of money from new government projects. Declining membership is not the only problem, but the FPDT faces the daunting task of finding the way to keep up an autonomous organisation aimed at resisting future development projects and land deals.
The Pasundan Peasant Union (SPP), West Java

The Pasundan Peasant Union (Serikat Petani Pasundan - SPP) was formed in 2000 with the assistance of various national and regional NGOs in response to land disputes in the southeastern part of West Java province, occurring since mid-1980s. For centuries, West Java has been a region with one of the richest soils in the country. With a tropical climate, hills slip irrigated rice terraces, oxen, and other dry crops such as corn, teak and palm trees, West Java is one of the most densely populated provinces in the country.

The current SPP organisation includes past experiences of social organisation in the region. It has become a massive peasant organisation that only involves local farmers and small producers who try to recover lands which the state gave away to large public and private plantation companies. However, as some lands were recovered, the organisation also addresses the development of collective production and distribution strategies among families organised as a way to encourage the state to implement comprehensive land reform. Besides this, the organisation is also active in the development of villages, building schools, mosques, facilitating capacity-building workshops, and so on.

Unlike FPDT, SPP is a widespread peasant organisation present in three districts of West Java Province: Garut, Ciamis and Tasikmalaya. The difference between how localised each organisation is, is linked to the objectives identified and the impulse from which each has arisen. SPP was organised in order to push back land reform implementations, and FPDT was organised around the specific threats posed by the airport project. The SPP coordination offices are run by young activists to help strengthen peasant organisations involved in land disputes with the state or private plantations. Young people in the urban sector are basically intermediaries between farmers and various government agencies with whom they negotiate. Unlike the Mexican situation, in West Java, farmers are organised to reclaim and restore lands which were never redistributed due to agricultural policies of the new order. Since Suharto’s era, most of Java’s lands are administered by the state which promotes large-scale plantations as the best way for agricultural development, excluding most farmers from their lands, or making them farm workers with very low wages. Nowadays, farmers in West Java are demanding access to those lands; that is the formalisation of land tenure that has not taken place yet. It is worth mentioning that together with young activists and intellectuals, SPP is part of a broader social movement fighting for the implementation of land reform, a social movement whose impulse has been strengthened since the fall of the new order in May 1998.

Until 2001, there were 484 cases of land disputes over 184,484 hectares of land under the state’s and private plantations’ control, only in West Java province. SPP has a wide repertoire of collective strategies, including demonstrations, almost daily land occupations on those lands that need to be recovered, training and capacity-building of leaders who are now able to access local government positions, the incipient creation of cooperatives of production and distribution, among others. They have been struggling more than a decade already, working hard to modify land-access in favour of poor and landless peasants. Many of the campaigns undertaken by SPP along with other peasant organisations and NGOs have resulted in the enactment of regulations that re-address the issue of redistributive land reform. Recently, President Yudhoyono has promised land-reform implementation through national programs, but in practice the government has not gone much further than formalising some individual titles in a few villages.
SPP movement has chosen strategic collaboration with the government to implement land reforms. Noticeably, while some resist government policies to defend access to land, others put pressure on the government to promulgate and implement appropriate policies. The results of democratisation have clearly given different opportunities for social mobilisation, including autonomy, to question governmental decisions.

Some differences: Organisational forms in Latin America and Southeast Asia

While there are some similarities that allow us to study these movements in a comparative perspective, unveiling some aspects of rural development in the history of south countries, this comparison has also brought out interesting differences. One of the most prominent similarities between the two countries is the democratisation context, and social movements’ interaction with new democratically elected governments defending or claiming access to land.

Many studies have addressed the opening of democratisation in these countries as part of the emergence of social movements in the last decade. As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, comparison is not about trying to exactly match two cases, but to uncover some common features and differences between structural dynamics. The ideal of redistributive land reform and the need for farmers to gain and maintain their own land have led to social organisation in two developing countries where land continues to be a source of dispute within development.

At first glance, one difference between these two organisations is their membership patterns. This comparative study assumes a broad definition of what peasant mobilisation is in the twenty-first century. As McMichael says, ‘peasant mobilisation… reaches beyond the daily round of survival on the land to linking that struggle to a reframing of what is possible on the land in contradistinction to what is being done to the land and its inhabitants by the neoliberal’. In this sense, all those struggles that aim to preserve certain practices of land, opposing the commercial usufruct devised by neoliberal policies, can be considered as peasant mobilisation. Among the activists involved in the FPDT, peasant identity is constantly emphasised; it is an essential part of their discourse. The reaction against the expropriation of land brought together different actors, including ejidatarios, vendors, peasants and settlers. As is known, the population of this region is devoted mostly to tertiary sector activities rather than to agriculture, which although limited, is present in the area. In order to legitimise their attachment to land and oppose the expropriation, peasant identity was strengthened among those organised. ‘We rise with our machetes in hand because we are peasants and landless peasants are worthless.’ One notes the emphasis on peasant identity in relation to recent changes in productive activities in the area. Most of the people are primarily engaged in productive activities other than agriculture. For that reason, many of the viewers who followed the dispute over the airport project on television did not recognise peasant identity of the ejidatarios in San Salvador Atenco. That is only one of the reasons why within the discourse of FPDT peasant identity has always been enhanced. Actually, those who organised and promoted the struggle in defense of land were the settlers of the area, without any direct assistance of other activist groups. However, social struggle quickly attracted other activists, teachers and students from local universities who supported them during demonstrations and in litigation.

Unlike the autonomy and self-organisation of FPDT, Pasundan Peasant Union is marked by the assistance of urban activists, students and NGOs. SPP does not emphasise members’ peasant identity but focuses instead on the claim over land. During late 80s and early 90s, conflicts and land disputes involved poor rural families and they actually began to occupy lands under public and private plantations control. However, formal and structured organisation of these families did not occur, mainly because of the fear that was evoked by brutal repression in the mid 60s. It was then that urban activist groups formed NGOs to assist these families in their struggle for land, began promoting grassroots organisations, and strengthening existing collective actions. Although SPP members are farmers from different villages, the leaders are students and young activists who live in cities and have no direct relationship with rural life.

Differences in the memberships of these social movements were distinguished during fieldwork. Apparently, in Mexico, the following ideas dominate: self-organisation and organisational autonomy.
last decade in Mexico, and Latin America in general, social movements have emerged highlighting horizontal organisation and self-representation, challenging models implemented by the state and proposing people’s own alternatives. In contrast to this, post-reformasi Indonesia (1998 to today) has been going through a complex process of civil society organisation, where NGOs have dominated the arena of social struggle, integrating different social sectors under a common demand, such as land reform. In Indonesia, most NGOs are characterised by their collaboration with governments and usually tend to perform unfulfilled state obligations. This form of organisation, also commonly found in Mexico, somehow assumes that those in need have to be assisted because of their limitation to act and to successfully realise their own claims. Between these two kinds of organisational forms, one is not better than the other; but this difference surprised both Mexicans and Indonesians when they were told about organisational forms across the world. Two Indonesians visiting FPDT asked, ‘Who has organised them?’, without imagining the possibility that the subjects directly affected by the attempt of expropriation could organise by themselves to confront the government and defend their lands.

The organisations presented here are an example of how social mobilisation and political organisation emerge to stop or deflect the negative effects that land dispossession and/or lack of land tenure security can have on vulnerable people. The People’s Front in Defense of Land (FPDT) and the Pasundan Peasant Union (SPP) are instances of how important land is for the people living in and off them. The acceleration in the purchase and sale of land in recent years has led to clashes and deepening of different views on the use and fate of land. While ‘development’ projects attempt to demonstrate the impact of large-scale land acquisition on reducing poverty and ensuring food production, many people belonging to the land in question are raising their voices to challenge such development perspectives.

Mexico and Indonesia are countries where legal insecurity and corruption have given way to land appropriation by force. Democratic processes, opened in the previous ten years, are marked by increased social participation and the rising voices of organised communities. The FPDT has succeed in stopping the airport project from materialising, and continues to fight against different strategies that transnational groups, in collusion with government agencies, deploy to appropriate lands valued for their proximity to the capital city. For its part, SPP could not stop the delivery of private property titles that President Yudhoyono has been handing out during the last four years, but it has been able to stop the government from doing this in their region. Furthermore, they are putting into practice collective land tenure and use in those plots which have been recovered and are now being cultivated by local families. Undoubtedly, these organisations are key elements, like so many others around the world, in challenging and presenting alternatives to neoliberal projects on lands assumed to be ‘empty’ and ‘available’ for new large-scale agricultural development projects.

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1 Agricultural technology after the Green Revolution continues to be one of the most controversial. Like the original Green Revolution, the new one continues to generate inequality in the access to these resources.


3 Both Mexico and Indonesia are among the few countries that have enacted constitutional land reform. Mexico is among the first countries where a comprehensive land reform policy has been realised along with Russia, China and Vietnam, just at the end of the well-known Mexican Revolution of 1910. In the other side of the world, Indonesian land reform enacted in 1960 represents a truncated case which did not reach large-scale land redistribution, or alter the structure of land ownership, bequeathing a problem that emerged with potency during the democratic transition.

4 It should be noted that the constitutional amendments came only to formalise a dynamic that was already underway in several regions. For various socio-economic pressures, the practice of leasing
and selling land was common within the ejidos, but was informally done.


9 President Vicente Fox ended the 72 year rule of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) winning the presidential election of year 2000 with the National Action Party (PAN).


The Influence of Agricultural Extension Agents’ Understanding of Extension Policy on their Job Performance

This study assesses the understanding of agricultural extension agents of the demand-driven agricultural extension policy objective in Ghana and how their levels of understanding influence their service delivery. The study also explores the influence of personal characteristics on understanding of extension policy and the level of involvement of farmers in extension activities.

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Introduction

Historical facts show that no nation has actually developed and become great without developing agriculture and its agricultural potentials. Development of the agricultural sector is not possible unless all the component units and efforts are effectively harnessed for maximum benefit. Development programmes and projects are built from policies and, when effectively executed, result in national development.

Policies are principles, rules, and guidelines formulated or adopted by an organisation, government and/or quasi-government institutions to reach its long-term goals. Policies affect agriculture either directly or indirectly. Policies affecting agriculture consist of government decisions that influence direction of human resource development, the level and stability of input and output prices, public and private investments affecting agricultural development, costs and revenues, and allocation of resources. Agricultural policy describes a set of rules and regulations relating to domestic agriculture and imports of foreign agricultural products. Governments usually implement agricultural policies with the aim of achieving desirable outcomes in the domestic agricultural product markets. The objectives of any organisation are derived from its policy framework; the job descriptions of its staff are derived from these goals and objectives. Accomplishment of the job description of each member of an organisation is an indication of his/her performance.

Agricultural policy in Ghana revolves around the following areas of concern: (1) ensuring food security and adequate nutrition for the population; (2) promoting the supply of raw materials for other sectors of the economy; (3) contributing to export earnings; (4) increasing employment opportunities and incomes of the rural population; and (5) generating resources for general economic development. Over the years, emphasis on agricultural development has been on stabilising the economy and laying the foundation for a sustainable agriculture for rural development, accelerated job creation, and agro-based industrial growth. In recent years, many developing countries have reaffirmed the essential role that agricultural extension can play in agricultural development. In recognition of this, extension is seen as one of the most strategically important policy instruments for achieving sustainable agricultural- and food security in developing countries.

Current perspectives in extension revolve around demand-driven and multiple-stakeholder processes of cooperative knowledge construction, and participatory approaches in integrated rural development. For a demand-driven system to work in the context of a rapidly changing multifunctional environment, the ability of service providers to quickly absorb new knowledge and organise their methods of delivery is of crucial importance. It is ultimately important to have quality extension service providers. The understanding of extension policy objectives and strategies by the extension providers is of crucial importance to their work.

Agricultural extension agents are vital to extension program implementation because they provide the necessary links with farmers and communities, manage on-farm research efforts, and deliver education and training programs. However, many have identified agricultural extension agents’ lack of awareness and understanding of policies and programmes as impediments to the effective transfer of extension strategies to farmers. Research has shown that low knowledge and understanding of programs by extension agents contribute towards low coverage of extension activities. A study undertaken by De Groote, Gunaratna, Ergano and Friesen in 2010 revealed that in Uganda, good agronomic performance was as a result of high levels of knowledge on the part of extension agents and their activities in the spread of programs, and this contributed to an increased adoption of the project.

If agricultural extension agents are to accomplish their work satisfactorily, they must have great skills and judgment, deep understanding of agricultural policies and strategies, and high levels of technological expertise. Athman and Monroe have argued that knowledge of processes and systems plays an important role in ones ability to perform. Palmer has emphasised that people should acquire an appropriate range of knowledge about agriculture-related situations so that significant result can be achieved.
The public extension system in Ghana– A brief historical perspective

A historical overview of agricultural extension activities in Ghana indicates that agricultural extension delivery was initiated in the nineteenth century by the early missionaries and foreign-owned companies involved in the production of export crops such as coffee, cocoa and rubber. The extension approach used then was the commodity-based approach. After independence, Ghana tried various extension approaches including extension under the farmers’ cooperative movement and several donor-assisted projects to help strengthen staple crop production. In the 1970s and 1980s, all the departments of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) undertook separate extension services. Agricultural extension was, therefore, fragmented among the various departments within the same ministry. In 1987, MOFA established the Directorate of Agricultural Extension services (DAEs) to bring all splinter MOFA extension services under one umbrella. In the beginning of the 1990s, DAEs adopted the training and visit (T&V) extension system nationwide. This extension initiative was supported with World Bank funding through the national Agricultural Extension Project (NAEP), which was implemented to help improve the efficiency in the management and delivery of extension services, to improve technologies available to farmers, and strengthen the technical department of MOFA. The T&V was more focused on transfer of technology with farmers playing a passive role. This approach failed to factor in the diversity of the socio-economic and institutional environments facing farmers.

The seemingly passive role of farmers in the T&V approach necessitated the promotion of participatory approaches, in which the need for empowerment is paramount. In this approach, the role of AEs has become that of facilitating learning among farmers instead of only transferring technology. Thus, once farmers are aware of the causes of their problems and have identified the most pressing ones, the extension agent provides technical knowledge which may be useful to addressing the problems identified. What makes this approach participatory is that farmers are the principal decision-makers in defining goals, planning, implementing, and evaluating development activities.

In relation to community development, the existence of a local government and a decentralised administration is a precondition. Participatory approaches depend strongly on a conducive political and administrative environment. This led to MOFA drafting the policy document with demand drive being the dominant direction in the current participatory approach. The concept of demand-driven extension emphasises the need to provide services that meet needs and priorities of farmers in the context of changing domestic and international environments for agriculture. It is linked to a paradigm shift in public-sector reform towards responsive governance. Extension methods have also changed over time. Participatory and group-based approaches which focus on learning and empowerment have increasingly gained importance. Expectations are that with the implementation of the objectives from the policies, the agricultural industries will be better served through demand-driven extension services.

The Problem

Experience has shown that while new extension concepts have often been widely embraced at a conceptual level, the implications of these new ideas for changing field-level practice have not always been confronted.

In 2002, the Extension Directorate of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture Ghana developed a draft of its Policy Framework for Agricultural Extension, which aimed at major reform and reorientation of Ghana's entire agricultural extension system. The dominant extension approach to be followed in the policy document was the new international paradigm of promoting demand-driven and farmer-accountable extension.

‘Demand’ is defined as what people ask for, need, and value so much that they are willing to invest their resources, such as time and money, to receive the services. Demand driven services therefore mean services provided as per the expressed needs of clients. In order to achieve demand-driven extension service, MOFA is expected to promote extension service to ensure that services provided are relevant to farmers’ needs. The summary strategies to be adopted are:

- strengthening linkages among farmers, extension workers and researchers,
- involving clients in the planning and evaluation of extension activities, establishing functional RELCs, and
empowering farmers through the formation of FBOs.

Under demand-driven extension, the staff is expected to organise farmers into groups and work closely with them to identify agricultural problems, using Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), Farmers Field Schools (FFS) and Rapid Appraisal of Agricultural Knowledge Systems (RAAKS). Farmers' problems are supposed to set the extension agenda, to ensure that extension services are demand-led, and based on local situations and resources to ensure full participation of farmers in extension activities.

One of the ways of placing extension in the pull of the demand drive is to organise farmers into groups. Most extension workers have been trained as crop or livestock specialists and have little or no training in the social sciences; therefore, most are not trained in how to organise farmers into producer groups or other types of farmer organisations. The new role of managing and facilitating learning processes requires the development of special skills and competencies that are different from the present technical knowledge of extension agents. The demand-driven services also require major institutional reforms such as extension delivery approaches, organisational structure, professional attitudes of staff and the process and supply of adequate facilities for satisfactory work. Studies have shown that the inability of agents to understand decentralisation policy has been the reason for poor working knowledge relationship between them and their clients. Secondly, extension workers are expected to increase farmers' participation in extension topics and the learning process. Generally, small-scale farmers do not have adequate capacity and mechanisms to articulate their demands and, because they are not well organised, their negotiation powers are weak. Even though there is some level of involvement of farmers in programme planning and identification of needs, experience has shown that the limited emphasis of MOFA staff on participation during their interaction with farmers has resulted in very low farmer involvement in programme planning and inadequate expression of their needs.

To ensure the success of demand-driven extension delivery, it is also important to have quality implementers who have adequate working knowledge to carry out the responsibility given them. Their job performances represent some of the fundamental determinants of success in their sector. The knowledge and skills of an organisation's workforce have become increasingly important to its performance, competitiveness, and innovation. It has been proposed successfully by Cohen and Hill that well-written policies are themselves instructional in nature, and that extension agents are known as a key connection between policy and practice, their opportunities to learn about and from policy are a crucial element in their practice and achievement. Therefore the understanding of the policy document by extension agents (AEAs) cannot be underestimated with respect to delivery of their duties.

Performing effectively on the job requires that the person has and understands a complete and up-to-date job description for the position, and that the person understands the performance requirements and standards that are expected. The lack of know-how on the part of extension agents significantly affects agricultural performance. This study focuses on extension agents' knowledge in extension policy and the influence of such knowledge on both their performance and farmers' participation in extension activities.

Research Questions
The proposed research seeks to find answers to the following research questions:

1. How do extension workers' knowledge-levels relate to their performances in demand-driven extension policy?

2. Are farmers' participation in planning and delivery of extension programmes influenced by the knowledge levels of AEAs?

Hypothesis
The following hypotheses were set up for verification through empirical data (stated in the null form H0): H0; Agricultural extension workers knowledge levels pertaining to demand-driven extension policy does not influence their performance; H0; Farmers participation in planning and delivery of extension programmes are not influenced by the AEAs knowledge level.
Specific objectives of the study

1. To determine the influence of knowledge level of Agricultural Extension Agents on demand-driven agricultural extension policy objectives.
2. To determine how the Agricultural Extension Agents' understanding of the new agricultural extension policy influences their service delivery.
3. To determine the extent to which extension agents' knowledge of demand-driven policy influences farmers' participation in planning and implementation of extension activities.

Methods and procedures

This investigation is quantitative and descriptive in nature, applied in type and survey in design. The design employs survey tools and traditional quantitative methods such as questionnaires and interview schedules. Using the survey instrument, data was collected from agricultural extension agents/staff (AEA) from four municipalities and four districts in Greater Accra and Eastern Regions of Ghana. Data was also collected from farmers from these districts and municipalities. A sample size of 160 individuals was considered for the study. Fifteen extension agents and five farmers were randomly selected from each district and municipality, totaling 40 farmers and 120 agricultural extension agents. Out of the 120 extension agents the researcher could only interview 112 extension agents; the figure represents 93 per cent of the expected AEA respondents. Some could not be interviewed because: 1) AEs were reluctant to be interviewed, and 2) those who took the questionnaire home just failed, or were unwilling, to return them.

The survey instrument employed for AEs contained four sections. These were 1) the general characteristics of AEs, 2) knowledge of demand-driven agricultural extension policy, 3) AEs interaction with farmers and their performance, and 4) participation in and knowledge of planning and implementation of extension activities. The farmers' instruments consist of general farmers' characteristics, information on farmer-extension worker interaction addressing farmers' views on AEs role performance, and participation in planning of extension activities addressing issues of farmers' levels of involvement.

Data were analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 17.0. Open ended questions were developed into categories before entering the data. The descriptive statistics used included frequency distributions, percentages, means, and standard deviations. Categories for the open-ended questions were developed as mutually exclusive and exhaustive, based on themes that emerged from the literature review. Chi-square test analyses were conducted to achieve research objectives.

Results and discussion

Findings based on the demographic characteristics of extension agents indicate that male agents 83.9 per cent dominated female's agents 16.1 per cent. Respondents' age ranged between 20 and 59 years. This falls within the economically active age group as defined by the 2000 population and housing census (which is 15 – 64 years). Majority of respondents age fell between 30 to 50 and above (87.4%), thus 12.6% in age group 20-29, 31.2% in group 30-39, 32.1% in group 40-49 and 24.1% in group 50 and above. Sixty four percent extension agents had agricultural college certificates whiles 24.1% had diploma in agriculture. Only 11.6% were Bachelors Degree holders. A large portion (78.6%) of extension agents were technical officers in their professional rank, 12.5% sub-professional whiles approximately nine percent (8.9%) were professionals. This was an indicative reflection of their educational background. Of the respondents, 52.7% had above 10 years of experience as an extension agent while 47.3% had 10 and below years of experience. Majority of respondent (51.8%) were specialist both in crops and animals, 32.1% animal specialist, 8.9% crop specialist whilst 7.1% were specialist in women in agricultural development (WIAD) and general agricultural (Table 1).
### Table 1: Demographic characteristics of Extension agents (N=112)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>83.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 and Above</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Educational Level:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agric College</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Work Experience:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≤ 10 years</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 10 years</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Professional Rank:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical officer</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>78.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Professionals</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specialisation:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crops</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animals</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>both (crops and animals)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (WIAD, Gen. Agric)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Survey, 2010

**The knowledge level of extension agents on demand-driven extension policy**

The knowledge level Scale scores for extension agents in this study ranged from 8 to 24 (the higher the number on the scale the higher the level of knowledge). The demand driven knowledge Scale scores of the respondents were divided into three categories, 1 (0 to 8) – indicating low knowledge level, 2 (9 to 16) – indicating medium knowledge level and 3 (17 to 24) – high knowledge level. Majority (50.9 per cent) of the respondents scored in the medium knowledge level and 43.8 per cent of participants scored in the high knowledge level. Only 5.4 per cent of the respondents scored in the low knowledge level (Table 2).

### Table 2: Level of knowledge of extension agents on demand-driven policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Knowledge</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage(%)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Survey, 2010
The findings showed that a large number of extension agents are knowledgeable in demand-driven extension and its policy objectives and strategies, as stated in the MOFA 2003 policy document.

**Performance of agricultural extension agents' roles**

There were several indicators used by each district or municipality to appraise the work performance of extension agents. The approved ones by MOFA that run through all the districts/municipality district agricultural development units (DADU) were used. In this research, the following performance indicators were used: 1) number of visits to farmers, 2) demonstrations conducted, 3) organised field days and tours, and 4) numbers of FBOs/farmer groups formed. The performance composite score generated in this study ranged from 4 to 12. A score below or equal to four categorised – 1, indicated low performance, category – 2 (score 5 – 8) indicated medium performance while category – 3 (score 9 – 12) indicated a high performance level. Findings indicated that 70.5 per cent of respondents performed in the medium category, 24.1 per cent fell in the low performance category whiles 5.4 per cent were in the high performance category (Table 3). The study showed that overwhelming majority of extension agent performed their roles at a medium level.

**Table 3 Level of role performance of extension agents' respondents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Knowledge</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage(%)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Survey, 2010
The study compared level of knowledge of extension agents in demand-driven extension and their role performance.

**Relationship between knowledge level and role performance**

Knowledge levels and performance in specific roles and overall performance, the specific roles are: 1) number of visits to farmers; 2) demonstrations conducted; 3) organised field days and tours; and 4) numbers of FBOs/farmer groups formed.

Cross-tabulation of role performance with knowledge level was conducted to assess the relationship between the two variables of interest. Pearson Chi-square test was used to ascertain the relationship. The chi-square test of significance is summarised in Table 4. The results of chi square test of significance (Role performance: $\chi^2 = 6.535$, (df = 4), $P$ – value: 0.16 < $p$ < 0.17, Non-significant) between the variables showed no statistically significant difference between knowledge level of extension agents and their role performance. This means that knowledge levels of extension agents in demand-driven extension policy had no influence on the AEAs role performance. Hence the null hypothesis that extension agent's knowledge levels pertaining to demand driven extension policy does not influence their performance holds valid.

This findings deviate from that of Schmidt\(^{20}\) and Hunter\(^{21}\) who propose that cognitive ability affects the acquisition of job knowledge and that job knowledge in turn affects performance. Their study reported that job knowledge had a positive influence on job performance and was a better predictor of role performance. The phenomenon could be explained by the fact that in Schmidt's and Hunter's research the cognitive abilities of their respondents were different and higher than the respondents in this study; moreover, their research used respondents from tertiary institutions. Therefore in this study the change could be explained by the fact that the vast majority (78.6 per cent) of the extension agent respondents comprised technical officers, thus, agricultural college certificate holders.
Table 4 Knowledge levels of AEA and their level of role performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Knowledge</th>
<th>Role of Performance</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>72.2%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>67.3%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>70.5%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Role performance: $\chi^2 = 6.535$, (df = 4), P – value: 0.16 < p < 0.17, Non-significant

Source: Field Survey, 2010

The influence of AEAs knowledge level farmers' participation in extension activities

The extension agent is a change agent: he intervenes to bring about change in order to help improve the lives of farmers and their families. The basic role of the agent in bringing change into a rural area, his knowledge and personal skills would be useful in performing his role and, for that, matter farmer participation. The agent's knowledge on participation, which forms one of the core policy strategies, is paramount to the delivery of the service. This section presents the knowledge levels of extension agents in demand-driven policy and their relation to the participation of farmers in extension.

Findings indicated that in Greater Accra region, 7.3 per cent of extension agents had low knowledge level, 49.1 per cent had medium knowledge level and 43.6 per cent had higher levels of knowledge. In the Eastern Region, 3.5 per cent of AEA respondents had low level of knowledge, 52.6 per cent had medium levels of knowledge and 43.9 per cent had high. In both regions, majority of respondents had medium to high levels of knowledge. Eastern region had the highest majority of respondents with medium to high knowledge levels (Table 5). This was reflected in the percentage of farmers participating in extension planning and deployment activities. Ninety five per cent of farmers were active participators in the Eastern region, and in Greater Accra region, ninety per cent of farmers actively participated in extension.

Table 5 Knowledge levels of extension agent on farmer participation in extension activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Knowledge Levels</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater Accra Region</td>
<td>4 (7.3%)</td>
<td>24 (43.6%)</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Region</td>
<td>2 (3.5%)</td>
<td>25 (43.9%)</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Farmer Participation</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Passive Participation</td>
<td>Active Participation</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Accra Region</td>
<td>2 (10%)</td>
<td>18 (90%)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Region</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>19 (95%)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Source: Field Survey, 2010

The level of knowledge of extension agent respondents indicated that agents are quite knowledgeable in the delivery strategies of demand-driven extension which requires farmer participation. The high participation of farmers in extension activities indicated that extension will be tailored to the needs of farmers. According to Elfaki,23 farmers' participation increases commitment to the extension programs.

Conclusion and recommendations

The study revealed that agricultural extension agents are knowledgeable in demand-driven extension policy. The study found that respondents had medium (50.9 per cent) to high (43.8 per cent) knowledge levels on demand-driven extension policy. This phenomenon was equally exhibited in all the regions, municipalities, and districts that were studied. The knowledge levels of agricultural extension agents in demand-driven extension reflected moderate to high knowledge levels. This was in spite of the fact that majority of the respondents had not received training in demand-driven extension.

Data collected showed that even though knowledge levels of extension agents were within medium to high, and the majority (70.5 per cent) of agents' performance was medium, the level of knowledge of extension agents did not have any influence on their role performance. Therefore, their understanding of the extension policy objective had no direct influence on their service delivery.

Based on the findings of the study, the following recommendations are put forward. It is important that future research includes the input of farmers on demand-driven and other organisations undertaking extension, particularly those working on farmers' ability to demand extension services; extension agents' knowledge levels in demand-driven extension is only a starting point. Results showed that even though extension agents were knowledgeable in demand-driven extension, the majority of them scored in the medium category. It is recommended that a rigorous and continuous capacity-building structure be established within the Ministry of Food and Agricultural in Ghana to upgrade and sustain the knowledge base of extension agents or frontline staff. Also, when new policies are promulgated, agricultural workers should be educated and trained in these new developments.

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7 M. Karbasioun, H. Biemans, and M. Mulder ‘Supporting role of the agricultural extension services and implications for agricultural extension instructors as perceived by farmers in Esfahan, Iran’, Journal of international agricultural and extension education, Volume 14, Number 1, 2007.
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Farmers’ Perception of Adoption of Chickpea Technology Package: A Study in East Shewa, Ethiopia

Chickpea (Cicer arietinum L.) is one of the major pulse crops grown in Ethiopia. It plays an important role in improving household income, nutrition and food security. Despite its high production potential in East Shewa, chickpea growers do not benefit from chickpea production. There are different contributing factors to the low productivity level. Among these, farmers' perception of particular technologies is a key concern. The objective of this paper is to assess the influence of farmers' perception of a chickpea technology package on its adoption.

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Introduction

The major chickpea production areas in Ethiopia include the central highlands of southwest, west and east shewa zones, and south and north Wollo zones. It is widely grown in eight agro-ecological zones (Asnake et al., 2005). East Shewa zone is located in Oromiya Regional State which is where the present study was undertaken (particularly, Akaki and Ada’a woredas). It is one of the major chickpea-growing areas of the country. However, productivity levels of chickpea are low compared to the potential yield for Akaki and Ada’a woredas. The productivity level of chickpea in the case of the two woredas is below its potential, which is 4.7 tons/ha.

Some of the contributing factors to low productivity are low yield potential of seed cultivars, poor quality of seeds, susceptibility of seeds to biotic and abiotic stress, and farmers’ unwillingness to adopt the recommended package. Similarly, farmers in some woredas of East Shewa, in general, and woredas which were studied, in particular, are among those that are suffering from the problem of low yield. Another major contribution is farmers’ perception of technology. The study of perception is regarded as an excellent means of determining psychological field forces which influence behaviour. The independent variables or situational factors (personal, physical, economical, social, cultural or communication) have only indirect influence and thus play a less important role in the behavior-determination process. Non-adoption of new technologies can be traced back to unwillingness to adopt a new technology. Farmers’ perceptions of technologies are important in adoption decisions, and thus, deserve research attention.

A number of studies have analysed the relationship between the characteristics of an agricultural technology and its rate of adoption. Most have used more-or-less objective parameters, or have assumed that all farmers perceive these characteristics in the same way. A person’s perception of an innovation may, however, differ widely from the actual characteristics of the innovation. Perception is influenced by our values, beliefs and attitudes, relative advantage, compatibility etc. Adesina and Zinnah found that farmers’ perceptions of technology-specific attributes affect the decision for adoption beyond other factors. But earlier adoption studies have rarely considered the impact of perceptions on adoption decision. In short, the perception of farmers about chickpea production and attributes of chickpea technology, and their relation to adoption and extent of use of the technology have not been investigated rigorously, particularly in the areas selected for study.

The availability of information on what factors are determining the adoption of chickpea technologies, to what extent chickpea technologies are adopted, what are farmers’ perceptions of chickpea technologies, and what policy measures can be designed, are crucial in the process of technology generation and dissemination efforts. Based on these ideas, the study sought to find answers to the following key research question: How do farmers’ perceive the chickpea technology package in the areas picked for this study? This research project was initiated to bridge the abovementioned gaps in existing research by focusing on chickpea technology packages.

Research Methodology

The sampling procedure followed in this study is depicted in the diagram below.
Sampling procedure

**Table 1. Number of respondents in each of the selected PA, based on status of adoption**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of districts</th>
<th>Name of Peasant Association</th>
<th>Number of chickpea grower household heads</th>
<th>No of Respondents Selected</th>
<th>TNR</th>
<th>Percentage of Sample respondents (in per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ada’a</td>
<td><strong>Hiddii</strong></td>
<td>513</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akaki</td>
<td><strong>Denkaka</strong></td>
<td>601</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Insilalee</strong></td>
<td>300</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Googeecha</strong></td>
<td>407</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1821</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: As refers to Adopters, NAs refers to Non-Adopters and TNR refers to total number of respondents

**Data type, sources, methods of data collection and analysis**

The data type, sources, methods of data collection and analyses are provided here:
Results and Discussions

Table 3. Distribution of respondents by level of adoption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adopter Category</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>per cent</th>
<th>Adoption index Range</th>
<th>Mean Adoption index</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non adopters</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0325</td>
<td>0.10014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low adopters</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.01-0.33</td>
<td>0.3179</td>
<td>0.3179</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium ado.</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.34-0.66</td>
<td>0.5608</td>
<td>0.06242</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High adopters</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.67-1.00</td>
<td>0.8513</td>
<td>0.09980</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.5071</td>
<td>0.30847</td>
<td>910.174***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: N refers to number of respondents and SD refers to standard deviation
Source: Own survey data, 2007; ***= the mean difference is significant at less 1 per cent level

Farmers’ perception of improved chickpea varieties and their relative advantage

The relative superiority of the technology in terms of its advantage will enabled farmers to have a favourable perception of the technology, which in turn enhanced decisions in favour of its adoption. With regard to the assessment of perception, an index (five point scale) which identifies how well certain
attributes of improved varieties meet farmers’ preference over the local variety was used. Accordingly, the ratings such as very low (1), low (2), medium (3), high (4), and very high (5) were used to measure the respondents’ reactions to the technologies. In the list of advantages, a value less than three indicates how the farmer perceives the characteristics under evaluation to be poor or negative and in the list of disadvantages, the reverse is implied.

Based on the survey results, the varieties were supported by farmers for certain attributes such as world market demand, yield potential, profitability, quality grain, and early maturity which took the average scores of 4.01, 3.97, 3.92, 3.53 and 3.13 respectively. Attributes such as long harvest time, disease resistance and pest resistance were given the least scores of 2.64, 2.60, and 2.44, respectively. The low ratings on long harvest time could be due to shattering, for instance, when it dries too much, and on disease and pest resistance due to the availability of improved varieties compared to local variations.

**Perceived Relative Disadvantages of Improved Chickpea Variety**

Perception of storability, regular fresh seed requirement, high seed purchase price, unavailability of seed at the right time and of adequate quality, local consumption demand and local market demand-related attributes were assessed to get farmers’ views on relative disadvantages of improved chickpea variety (Table 4).

**Table 4. Respondents’ perception of chickpea varieties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of Advantages</th>
<th>Distribution of respondents per perception average score category (per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High productivity</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early maturity</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality grain</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disease resistance</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insect&amp; pest resistance</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long harvest time</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World market demand</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of profitability</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**List of disadvantages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of disadvantages</th>
<th>Distribution of respondents per perception average score category (per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low storability</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular need for fresh seeds</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High seed cost</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed unavailability and quality</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The taste is not liked by the society</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No credit service</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems on input &amp; credit supply</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low local consumption</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Farmers' perception of seeding rate

In this study, perceived relative advantage and disadvantage of seed rate were measured in by asking respondent farmers to rate the practice. The calculated survey result in Table 5 revealed that farmers' perception of relative advantages of seed rate use was high for all listed attributes such as perception of better yield and quantity of seed required. Consumption of more time and requirement of more skill were the important disadvantages associated with seed rate with an average mean score of 3.28.

Table 5. Perception of relative advantages, disadvantages of seed rate (N=200)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Distribution of respondents per perception average score category (per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of better yield</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It saves quantity of seed</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Disadvantages

| It is labor intensive                   | 23.5 | 38.5| 24     | 11   | 3    | 2.32 | 1.04 |
| It consumes more time and requires skill| 23.5 | 35  | 23.5   | 16   | 2    | 3.28 | 1.07 |


Farmers' perception of chemicals

As far as the relative advantages and disadvantages of chemicals are concerned, same procedure as that of seed rate and variety was followed in obtaining farmers' judgment on certain identified attributes. The calculated survey results revealed that farmers' perceptions of relative advantages of pesticide chemicals were found to be positive for the listed attributes. The disadvantages, such as non-availability at the right time, requirement of skill and pollution of environment, were not perceived as major impediments by respondent farmers, which had an average score of less than three.
Table 6. Perception of relative advantages, disadvantages of pest chemicals (N=200)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Distribution of respondents per perception average score</th>
<th>category (per cent)</th>
<th>Very Low</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Very High</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perception of better yield</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It helps in reducing crop damage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disadvantages</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not available at the right time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It requires skill</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polluting the Environment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The use of chemical does not fit with financial capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Total perception of the package**

**Total perception score for relative advantage of the package**

Total perception score for relative advantages of the package (improved seed, seed rate and chemicals) for whole respondents was 10946. This number was divided by 200 to get the average total relative disadvantage score for a household head in the sample and it was found to be 54.73. Finally, this number was again divided by the total attributes (12) of the technology listed to be rated by interviewees. The resulting figure was 4.56 which is a bit larger than the median score (3), implying positive perception of the technology package i.e. improved seed, seed rate and chemicals.

Non-adopters' mean perception score on advantages of technology attributes was 50.90 and that of low, medium and high adopters' were 54.71, 55.08 and 56.90, respectively. The ANOVA result shows significant mean difference (F=7.096, P=0.000) between adopter categories in relation to perceived relative advantages of the package. This may be taken as an indication that adopters have a relatively optimistic perception of the positive attributes of the chickpea technology package. Similarly, the result of correlation analysis shows that there was a positive and linear association between adoption and intensity of the technologies and perceived relative advantages (r=0.301, p=0.00).

Many other researchers have also reported the positive relation between farmers' perception of technology attributes and adoption. The work of Adesina and Zinnah asserts that farmers' perception of specific characteristics of technology influence adoption decision positively and significantly. They further indicate that the omission of such variables in an adoption model might bias the results of factors determining adoption decision of farmers. Similarly, a study conducted by Taha reported that total perceived relative advantage of improved onion production package was positively and significantly related with adoption of improved onion production package.

**Total perception score for relative disadvantage of the package**
Total perception score for relative disadvantages of the package (improved seed, seed rate and chemicals) for whole respondents was 8263. This number was divided by 200 to get the average total relative disadvantage score for a household head in the sample and it was found to be 41.315. Finally, this number was divided by the total attributes/items (14) of the technology listed to be rated by an interviewee. The resulting figure was 2.95, which is a bit smaller than the median score (3), implying lower perception of the disadvantages of chickpea technology package (i.e. improved seed, seed rate and chemicals).

Accordingly, the ANOVA result shows the existence of significant difference between adopter categories at less than 1 per cent probability level. Similarly, the result of correlation analysis shows that there is negative and linear relationship between adoption of chickpea technologies and perceived relative disadvantage. Adopters’ low scores on relative disadvantage imply that they did not perceive the package as highly disadvantageous compared to non-adopters, who perceived it to be so.

**Perceived total attributes (total perception of the package)**

Improved chickpea technology package adoption is influenced by both positive (perceived relative advantages) and negative (perceived relative disadvantages) attributes. In this research, total perception of technology attribute (sum total of relative advantages less the disadvantages) was used to understand the influence of perception on practices of adoption. The survey result indicated that non-adopters’ mean perception score on perceived total attribute of technology attributes was 4.93 and that of low, medium and high adopters’ category was 15.21, 15.11 and 16.34, respectively. This implies that adopters have positive perception of the advantages of chickpea technology package compared to non-adopters. The ANOVA result shows significant mean difference (F=20.598, P=0.000) between adopter categories in relation to perceived total attribute of the package. Similarly, the result of correlation analysis shows that the relationship between adoption of the technologies and total perception of the package is positive and linear (r=0.423, p= 0.000), implying that adopters have positive perception of chickpea technology package as compared to non-adopters.

**Table 7. Total perception score on advantage, disadvantage and total attribute of the technology**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Adopter category</th>
<th>Non</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>r</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advantages of technology</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>50.90</td>
<td>54.71</td>
<td>55.08</td>
<td>56.90</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>7.096***</td>
<td>0.301***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>6.78</td>
<td>6.18</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>6.78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disadvantages of technology</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>45.98</td>
<td>39.50</td>
<td>39.97</td>
<td>40.56</td>
<td>41.31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>23.952***</td>
<td>-0.372***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTA of the technology</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>15.21</td>
<td>15.11</td>
<td>16.34</td>
<td>13.42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>7.77</td>
<td>8.40</td>
<td>7.68</td>
<td>7.71</td>
<td>8.89</td>
<td>20.598***</td>
<td>0.423***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: survey data, 2007. *** Represents 1per cent significance level

**Results in the Econometric model**
Contact with extension agents has also positively influenced adoption of chickpea and its intensity (significant, at less than 5 per cent probability level). Access to extension services accounted for about 11.6 per cent of the variation in the adoption of improved chickpea production package and its intensity. Extension service as a source of information regarding the benefit of chickpea technology package, its application rate, etc., has a strong influence on farmers’ adoption decisions. Similar results were reported by Bezabih.

Distance from nearest farm was assumed to influence chickpea technology adoption. The finding in Table 8 agrees with the hypothesis that distance from farm to home is negatively and significantly associated with the probability of adoption and extent of use, at less than 1 per cent significant level. The negative association suggests that the likelihood of adopting improved chickpea production package declines as the distance from farm increases. The probable reason might be that farmers nearer to the farm center have kept the farm from theft, whereas those at far distant cannot. Besides, as farm distance increases farmers may incur more costs for transport, and spend more time and energy; consequently, farmer initiation for adoption of new chickpea technology would diminish. As indicated in Table 8, distance from nearest farm center accounted for about 5.0 per cent of the variation in adoption of improved chickpea production package. This clearly shows the importance of farm distance in crop production in general, and chickpea production in particular.

One of the important intervening variables hypothesised in this study was knowledge and it was found to influence the probability of adoption and intensity of use of chickpea production package positively and significantly at less than 5 per cent probability level. Chickpea technology knowledge gives farmers more confidence and minimises possibilities of failure. During the survey, it was observed that majority of respondents did not know the appropriate seed rate and characteristics of the new technologies. The variable accounted for 2.6 per cent variation in the adoption and intensity of use of chickpea production packages. This calls for due attention to improve farmers’ knowledge, prior to package promotion.

The other important intervening variable hypothesised in this study was perceived total technology attributes (PTA) and it was found to influence the factors under consideration positively and
significantly, at less than 1 per cent probability level. The direction of influence is also in line with the hypothesis that households who had a positive opinion of the total technology were more likely to adopt new chickpea production packages. According to the model result, household's PTA accounted for 1.2 per cent of the variation in adoption and intensity of use. This means that a farmer who has positive perception will be more likely to adopt and increase level of use of improved chickpea production package. On the contrary, farmers who have negative perception, will likely face difficulty in adopting, and increasing level of use. This result is affirmed with the finding of Ebrahim (2006).

Effects of changes in determinant variables

Table 9. Marginal effects of determinant variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Change in Probability of Adoption *</th>
<th>Change in the Intensity of Adoption*</th>
<th>Change among the Whole</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONTAEXTE</td>
<td>( \frac{\partial F(z)}{\partial X_i} )</td>
<td>( \frac{\partial E(Y</td>
<td>Y^*_i &gt; 0)}{\partial X_i} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISTFARM</td>
<td>-0.070905863</td>
<td>-0.01945</td>
<td>-0.02754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNOWLE</td>
<td>0.030048597</td>
<td>0.008241</td>
<td>0.011669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>0.019754858</td>
<td>0.005418</td>
<td>0.007672</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contact with extension agents, distance to the nearest farm, knowledge and PTA are among the hypothesised explanatory variables found to influence the probability and intensity of use of chickpea technologies (Table 9). The marginal effect of contact with extension agents on the overall adoption of improved chickpea production package was 7.9 per cent. Table 10 above shows that a unit's increase in contact with extension agents increases the probability of adoption by 20.3 per cent and the intensity of adoption by 5.57 per cent. A unit's increase in distance from residence to farm also reduces the probability of adoption of chickpea technologies by 7.1 per cent and the intensity of use by 1.9 per cent. The marginal effect result also shows that the estimated increase in the probability and intensity of use of improved chickpea production package, resulting from a better attitude towards improved chickpea production package, is 0.98 per cent and 0.27 per cent, respectively.

A change in improved chickpea production knowledge brings about 3.0 per cent increase in probability of adoption and 0.8 per cent increase in intensity of use by the adopters. A marginal change in PTA increases the probability of adoption and use by 1.98 per cent and 0.54 per cent, respectively.

Summary and Conclusion

Chickpea is one of the major pulse crops grown in Ethiopia, which is the third chickpea-producing country in the world. Its contribution to households' nutrition, income and food security is remarkable. Regardless of its contribution, the average yield is below the global mean yield. A relatively low average national yield is attributed to the low level of adoption of improved chickpea production technologies. There are different contributing factors to the low productivity level of the technology. Among these, farmers' perception of a certain technology is one of the key contributing factors. Farmers' perceptions of technologies are therefore very important in adoption decisions, and hence, deserve research attention. The objective of this study was to assess the influence of farmers' perception of attributes of chickpea technology package in Ada'a and Akaki districts.

Multi-stage sampling procedure was used to reach the required sample size. First, the study was initiated purposively in Eastern Shewa zone, specifically, Ada'a and Akaki districts. Then, four PAs were selected randomly (near and far) from the total chickpea growing PAs. Adopters and non-adopters were selected based on the number of chickpea growers in each PAs. Finally, random samples of 200 farmers...
were drawn from the PAs.

The ANOVA result shows that significant mean difference \((F=7.096, P=0.000)\) between adopter categories in relation to perceived relative advantages of the package. This might be taken as an indication that adopters have relatively optimistic perception of the positive attributes of the chickpea technology package. The direction of influence is also in line with the hypothesis that households who have positive perception of the total technology are more likely to adopt new chickpea production packages. According to the model result, households' PTA accounted for 1.2 per cent of the variation in adoption and intensity of use of improved chickpea production package. This means that a farmer who has positive perception will be more likely to adopt and increase level of adoption while those who perceive negatively will face difficulty in adopting and increasing level of use.

Perceived total attribute and knowledge of chickpea technology application are the critical precursors of behavioural change and need to be accurately evaluated before engaging in behavioural change program. Clear perception of the advantages, as well as disadvantages of technology, is an important issue in adopting a new technology package. Hence, farmers' perception of chickpea technology package should receive due attention from both technology developers and development agents. Moreover, agricultural extension programmers should focus on awareness-creation to reduce faulty perceptions.

1. ARDO (Agricultural and Rural Development Offices) Annual Report 2006/7; Ada'a, Debrezeit and Akaki, Dukem.
6. Ibid.
South African Business in Nigeria: An Emergent Global South Neo-Imperialism?

This paper addresses the silence in social science literature on the presence and impact of South African capital in West Africa, especially Nigeria, South Africa's closest competitor for economic and political primacy in Sub-Saharan Africa. It attempts to fill this gap by examining the expansion of South African business in Nigeria. It distinguishes between South African enterprises concentrated in a few urban centres, such as supermarkets, and the territorially dispersed businesses, such as telecommunications, and analyzes the social, political and economic ramifications of these business activities in Nigeria. The paper also indicates the countervailing forces against the dominance of South African capital in the Nigerian economy.

Ayodeji Olukoju

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Introduction

The steady expansion of the economic and political influence of the South African state and business interests on Africa since the apartheid era has attracted considerable interest among scholars and policy makers.¹ Of particular interest is the rapid expansion of South African capital in Southern Africa in the aftermath of the collapse of apartheid.² Martin notes how ‘a surge of South African investment’ in Southern Africa coincided with the privatisation of state enterprises and relaxation of controls in other countries in the region.³ ‘The regional omnipresence of South Africa as well as the integrating role of its multinational corporations’, some analysts asserted, ‘is an important feature of post-Apartheid Southern Africa’.⁴ The importance of the study of the expansion of South African capital in Africa is underscored by the dedication of a special issue of an influential scholarly journal to the subject.⁵

Yet, insufficient attention has been paid in the literature to the presence and impact of South African capital in West Africa, especially Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and South Africa’s closest competitor for economic and political primacy in Sub-Saharan Africa.⁶ This paper attempts to fill this gap by examining the dimensions and implications of the expansion of South African business in Nigeria. It distinguishes between South African enterprises concentrated in a few urban centres, such as supermarkets, and territorially dispersed businesses such as telecommunications, and analyses the social, political and economic ramifications of these business activities in Nigeria. The paper also indicates the countervailing forces against the dominance of South African capital in the Nigerian economy. Drawing parallels between the Nigerian and Southern African contexts of South Africa’s capital expansion, it crystallises the discussion around the following critical, interlocking issues in African political economy: First, the imperative of domestic economic restructuring as a plank for regional and continental competitiveness; second, the vital role of state-private sector alliance in achieving this aspiration; third, the prospects and challenges of promoting national economic interest in the context of the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and, finally, the incipient conflict between the rhetoric of NEPAD and the African Renaissance, on the one hand, and the palpable fear of the emergent neo-imperialism of South African capital.

The dynamics of South African business relations with Sub-Saharan Africa

Until the formal end of the apartheid regime in South Africa, following the release of Nelson Mandela from jail in 1990 and the epochal elections of April 1994, which ushered in a government of national unity, attention had been focused on African nations’ involvement in the liberation struggle in that region. This involvement began in the early 1960s, and included giving support to the liberation movements in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Angola and Mozambique. Understandably, in the aftermath of the collapse of apartheid, greater scholarly attention has been devoted to the reality of South Africa’s engagement with its African neighbours. It is in this connection that this paper examines South African business forays into Nigeria, as part of the northward expansion of South African capital in the post-apartheid era.

This expansion took place in two successive phases – the first being the apartheid-era expansion into the proximate (and often captive) countries in the Southern African region, which has since been consolidated in the post-apartheid era; and, the second, the post-apartheid drive into more distant parts of Africa, including Nigeria, once a leading backer of the anti-apartheid onslaught. The first wave of South African expansion was founded largely on the overwhelming military and economic edge that the apartheid regime had over its African neighbours, the economic and transport infrastructure of which were aligned with and dependent upon South Africa’s, and which were reinforced rather than relaxed in the post-apartheid era.⁷

Nigeria was in a much different state given the distance from South Africa and its relative economic autonomy. However, as will be indicated in this piece, mere distance could not deter the ingress of South African capital.
The political context, dimensions and dynamics of South African-Nigerian business relations since the 1990s

The end of apartheid provides a convenient starting point of any analysis of this relationship. For, if there were any such apartheid-era business relations, these have not been documented and could only have been subversive of Nigeria’s commitment to and support for the liberation struggle. In practical terms, Nigerian-South African trade relations began effectively after the formal transfer of power to the African National Congress (ANC) government of Nelson Mandela. However, what promised to be a consolidation of apartheid-era working relationship between Nigerian governments and the liberation movements in Southern Africa, rapidly deteriorated when Mandela sought to prevail on Nigeria’s military dictator, Sani Abacha, to release the detained winner of the 12 June 1993 presidential elections, Moshood Abiola, and return to legitimacy. Abacha brusquely rebuffed such initiatives, including the Catholic Pontiff’s mediation, and took the unprecedented step of preventing the national football team, the Super Eagles, from defending their continental title when South Africa hosted the competition in 1996. It took Abacha’s death in 1998 and the return to civil rule in 1999 for normal relations to be re-established between two of Africa’s leading powers.

Nigeria’s new civilian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, military head of state from 1976 to 1979, had been one of Abacha’s captives after a stage-managed trial for a phantom coup d’etat. Obasanjo’s accession paved the way for the dramatic entry of South African capital, facilitated by the personal friendship between him and South African president, Thabo Mbeki, who was in exile in Nigeria between 1974 and 1979. This personal friendship and wider political ties created a favourable environment for South African business to flourish in Nigeria. The foundation for this was the conclusion of bilateral trade and investment agreements, which aimed to boost trade between the two countries. Specifically, they guaranteed the security of South African investments against possible nationalisation and harmonised policies to ensure that the companies did not pay double taxation. The cordial political and economic ties were formalised by instituting in October 1999 the Nigeria-South Africa Binational Commission to promote increased trade between both countries. It has since been a broad clearing house for business deals, particularly to the advantage of the South Africans. The South African government through its Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), a copy of the old Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI, now METI) model, had moved a step further by fostering the South Africa-Nigeria Business Forum to provide further assistance to South African enterprises committed to investing in Nigeria.

However, beyond the inter-governmental and personal levels, the formation of the Nigeria-South African Chamber of Commerce (NSACC) in Abuja, Nigeria in May 2000 marked the institutionalisation of this relationship. By January 2011, membership of NSACC comprised 295 corporate entities, either wholly owned by Nigerians or jointly owned with South African investors. The range of activities of member organisations covers manufacturing, banking/finance, accounting/auditing, broadcasting, aviation, engineering, hospitality, insurance, advertising, consulting, management, law, health/pharmaceuticals, information technology, freight and stockbroking. The South African-Nigerian Chamber of Commerce was inaugurated in Sandton, Johannesburg in May 2005. The event was attended by more than 150 business and media stakeholders, including the Nigerian High Commissioner to South Africa.

The two Chambers of Commerce served as clearing houses in the respective countries of investment and economic exchanges between the leading economic powers in Sub-Saharan Africa. A noticeable feature of Nigerian-South African economic relations is their grounding in the political framework of inter-state relations. Addressing a business luncheon at the fifth session of the South Africa-Nigeria Binational Commission in Lagos on 11 December 2003, then South African Deputy President Jacob Zuma, lauded the ‘remarkable increase’ in bilateral trade between both countries, which had a total of R3.7 billion in the first half of 2002 alone. Recalling how the Chamber had facilitated exchange in industry visits, participation in exhibitions, seminars and related activities, Zuma gleefully noted ‘the growing presence of South African companies and parastatals in Nigeria after just over four years since the democratic transition’. 
Cordial political and diplomatic relations between Nigeria and South Africa – in spite of increasing rivalry for primacy in Africa and quest for the proposed Permanent Seat on the United Nations Security Council – have been fundamental to burgeoning business relations between them. Zuma’s remarks above allude to the sharp contrast between post-1999 bilateral relations and the hostility of the Sani Abacha dictatorship in Nigeria (1993-98). This explains his elation when reeling off the list of areas of the Nigerian economy where South African companies were already active – defence, telecommunications, transportation, aviation, entertainment, water, electricity, minerals and energy, hospitality, publishing and banking. Expectedly, the post-2000 surge in the activities of these companies was reflected in the steep rise of South African exports to Nigeria. Accordingly, the value of bilateral trade between South Africa and Nigeria rose from US$11 million to US$11 billion in eleven years. But the figures mask the stark reality of the contrasting fortunes of the trade partners.

First, the commodities of trade reflect the structure of the two economies: Nigeria’s monocultural, primary-product exporting economy could not offer anything beyond crude oil, which made up 97 per cent of its total exports to South Africa. In contrast, South African exports were not only more diverse, they were virtually all processed goods, including chemical products, machinery and electrical equipment. As Hattingh aptly remarks, although South Africa was apparently saddled with a trade deficit, it was better off than Nigeria as ‘the pattern of trade replicates that found between a developed and developing country’. Nigeria's foreign trade sector had merely been locked in another lopsided commercial relationship. To make matters worse for Nigeria, certain sectors of its domestic economy which would ordinarily have been in the grip of its nationals have rapidly fallen before the expanding South African business juggernauts.

The influx and consolidation of South African business enterprises in Nigeria

Presumably because of the hostile political and business environment for South African business in Abacha’s Nigeria, it is not surprising that there were only four South African firms in Nigeria before 1999. There was a dramatic change, especially from 2000, partly on account of the return to civil rule in Nigeria, but also because of the strong state support for South African business in Nigeria. The close personal relationship between Obasanjo and Mbeki also facilitated this tendency. At the end of Obasanjo’s presidency in 2007, over 100 South African companies were established in various sectors of the Nigerian economy as key players and leading investors. It is striking that South African firms were able to compete with and, even, displace entrenched players from Europe and America.

The telecommunications sector was an early site of South African business breakthrough in post-military Nigeria. This was largely because of the great need to bridge the wide gulf between demand for and supply of telecommunications services in a country lacking in the human and technical capability to offer such services. Accordingly, following the Obasanjo government’s deregulation and liberalisation of the economy, the telecommunications sector was opened up to external investors. Licences were auctioned by open and competitive bidding. Ironically, the biggest winners were from Southern Africa – South Africa’s MTN and Zimbabwe’s ECONET Wireless. Between 2001, when it was issued an operating licence, and 2007, MTN established the largest network of cellular phone subscribers in excess of 10 million persons. Though the company invested heavily in the enterprise – $285 million in licence fees and a further $1 billion in infrastructure and operations – it quickly recouped and soon made huge profits. Its Nigerian operations generated after-tax profits of R2.4 billion in 2004. An indication of the success of its investment in Nigeria is the commitment made in 2010 to invest a further $1 billion in the Nigerian network.

The massive profits made by MTN in Nigeria attracted other prospective investors into the sector. Another South African firm, Telkom, which was a latecomer to the Nigerian market, acquired Multi-links, the second largest private telephone service provider in Nigeria with over 160,000 subscribers in 2007. It paid $280 million or R2.1 billion for a 75 per cent stake in Multi-links. The acquisition was of great strategic and commercial significance for Telkom. First, it ensured the diversification of the company’s investments and asset base to offset its dismal domestic record of performance. Second, it was beneficial to Telkom because it automatically inherited a large customer base. Third, the acquisition
was seen as a fair bargain by industry watchers. Fourth, the foray into Nigeria also injected life into another South African giant, Vodacom, 50 per cent of the shares of which is owned by Telkom. Fifth, Multi-links bequeathed to Telkom access to key technologies which confer a competitive edge. Sixth, the year preceding the acquisition, Multi-links had been awarded a unified license, which enabled it to offer a diverse range of services, thereby creating opportunities for growth and control of a larger market share. Seventh, given the continental expansionist vision of South African capital, the Telkom acquisition of Multi-links provided a springboard for further expansion into the West Africa sub-region. In effect, South African firms had secured a virtual stranglehold on the mobile and fixed telephone systems in Nigeria within seven years. The big winners were MTN and, to a lesser extent, Telkom. Comparatively, Vodacom, MTN’s rival, was a big loser when it decided early not to enter the Nigerian market. However, it attempted to make up for its loss of “first mover advantage” by making a bid to acquire Nigeria’s state-owned fixed line giant, NITEL, which had been brought to its knees by corruption and inefficiency. That deal was never consummated and NITEL remains a monumental waste on the Nigerian economic landscape.

Public infrastructure is another important arena of South African business excursion into the Nigerian economy. First, in the power sector, an area of critical concern in Nigerian public life, South African firms have made a notable impact within a decade of their entry. In 2005, the Group Five (G5) Corporation of South Africa was awarded a $90 million (R585 million) contract to build a 685-MW Independent Power Plant in Ikot Abasi by the Ibom Power Company, owned by the Akwa Ibom State Government. By December 2007, it had successfully executed the first phase of the project. The contract marked the company’s successful thrust into the West African independent power market and signalled its readiness to undertake major turnkey power projects in the region. It subsequently won a $62 million (R430 million) contract to design, supply and install a 130-MW power station in Aba, the commercial capital of Abia State and southeastern Nigeria. The project commenced in October 2007 and was scheduled for completion in December 2008. It was executed on behalf of Geometric Power Limited, a local Nigerian firm operating independent power plants for the generation, transmission and distribution of power to various categories of commercial, industrial and household consumers.

Second, in engineering and public works, South African companies have also proved their mettle. The most spectacular from a public impact point of view was the feat performed by Wreckers Dismantling Corporation, which carried out a scientific demolition of the partially collapsed multi-storey head office building of the Bank of Industry on Broad Street, Lagos. The structure had been gutted by a mysterious fire, leaving the towering shell a potential disaster in a built-up, densely populated area of Lagos. But the South African firm not only beat off competition from American and European firms to the contract but brought down the building in full view of the media and onlookers without damage to life or property. Furthermore, a consortium of South African firms, led by Entech, an engineering firm, was engaged to handle a major seafront redevelopment project at the Lagos Bar Beach on Victoria Island, filling the void created by lack of requisite local engineering expertise in the country. The contract was worth $3 billion.

The Nigerian entertainment and media industries have also attracted massive South African investment especially since 1999. In the entertainment industry, Multichoice was the first South African company to invest in Nigeria, well before the summer of the Obasanjo-Mbeki romance. Within a decade, it had achieved a monopoly of the pay-per-view television business in Nigeria through DSTV. It controls 90 per cent of cable business in Nigeria by fuelling and exploiting Nigerian football fans’ addiction to the English Premier League and operating a dedicated channel for music lovers. By November 2008, Multichoice had secured a subscriber base of over 25,000 which ensured an annual turnover of some N10 billion. Though the company claims to spend nearly one million US dollars every month to procure the services on its DSTV, its critics allege that it makes enough profits to repatriate upwards of $120 million to South Africa every fiscal year. A clear indication that Multichoice was running a most profitable business in Nigeria is indicated by its decision in January 2011 to inject US$100 million into its Nigerian operations. Another South African firm, Johnnic Communications (Johncom), is also a big player in the Nigerian entertainment industry, with its chain of cinema complexes all over the country. It invested US$40 million in a single cinema complex in Lagos. In the
related media industry, Johncom acquired *Business Day*, a major Nigerian daily newspaper, commencing with a partnership in August 2007.27

In the hospitality and tourism industry, the South Africans have achieved a near-total dominance.28 Even the US$300 million TINAPA resort complex (comprising a casino, four hotels, four shopping centres and five bulk warehouses) in Calabar, initiated by Donald Duke, governor of Cross River State (1999-2007), is a joint venture involving several major South African organisations – Standard Bank, Southern Sun, Johncom, Tsogo Sun and Broll. They had injected funds and expertise to make the project a success. Southern Sun owns a 300-room hotel while the casino belongs to Tsogo Sun. Broll is the leasing agent for the entire project. Related to this has been the entry of the South African hotel chain, Protea Hotels, in 2002. Since its arrival, the group has established hotels in such major cities as Abuja, Lagos, Port-Harcourt and Enugu, and has also acquired the Bolingo Hotels in Abuja.

The retail sector of the Nigerian economy has also witnessed an influx of South African investment. This is one area, apart from telecommunications, where the reality of the South African business presence is brought home to Nigerians, especially in the major urban centres. Nowhere is this more vivid than Lagos, where South African retail firms are notable by their presence. The Palms shopping centre in the Lekki Corridor of Lagos, reputed to be the largest of its kind in sub-Saharan Africa, is managed by Broll and dominated by other South African business enterprises. Shoprite, the flagship of the South African retail brands, is joined by NuMetro, Game and Nandos.29 Shoprite has two outlets in Lagos, with two more planned for 2011.30 In addition, Broll manages some 600 retail fuel stations all over Nigeria while Johncom operates retail outlets for books, CDs and DVDs. South African firms, such as Nandos, St. Elmo’s and Famous Brands, are also involved in the fast food business.31

South African banks have also made their presence felt in spite of the existence of several established expatriate and indigenous operators in the Nigerian commercial banking sector and the major consolidation exercise of 2004. A striking example is the acquisition by Standard Bank of South Africa of the controlling equity in the IBTC Chartered Bank in 2006. The strategic investment of US$620 million produced the Stanbic-IBTC Chartered Bank, which became a bigger player in the Nigerian banking sector.32 In what has become a recurring practice, the bank was involved in packaging the syndicated loans that underpin the business expansion of another South African firm, MTN, in Nigeria – an indication of the strategic alignment of South African business enterprises in Nigeria. It has also embarked upon an ambitious expansion of its branch network all over the country. The example of Stanbic Bank was followed by FirstRand, which added Nigeria to its list of offshore banking sites. By April 2011, plans were being concluded for it to acquire Sterling Bank, which provided it with ‘a well-established banking platform’ by virtue of its nationwide network of 99 branches.33

Even in the oil sector, long dominated by American and European oil giants, South African investors have gained a foothold. They have won concessions for oil blocks and featured in various areas of the oil services sector. Some have struck partnerships with oil giants, such as Chevron, while others have operated on their own account in oil exploration and the development of a gas-to-fuel facility at the Escravos terminal.34 Leading South African players in the Nigerian oil industry include SASOL, Ophir Energy, PetroSA and Grinaker.

Undoubtedly, the political context and post-apartheid pan-African goodwill worked to the advantage of South African business in Nigeria. Much can be made in this regard of the Obasanjo-Mbeki political (and business?) accord with the NEPAD platform as a good launch pad. However, other factors worked in favour of South African business.

South African business practices in Nigeria and local responses

Intrinsic and external factors have propelled South African firms to front-runner status in various sectors of the Nigerian economy. First, the South Africans needed fresh conquests after completing the domination of the SADC countries. So, they could not afford to ignore the tempting bait of Nigeria’s ‘open’ economy under Obasanjo. Second, they took risks which Western investors were unwilling to take (such as investing in the Nigerian economy in the face of the collapse or absence of infrastructure), studied the business terrain (to ascertain the people’s tastes) and rode their luck when there were
fortuitous openings, such as the auctioning of Nigeria’s cellular telephone networks in 2001. A Nigerian newspaper editor opined that they carefully ‘filled a void in the investment space in Nigeria’. Third, they were encouraged by the success stories of Multichoice and MTN in the media and telecommunications sectors, respectively. Fourth, they carefully chose the sectors in which they had comparative advantage vis-à-vis both expatriate and local competition. Fifth, the favourable bi-national agreements, especially the leeway to repatriate profits, gave South African firms great incentives to invest. Sixth, some South African businessmen claimed that they felt safer in Nigeria in the event of armed robbery attacks. A manager at Shoprite in Lagos asserted that ‘Nigeria is safer than South Africa. In South Africa armed robbers will take your money and kill you, but here in Nigeria, they will take your money and apologize’.

Opinion is divided on the role of South African business in Nigeria. On the one hand, a number of Nigerians have welcomed the entry of the South Africans as a positive development. However, other Nigerians have been less enthusiastic about South African involvement in the Nigerian political economy. Those who have taken a positive view of their entry assert that the South Africans have merely taken advantage of opportunities created in an ‘emerging market’ like other entrepreneurs, driven primarily by the profit motive. Building on this argument, it is asserted that the South Africans intervened fortuitously at the critical juncture of transition to civil rule after a long spell of ruinous military rule. Unlike them, European and American investors, wearied by years of arbitrary military rule, had not devised appropriate responses to the emerging civilian, democratic dispensation. Moreover, the European and American firms had focused on the oil sector to the neglect of equally lucrative non-oil sectors of the economy into which the South Africans chose to venture and invest their capital. A further argument is that the South African presence has created a learning environment for Nigerian entrepreneurs. In any case, it is also argued that, unlike Chinese products which, though cheap, are considered substandard, South African products compare favourably with those from the North. Furthermore, South African firms and their products offer consumers a choice and promote competition in a ‘free market’ economy.

Against such optimistic and positive views of South African business in Nigeria, a litany of complaints has emanated from a cross section of Nigerians. With regard to Multichoice, one of the success stories of South African investment in Nigeria, three major charges have been levelled against its business practices. First, its overwhelming dominance of the cable business has been decried as stifling the growth of broadcasting corporations in Nigeria. Second, its promotion of the English Premier League has been identified as a major factor in the decline of the domestic football league. Third, its tariffs are considered prohibitive and exploitative. Fourth, the repatriation of its profits is seen to be promoting capital flight.

However, it is important to place events in their proper perspective by responding to some of these charges. In the first instance, the practices complained about are not peculiar to Multichoice but are characteristic of a laissez-faire economy devoid of government regulation. In other words, buyers have a choice to patronise or boycott the service providers. In addition, the decline of the domestic football league began with the exodus of star players to Europe since the late 1980s and has been aggravated by the poor administration and financing of professional football in Nigeria. Multichoice cannot be blamed for repatriating profits if the existing law permits it. That said, the entry of other service providers, such as AIT, HITV and Trend TV, has broken the monopoly previously enjoyed by Multichoice.

MTN has also been criticised on similar lines on account of its business practices. First, for over a year after take-off, its charges were considered exploitative and its restrictions on air time use were clearly oppressive. Second, its telephone services were often inefficient and incommensurate with the high charges. Third, it is alleged that ordinary Nigerians have not benefited from its operations. Fourth, like other South African firms in the retail business, MTN has been criticised for failing to procure its products locally. Fifth, with particular reference to the use of a South African bank (Stanbic-IBTC Chartered Bank) for its loan syndication and another South African firm (Multichoice) in strategic partnership, MTN has tended to limit its business partnerships to fellow South African firms at the expense of capable prospective Nigerian partners.
Initially, MTN appeared unresponsive to these criticisms even when inundated by complaints about its high tariffs and its claim that per second billing was not practicable. When it chose to call the bluff of aggrieved consumers, it experienced a consumer boycott without precedent in Nigerian history. This, coupled with the bold entry of Globacom, a Nigerian rival, forced it to follow Globacom’s lead in introducing per second billing and generally moderating its charges. The Nigerian Senate had to call MTN and other providers to order for their shoddy services. In the end, MTN adjusted its tariffs and billing policy both to meet the Globacom threat and to assuage consumers’ feelings. It also set up the MTN Foundation, which has engaged in a number of corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, including capacity building in Nigerian tertiary institutions. In addition, between 2001 and 2008, MTN contributed over N140 billion out of its estimated N800 billion earnings from its Nigerian operations to federal and state government coffers through taxes, levies and material support and services, including CSR. Whatever may be said of its services and charges, the company controls 40 per cent of the market with a subscriber base of 14 million in a population of over 140 million.

Other complaints have been raised against South African business enterprises in Nigeria. First, that their procurement policies foreclose upstream and downstream linkages in the Nigerian economy. Second, that they have created few jobs: MTN, in particular, has created just 500 permanent jobs, in spite of the scale of its operations and the magnitude of its profits. Third, that most of their firms deny their Nigerian employees the right to unionisation but rather promote casualisation of workers. Fourth, that they engage in ‘blatant profiteering and looting in Nigeria’, as exemplified by MTN tariffs, which rank among the highest in the world. Fifth, that they employ high-handed tactics in debt recovery or handling of protests at their facilities. It is not unlikely that such resentments further aggravated the protest against the xenophobic attacks on foreigners from sub-Saharan Africa, including Nigerians, in South Africa in May 2008.

Conclusion

This essay has mapped the march of South African capital across various sectors of the Nigerian economy especially since the transition to Nigeria’s Fourth Republic in 1999. The intervening years have witnessed unprecedented growth of South African investment in Nigeria. The analysis of the business practices of South African enterprises in Nigeria – and local responses to them – has shown, on the one hand, the immense possibilities of state-national capital strategic partnership and visioning, aptly exemplified by South Africa, and, on the other, the implications for countries, such as Nigeria, which have failed to realise such potential. To be fair, the South African business engagement with Nigeria is not wholly one-sided nor have all its Nigerian ventures been uniformly successful. As an instance of the latter, the initially promising alliance between South African Airways and Virgin Nigeria broke down irrevocably apparently because of the lack of sufficient reciprocity on the part of the South Africans.

Moreover, the political undertones of this business relationship – with alleged involvement of the personal interests of leaders of the ruling parties in both countries – negate the fine rhetoric of a new paradigm of development on the NEPAD platform. This is aptly illustrated by the printing in South Africa of Nigeria’s ballot papers during the sham elections of 2007 and the indecent haste with which Mbeki endorsed what local and international election monitors – and subsequent court rulings – overwhelmingly condemned as the worst and least credible elections in Nigerian history. It can be argued, therefore, that Mbeki was primarily interested in promoting the economic interest of the South African state and its private sector, with Nigeria as a junior partner or surrogate.

The fundamental lesson for other African states, therefore, is the need for domestic restructuring to ensure that state-private sector alliance on the South African model can promote national economic interests in the context of NEPAD. This is epitomised by the pivotal role of the state-controlled Industrial Development Corporation in funding some of the mega projects executed abroad by South African firms. Other African states should adopt this model to make them regionally or continentally competitive. The success of the South Africans follows the historical trajectory of the Asian Tigers, harking back to Meiji Japan.

The key issue arising from the foregoing discussion is the challenge of harmonising the rhetoric
of NEPAD and African Renaissance on the one hand, with the palpable fear of a South African global south neo-imperialism on the other hand. The discussion indicates that this tension is likely to culminate, as in Zambia, in resurgent economic-nationalist awakening in the form of a homegrown South Africa-type business expansion. Both Nigeria and Angola, otherwise endowed regional powers, have the potential for expansion into proximate countries as South Africa has done. However, basic political instability, the venality of the ruling elite, physical infrastructure deficit, and weak institutional structures make such a prospect most unlikely in the short run, short of a revolutionary rebirth in those countries. For now, the advance of South African capital – Afrikaner, English, Indian and African – will continue apace. However, South Africa’s potential hegemony in Africa must contend with the aggressive expansion of Chinese capital and political influence into Africa. It remains to be seen, however, whether ‘China offers an attractive alternative’.43


4 Miller et al, ‘South African Corporations’.


8 Adetajo, Prophets of Africa’s Renaissance.

9 Hattingh, ‘South Africa’s Role in Nigeria and the Nigerian Elections’.

10 Ibid.


13 Ibid.


15 Hattingh, ‘South Africa’s Role in Nigeria and the Nigerian Elections’.

16 Ibid.


21 SAinfo reporter, ‘G5 to build Nigerian power plant’, 11 December 2007,

22 Uffot, “An Investment Haven for South Africa.”
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.

26 Hattingh, ‘South Africa's Role in Nigeria and the Nigerian Elections’.
27 Uffot, ‘An Investment Haven for South Africa’.
28 Ibid, for the details in this paragraph.
29 Lawal, ‘South Africa goes shopping’.

31 Uffot, ‘An Investment Haven for South Africa’.
32 Ibid.

35 Lawal, ‘South Africa Goes Shopping’.
36 Ibid.
37 O. Iwuagwu, former Special Assistant to Nigeria’s Minister of Commerce and Industry, personal communication, 2011.
38 Uffot, ‘An Investment Haven for South Africa’.
39 Ibid.
40 Hattingh, ‘South Africa’s Role in Nigeria and the Nigerian Elections’.
42 Hattingh, ‘South Africa’s Role in Nigeria and the Nigerian Elections’.
43 Martin, ‘South Africa’s Subimperial Futures’, p.131.
CODESRIA and SEPHIS launched the first edition of the African-Arab Advanced Institute in Rabat, Morocco, between 19 and 30 September 2011. This annual advanced institute on African-Arab relations will be held alternatively in North Africa and in Sub-Saharan Africa. The institute is conceived as a high-level knowledge-building, agenda-setting, and networking forum for scholars in the prime of their careers, who are desirous of experimenting with new fields of knowledge and exploring new conceptual terrains.

The inaugural session of the institute used the changing political economy of Afro-Arab relations as a point of departure. Ten fellows drawn from across Africa and the Arab world, from the African and Arab Diaspora, and from different disciplinary backgrounds, were invited to participate in the session convened and led by Prof. Shamil Jeppie. Prof. Jeppie was requested by CODESRIA and SEPHIS to offer intellectual leadership and coordinate the output of the fellows into a joint SEPHIS-CODESRIA publication.

The purpose of this extended workshop was to focus on the historical and contemporary dimensions of the relations between people conventionally called ‘Arab’ and ‘African’. These terms are generally used vaguely, without much specific content. They have assumed qualities that place them at antagonistic and opposite ends. The most recent example is the conflict in the Dar Fur region of Sudan, which

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was cast in the international media and by western think-tanks as an African versus Arab conflict. The workshop was hosted to explore the great variety of forms that this relationship takes. Discussions opened with a panel devoted to the polemics employed in popular and academic debates about such a relationship.

In terms of geographical extent, the workshop examined relations in North Africa and the Sahara, East Africa, especially coastal East Africa, and the Nile valley. Focussing on these areas, the participants discussed both the historical terms and the more current dynamics of the relationship between the two communities. In order to understand the development of the relationship it was necessary to devote some time to the late antique and medieval dynamics of exchanges between peoples in Africa and Southwest Asia, where the Arabic language developed and became a major marker of Arab identity. This period also witnessed the rise of Islam and its spread in Asia and Africa. Therefore, extended discussions were held on the origins of the relations, the languages of contact, and the nature of religious diversity and competition in these regions.

Another set of discussions centered on the rise of nationalism and the ideologies of pan-Arabism and pan-Africanism. Finally, a concluding set of discussions took up the political economy of Afro-Arab relations, and the origins and impact of the ‘Arab Spring’. These sessions were solidly based in the twentieth-century and examined present-day implications. The enthusiasm that these sessions generated is to be explained by their relevance across the continent and the Middle East. There are still many areas that have not been closely studied; there is little thought given to prospective ways of developing strong economic and political relations across the divides.

One of the achievements of the event was the persistent questioning of the categories with which we think about Africa and the Middle East. For instance, two-thirds of Arabs live in Africa, yet there is often a perception, held even by Arabs themselves, that they are exterior to the continent. Possibly a more productive way of thinking about the question is to frame it in terms of ‘Africa and its regions’, in which, for instance, a focus on North Africa and the continent will have special questions, including ‘Afro-Arab’ ones. We could think of the kind of issues and questions a workshop on West Africa and the continent or on Southern Africa and the continent would throw up.
Traditional Medicine and Women Healers in Trinidad: Postnatal Health Care

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With the increasing number of maternal- and infant deaths being reported in hospitals, it is important to give some serious thought to the role of traditional healthcare for pregnant women. Our ancestors from Africa and India cultivated these folk traditions during slavery and Indentureship and continued to practice these traditions in their everyday lives. Most women at the time would have given birth to almost a dozen children in the comfort of their home without the assistance of a registered nurse or midwife.

Kumar Mahabir’s latest publication – Traditional Medicine & Women Healers in Trinidad: Postnatal Health Care – discusses the relationship between traditional healers and modern healthcare practitioners in Trinidad and Tobago. The information presented in this book was collected from almost two decades of library studies, oral interviews, and extensive research on the health system reform in the mid-1990s, with special focus on patients admitted to the Mt Hope Women’s Hospital.

The book is the first to be published in the English-speaking Caribbean world on this subject, and focuses on the postpartum period in which traditional techniques are used to care for the new mothers and their newborn babies. It highlights the activities of traditional masseuses, their training, and other techniques that were
passed down from one generation to the next. These masseuses share not only their techniques and personal experiences, but also a major part of their domestic and family lives.

The wealth of information contained in this book makes for interesting reading and is educational in its own right. It documents the traditional day- to-day rituals of the new mother and her newborn under the care and supervision of elders. Mahabir is thorough in presenting the vast information that he has collected for his book, and covers a wide range of topics. These include treating female infertility, inducing the flow of breast milk, ‘setting’ the mother’s womb back into place and ensuring she eats the right kind of food, treating jaundice in the newborn, and massaging the infant to ensure that his/her head is ‘shaped’ and his limbs ‘stretched’ and ‘exercised’ in a manner prescribed by yoga. The reader can also learn about the traditional chatti ceremony which is described as ‘The sixth-day… celebratory, social announcement of the safe return of the new mother and her newborn from the perils of childbirth…’

*Traditional Medicine & Women Healers in Trinidad* raises a lot of questions. For example, why are traditional medicines and healthcare – though easily available and cost-effective – not widely accepted as alternative forms of treatment and prevention, and often dismissed as ‘primitive’? It questions whether there is any real difference between the folk masseur or bonesetter, neither of who have any formal training, and the certified chiropractor operating in his clinic with expensive equipment. Mahabir argues, ‘biomedicine, rather than traditional medicine, is supported by a male-dominated, social elite for political and economic intentions’. He points out that men and women healers’ prescription of lime and honey for sore throats is now being patented, packaged and sold by international drug companies. Similarly, there are many other products that bear similarities to traditional home remedies.

What is of particular interest in this book is the key role that women played in a male-dominated society, especially at a time when there were no apologies made for expecting women to be subservient to men. As the book reveals, some of the women performed these activities without their husbands’ knowledge or permission because they wanted to serve their community.

Mahabir is successful in documenting the humble traditions and culture of our ancestors, and has done a great service to both present and future generations by making this information available in the public domain. It would have been a tremendous loss had this information been left to die a natural death. By publishing this book, he has paid tribute to many remarkable men and women who dedicated their entire lives to caring for others, that too at a time when public healthcare was not a viable option. Anyone who reads *Traditional Medicine & Women Healers in Trinidad*, and has never considered folk remedies before, is guaranteed to give it a second thought.